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ABSTRACT 
 
Cross-national studies seeking to explain the variation in rates of homicide have 
examined a multitude of factors including religion, but fewer studies have examined how 
religion may influence homicide through a society’s institutional structure. Social 
institutions include entities such as the economy, the family, the political structure, and 
educational system; and these institutions serve as guides for human action and behavior. 
Through its emphasis on values, religion may influence the interests and legitimize the 
functioning within societal institutions.  In the present study, I examine how the major 
world religions of Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism may be associated with homicide through various cultural and 
institutional mechanisms. These mechanisms include individualism, secularization, 
religious pluralism, economic dominance, and social welfare.  Higher levels of 
individualism may contribute to higher rates of homicide by reducing societal bonds and 
spurring secularization which results in the attenuated ability of religion to promote pro-
social behavior. Higher rates of homicide may also occur as the competing value 
structures associated with religious pluralism legitimize a differentiated institutional 
structure whereby economic conditions dominate and weaken the socialization capacities 
of non-economic institutions.  Non-economic institutions may be strengthened through an 
increase in social welfare which may also curb the deleterious effects of the 
individualism emanating from religion.  While all of the major world religions are 
assessed in terms of their relationship with these mechanisms, particular attention is 
given to Protestantism due to its individualistic focus and pluralistic religious landscape.  
A measure of atheism is included in the present study along with a global measure of 
religious pluralism to assess whether it is the major world religions or some other entity 
related to religion that may be linked to homicide.  Results from this study suggest that 
neither the major world religions nor atheism or religious pluralism is significantly 
associated with cross-national rates of homicide directly or through any of the proposed 
mechanisms.  These findings suggest that future studies attempting to explain the 
variation in cross-national homicide rates should consider alternative institutional 
mechanisms as well as the growth of secularization across societies.
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CHAPTER 1. CRIME, RELIGION, AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 Researchers have highlighted numerous factors which may explain the differences 
in rates of homicide cross-nationally.  Nivette (2011) suggests that some of the leading 
explanations for the variation in cross-national rates of homicide include a country’s 
distribution of wealth, its level of ethnic diversity, human development, and whether a 
nation is Latin in origin.  Lower homicide rates tend to be found in countries having more 
economic growth, stronger democracies, and higher income levels (LaFree, 2005; 
Neumayer, 2003), while increases in homicide have been linked to higher levels of 
income inequality (Jacobs & Richardson, 2008; Lee & Bankston, 1999; Messner, 1980). 
Economic discrimination as an ascribed form of inequality has also been linked to higher 
rates of homicide at the national level (Karstedt, 2003; Messner, 1989).  Economic 
discrimination refers to the denial of economic resources based on an individual’s racial, 
ethnic, or religious characteristics (Messner, 1989).  Aside from inequality, variation in 
cross-national rates of homicide has been attributed to poverty measured through infant 
mortality rates (Messner, Raffalovich, & Sutton, 2010; Pridemore, 2008; 2011). 
 One factor that may inhibit homicide within a nation is social welfare.  Messner 
(2003) notes that several studies have found a link between social welfare policies and 
lower homicide rates at the cross-national level.  In particular, social support measured 
through governmental expenditures on health and education has been shown to be 
associated with a reduction in homicide (Pratt & Godsey, 2002; 2003).  Several studies 
have also found that the positive relationship between income inequality and homicide is 
weakened in countries with stronger social welfare policies (Messner, Raffalovich, & 
Shrock, 2002; Pratt & Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000).  These studies examining the 
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role of social welfare also highlight the potential impact of a nation’s political structure 
on its homicide rate.  Nations with higher levels of political legitimacy in terms of their 
level of legality, justification of their values, and consent of their constituents have 
displayed lower homicide levels (Nivette & Eisner, 2013). Research has also shown that 
the exercise of coercive control from a nation’s political structure in the form of high 
levels of imprisonment may also lead to lower rates of homicide (Nadanovsky & Cunha-
Cruz, 2009).  Other potential correlates of homicide include alcohol (Rossow, 2001) and 
corn consumption (Mawson & Jacobs, 1978), which reduces an individual’s serotonin 
levels and may lead to higher levels of aggressive behavior. 
 Attempts to explain the variation in rates of homicide cross-nationally have also 
focused on the composition of a society’s inhabitants.  Social and cultural heterogeneity 
across societies have been assessed linguistically, ethnically, racially, and religiously.  
Research shows that ethnic heterogeneity is associated with higher rates of homicide 
(Altheimer, 2008) while linguistic heterogeneity tends to reduce homicide levels 
(Hansmann, 1982). Studies also show that religious heterogeneity does not display a 
significant association with homicide at the national level (Chon, 2012; Cole & Gramajo, 
2009).  Even though there is not much support for religious heterogeneity as a predictor 
of cross-national rates of homicide, other measures of religion have been shown to be 
associated with homicide at the national level.  In a study of forty-three nations Jensen 
(2006) finds that measures of religious benevolence are associated with lower homicide 
rates, while measures of religious malevolence are associated with an increase in rates of 
homicide.  Religious benevolence is measured through membership and participation in 
religious organizations, while religious malevolence is assessed through intense religious 
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beliefs and viewing individuals as either good or evil (Jensen & Akers, 2003; Jensen, 
2006).   
Studies have also looked at the impact of specific religions on rates of homicide at 
the national level.  In a study that looks at homicide in developing nations, Neapolitan 
(1997) finds that the proportion Christian displays a positive association with homicide 
while the proportion Muslim exhibits a negative relationship with homicide.  Lester 
(1996) also highlights the low homicide levels in predominantly Muslim countries.  
Although Christianity is positively linked to higher homicide rates in developing nations 
(Neapolitan, 1997), Messner (1982) does not find any association between Protestantism 
and homicide at the multivariate level in his cross-national study.  Besides Islam, 
Antonaccio and Tittle (2007) find that the interaction between eastern religions and their 
composite measure of capitalism is associated with a decline in homicide rates cross-
nationally. Their measure of capitalism is comprised of social security taxes as a percent 
of revenue, the GINI index, union density, and private health expenditures as a percent of 
total health spending (Antonaccio & Tittle, 2007).  
While several studies at the cross-national level have examined the direct link 
between various religions and homicide, there have been fewer studies that have 
incorporated the role of social institutions into this potential relationship.  In the present 
study I look to expand upon previous cross-national research by examining how the 
major world religions may impact homicide levels through their relationship with the 
functioning of a society’s institutional structure.  This study incorporates the family and 
political institutions into the potential association between the major world religions and 
homicide. I give particular attention to the relationship between Protestantism, social 
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institutions, and homicide. Yet, I also incorporate the other major world religions to 
assess whether the potential connections stemming from Protestantism are distinct to it or 
may be generalized to religion more broadly.  Aside from Protestantism, I also examine 
Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism.  
These seven religions represent the major world religions since each one of them can 
claim at least 75% of a nation’s residents as adherents (Lewer & Van den Berg, 2007).  
Before outlining the order for the rest of the paper, it is necessary to discuss the concept 
of social institutions and their potential linkages with religion. 
Social institutions are defined as the regulatory norms which guide individual 
behavior and action (North, 1990; Parsons, 1990).  In order for social institutions to 
effectively guide individual behavior, social norms must be supported by moral 
legitimacy (Wuthnow et al., 1984; Bellah et al., 1991; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2004).  This 
moral legitimacy that reinforces institutional norms stems from the ultimate common 
values which are found within a society’s cultural sphere (Bellah et al., 1991).  Religion 
may be linked to social institutions due to its close association with morality (Durkheim, 
1915; Parsons, 1951; Bellah, 1973) and its representation of ultimate common values 
(Vernon, 1962; Yinger, 1970).  However, when religion does not display a close link with 
morality and does not promote collective or common values, a society’s institutional 
structure cannot function properly and may contribute to higher rates of homicide.  In the 
present study the major world religions vary in terms of their ability to promote collective 
values and furnish social institutions with the morality necessary to guide their normative 
functioning.  While most of the major world religions emphasize collective sentiments, 
others such as Protestantism may foster a highly secularized (Parsons, 1964a) and 
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fragmented social environment through its individualistic focus.  When religion is not 
able to imbue institutional norms with a certain measure of morality, higher rates of 
homicide will occur as the dominance of the economy weakens the normative functioning 
of the other non-economic institutions (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).   
 The order for the rest of the paper is as follows. In chapter 2 I discuss how 
individualism fosters a highly secularized social environment which promotes a 
pluralistic religious landscape. This type of religious landscape becomes reflected in 
institutional differentiation whereby a free market economy dominates the institutional 
structure.  Chapter 2 also highlights the duality of individualism as both a crime 
facilitating and crime inhibiting mechanism.  In line with this idea, chapter 2 also 
examines the long-term decline in homicide since the Middle Ages, and how the 
individualism promoted by Protestantism may have contributed to this decline.  There is 
also a discussion in chapter 2 of the role of social welfare in reducing homicide rates 
given religion’s ability to facilitate the dominance of a free market over a society’s 
institutional structure.  Each of the other major world religions is assessed in terms of 
their potential association with the concepts of individualism, secularization, religious 
pluralism, economic dominance, and social welfare.  Chapter 3 discusses the data and 
methods used in the study.  Within chapter 3 I also include a discussion of how structural 
equation models are specified and selected for the present study.  In chapter 4 I discuss 
the results of the study and how each of the major religions is not associated with 
homicide directly or through the proposed mechanisms.  Chapter 5 concludes the study 
and discusses the findings, the role of religion in society, and implications for future 
cross-national studies of homicide.
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CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN SOCIAL LIFE 
 
 In this section I examine the potential mechanisms that may impact the 
relationship between the major world religions and rates of homicide cross-nationally.  
These mechanisms include individualism, secularization, religious pluralism, economic 
dominance, and social welfare.  Each of the major world religions varies in terms of the 
manner and the degree to which they may be associated with these proposed mechanisms. 
It is clear that these religions historically have undergone transformations due to varying 
societal responses to them, but the link between these religions and the proposed 
mechanisms is based on their doctrinal foundations.  A focus on the doctrinal foundations 
of the major world religions may not seem particularly relevant in a study examining 
contemporary homicide rates. Yet, it is these core principles of the major world religions 
which shape the mechanisms that are hypothesized to link these religions with homicide.  
For example, Protestantism which was founded through its detachment from the Catholic 
Church has cultivated an individualistic environment free from any ecclesiastical 
authority.  Thus, without an understanding of the foundations of the major world 
religions it becomes difficult to discern the type of relationships they will have with the 
mechanisms hypothesized to facilitate or inhibit contemporary rates of homicide.   
Social welfare may interact with Protestantism to influence lower rates of 
homicide cross-nationally, while the other concepts may facilitate the association 
between Protestantism and higher homicide levels.  With varying levels of association 
between the other major world religions and these mechanisms, it is possible that the 
other world religions may facilitate, inhibit, or not influence homicide at all.  
Protestantism, unlike the other major world religions, has as its historical base the 
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concept of separation which necessitates the need for social welfare to offset its potential 
crime facilitating divisiveness.  To begin this examination of the relationship between 
religion and homicide, I first look at the concept of individualism which served as the 
impetus for the formation of Protestantism. 
AN INDIVIDUALISTIC OUTLOOK 
 At first glance it would appear that societies with higher levels of individualism 
would have higher crime levels due to the promotion of self-interest and the disregard for 
the idea of society as a collective.  However, Durkheim (1900) would suggest the 
opposite that individualism should be associated with lower crime levels, particularly 
violent crime. It is moral individualism according to Durkheim (1900) which leads to 
lower rates of homicide within and across societies.  Moral or cooperative individualism 
is based on obligation, respect, and sympathy with an emphasis on solidarity and sacrifice 
for the betterment of others (Messner, 1982; Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008; 
Thome, 2007).   This type of individualism described by Durkheim (1900) lacked any 
semblance of egoism, selfishness or utilitarian motive (Chriss, 1993).  Under moral 
individualism greater worth is attributed to the individual (Durkheim, 1973), and in turn 
homicide becomes less common with this increased value associated with each human 
being (Durkheim, 1900). There has been mixed support regarding the relationship 
between moral individualism and lower homicide rates.  Messner (1982) using 
Protestantism as a measure of moral individualism does not find it to be significantly 
associated with homicide, while Huang (1995) conceptualizing moral individualism as 
personal dignity and individual rights finds it to be associated with lower homicide rates.     
Moral individualism has been identified as a leading explanation for the long-term 
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decline in homicide since the Middle Ages (Eisner, 2003a).  In Europe this decline since  
the Middle Ages has occurred over an 800 year period (Eisner, 2001; 2003a; Gurr, 1989).  
In Western Europe homicide rates declined from around 1500 to the middle of the 20th 
century (Eisner, 2003a).  Homicide rates in the late Middle Ages were between 20 and 40 
per 100,000, and in the mid 20th century these rates were between 0.5 and 1 (Eisner, 
2001).  Protestantism may be linked to this decline due to its emphasis on duty, 
methodical conduct, and an inner-directedness which promotes an ethic of self-discipline 
(Eisner, 2003a). Higher levels of social discipline and self-control stemming from 
Protestantism were fostered beginning in Europe from the middle of the 16th century (van 
Dülmen, 1993; 1996; Weber, 1920).  It may be that homicide rates in Europe began to 
decline in the 16th and 17th centuries as the discipline from Protestantism worked in 
tandem with the emphasis on justice from the state and the supervision of community 
residents (Spierenburg, 2004).  Roth (2009) discusses how the solidarity cultivated by 
Protestantism has combined with an increase in trust in the government to lead to a 
decline in homicide in Western Europe and the U.S over the past 400 years.  
 Between the 17th and 19th centuries homicide declined in Europe in predominantly 
Protestant and Catholic countries (Muchembled, 2008).  Muchembled (2008) explains 
that the Protestant ethic focusing on duty and methodical conduct is similar to the 
Catholic emphasis on individual guilt and collective honor.  Rather than solely attributing 
the homicide decline in Europe to the growth of Protestantism, Muchembled (2008) 
suggests that it was the combination of religious, cultural, and political factors which 
weakened the focus on defending one’s honor. Both Protestants and Catholics in Europe 
made efforts to supervise and instill a sense of civility in young men who were 
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particularly susceptible to engaging in violent behavior (Muchembled, 2008).    Moral 
individualism stemming from Protestantism placed greater value on human life in Europe 
during the long-term decline in homicide, but this value on human life also became a 
hallmark of Catholic countries (Muchembled, 2008).  
 From 1960 through the early 1990s there has been a rise in the rates of homicide 
in Europe and the U.S. (Eisner, 2001; 2003b; Spierenburg; 2012).  Eisner (2008) 
estimates that homicide rates increased somewhere between 100 and 150% from 1960 
through the early 1990s in Europe.  Factors that may have contributed to the rise in 
homicide in Europe and the U.S. beginning in the mid 20th century include the 
preponderance of market and consumer individualism, lower levels of self-control, and a 
lack of informal social control (Thome, 2001).  Fukuyama (1999) notes that in the U.S. 
and Europe since the mid 20th century there has been more disruption within the family 
due to a higher proportion of single parent births, divorces, and fewer cohabitating 
parents.  With higher levels of family disruption, violence may become a more likely 
outcome as children experience weakened socialization as they approach adolescence and 
young adulthood.  Homicide rates have declined or stabilized in Europe and the U.S. 
since the mid 90’s (Fukuyama, 1999; Spierenburg, 2012), but the increase in homicide in 
the 20th century took place as levels of individualism were also on the rise (Eisner, 2008; 
Fukuyama, 1999). 
 Morality becomes difficult to implement in environments characterized by a high 
degree of individualism due to the emphasis on individual choice (Wuthnow et al., 1984).  
With individuals having more freedom and options, self-interest begins to increase 
(Wuthnow, 1991) and a sense of interdependency is lost (DeTocqueville, 1835; 
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Durkheim, 1969; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).  Morality requires that individuals 
become attached to something other than themselves (Durkheim, 1973); otherwise 
morality will be replaced by egoism within society (Lukes, 1973).  Egoism or more 
specifically egoistic individualism serves as the antithesis of moral individualism since it 
fosters self-interest without a concern for others (Giddens, 1971).  Durkheim (1973) was 
concerned about the spread of egoistic or excessive individualism (Messner, Thome, & 
Rosenfeld, 2008); because he knew it would attenuate social connections and lead to the 
fragmentation of society (Durkheim, 1893).   This lack of societal cohesion led Durkheim 
(1893) to suggest that the presence of religion is not easily found in environments 
characterized by excessive levels of individualism. When religion is absent from society 
it is replaced by egoistic individualism (Weber, 1958), and the preponderance of this type 
of individualism often times leads to higher levels of crime and violence (Kornhauser, 
1978; Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008).        
 Protestantism has promoted individualism since the Reformation in the 16th 
century.  When Martin Luther separated from the Catholic Church and its sacraments, 
Protestants were granted a certain measure of freedom and autonomy in their faith 
(Parsons, 1964a; Bellah, 1973).  One manner in which this individualized focus became 
evident was through the increased attention directed toward the written word.  No longer 
did individuals require the mediations of the Church and its sacraments to gain God’s 
salvation, but rather they could attain salvation through their own efforts interpreting 
scripture (Yinger, 1970; Peck, 1993). While this individualistic focus within 
Protestantism has granted individuals more control over their relationship with God, it 
has also impeded the promotion of moral behavior (Pickering, 1984).  Protestantism is 
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not able to promote morality due to the manner in which it has cultivated individualism.  
By reducing the social role of the Church as an entity that brings human beings together 
and shifting the focus toward the individual, Protestantism has made itself susceptible to 
the propagation of egoistic or excessive individualism.  Religion has the capacity to aid 
the development of moral individualism, but Durkheim (1915) acknowledges the 
limitations imposed against religion without a strong church presence.    
 Despite the fact that Catholicism promotes collective behavior through the 
enactment of group rituals in the form of the sacraments (Greeley, 1989; Vernon, 1962), 
it still values individualism.  Novak (1993) explains that from 1891 to 1991 Papal social  
thought focused on themes such as personal responsibility, creative subjectivity, and the 
dignity of the person.  However, Catholicism for the most part has displayed its 
opposition toward excessive individualism.  Catholic social teaching in the late 19th 
century opposed liberal individualism and through the Subsidiary principle hoped to 
bridge the divide between the individual and the state by promoting intermediary familial 
and associational communities (Nanini, 2011).  Through the Church, Catholics view 
themselves as a community of believers united under the idea of a parish (Fichter, 1957).   
The Catholic Church itself serves as an intermediary between the individual and God 
(Vernon, 1962; Woodhead, 2009), whereby religious beliefs and practices intended to 
honor God may be enacted in communion with others.  It is these connections associated 
with religious symbols, communal worship, and the idea of a collective religious identity 
(Cohen et al., 2005) that permit Catholicism to stave off the egoistic tendencies that are 
often associated with a high degree of individualism.  
 Through its communitarian focus Orthodox Christianity does not contribute to the 
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growth of excessive individualism (Makrides, 2005).  Tradition is a central component of 
Orthodox Christianity, and this tradition is based on the Church which serves as a 
unifying body (Agadjanian & Rousselet, 2005).  In fact, this emphasis on tradition which 
is tied to the Church has caused the Orthodox Church in Russia to view excessive 
individualism and freedom as indicating the absence of real religion (Agadjanian & 
Rousselet, 2005).  Like the Russian Orthodox Church, the Orthodox Church in Romania 
values the idea of community and cannot support the proliferation of individualism and 
freedom within religion (Flora & Szilagyi, 2005) that may result in higher levels of 
egoism.  
Individualism within Judaism may be traced back to the Old Testament (Berger, 
1967; Sombart, 1913).  While individualism does exist within Judaism, it is shaped and 
guided by the community and an emphasis on tradition (Goodman, 1996; Williams, 
2015).  In Rabbinic Judaism both independence and interdependence are stressed, and 
collectivism and individualism are fundamentally linked with one another (Sampson, 
2000).  Judaism does not permit unrestrained or egoistic individualism but rather a type 
of moral individualism predicated upon a consideration of others.  Concepts of collective 
liability and brotherhood for the Jewish people (Sklare, 1957; Weber, 1952; Williams, 
2015) shape their communal quest for salvation (Troeltsch, 1969; Weber, 1915).  Due to 
their social and political exile and persecution, the Jewish people have attempted to 
maintain a sense of collective solidarity as a way to affirm their covenant with God as his 
chosen people (Abraham, 1988; Morris, 1996). 
 Individualism is present within Islam, but its growth is stymied by an adherence 
to tradition (Little, Sachedina, & Kelsay, 1996).  Choice and religious liberty in terms of 
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how individuals interpret and understand traditional Islamic teaching (Little, Sachedina, 
& Kelsay, 1996) capture the extent to which individualism manifests itself within Islam.  
For the most part a sense of community takes precedence over any excessive emphasis on 
individualism within Islam.  In fact, it is suggested that the low rates of homicide in 
Islamic nations are due to the Islamic focus on community and informal social controls 
(Neapolitan, 1997; Neumayer, 2003).  Rights within Islam are not bestowed upon 
individuals but rather the community of believers (Badie, 1986; Maila, 1991), and Islam 
encourages individuals to work hard so that the community may reap the benefits of their  
toil (Ali & Al-Owaihan, 2008).  Even the Islamic prophet, Muhammad, laid forth a  
certain mandate when he stated that the Islamic people needed to be unified in all aspects 
of life including politics, education, economics, and even at the cultural level (Rodinson, 
1966). 
 Like Protestantism, Hinduism promotes individualism by removing many of the 
mediations that may link the individual with God in their quest for salvation (Gupta et al., 
2002; Sinha, 1998; Weber, 1958).  Yet, Hinduism does not permit the growth of egoistic 
or excessive individualism since it still places substantial emphasis on collectivism and 
group behavior (Stark, 2005; Weber, 1958).  Within Hinduism individual rights and the 
idea of personality are not given high priority (Bennion, 1992).  Rather, Hinduism is 
based on social connections, and it is these connections which provide adherents of 
Hinduism with their religious identity (Cohen & Hill, 2007). 
 Individualism is evident within Buddhism as the pursuit of meaning and purpose 
in life becomes an individualistic endeavor (Cantwell & Kawanami, 2009; Whelan, 
2008).  Despite the autonomy that Buddhism grants to its adherents, at its core Buddhism 
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is concerned with the idea of community.  Individual freedoms and liberties that are a 
part of Buddhism can only be truly realized when they are accompanied by a sense of 
social responsibility (Thurman, 1996).  This consideration of others in one’s life pursuits 
makes the individualism within Buddhism have more of a moralistic rather than egoistic 
character.  Individuals are only able to attain true freedom, peace, and happiness within 
Buddhism when they contribute to the development of society through their own self-
renunciation (Bennion, 1992).                
 In this section individualism has been examined as facilitating (Kornhauser,  
1978) and inhibiting (Durkheim, 1900) criminal behavior.  In contrast to moral  
individualism, egoistic or excessive individualism will reduce the level of solidarity 
within societies since it is based on the pursuit of self-interest (Messner, Thome, & 
Rosenfeld, 2008).  With fewer societal bonds higher rates of crime and violence will 
occur in environments marked by egoistic individualism (Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 
2008).  Lower levels of societal cohesion stemming from egoistic individualism also 
provide evidence of the attenuated social influence of religion.  This weakened influence 
of religion over society may be attributed to the process of secularization, which 
Protestantism has unintentionally facilitated by shifting its focus from the collective to 
the individual (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1986; Berger, 1967; Tawney, 1926).   
A SECULARIZED SOCIETY 
 Protestantism has aided the secularization process by removing many of the 
religious mediations such as the Church that link the individual with God (Berger, 1967).  
These mediations are intended to make individuals consider matters outside of their own 
wants and desires.  Secularization is defined as the weakened influence of religion at the 
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cultural and institutional levels of a society (Berger, 1967).  Protestant emphasis on 
excessive individualism has incited the secularization process since the influence of 
religion is contingent on its ability to promote collective behavior.  In secularized 
environments religion is not absent, but rather religion no longer has the ability to 
legitimize the manner in which societies function (Wuthnow et al., 1984).  In effect, the  
secularization process has not only weakened the role of religion as a formative force  
within society but has relegated it to the private lives of individuals (Berger, 1967).  
Higher levels of crime and violence will occur in secularized environments as the  
plausibility of religious values is attenuated, and these religious values cannot spur the 
morality necessary to reinforce institutional norms (Glock, 1969).   
 Catholicism has been able to halt the secularization process.  In particular, 
Catholicism has made a concerted effort to maintain a role in public life.  Two 
manifestations of the secularization process include the separation of Church and state 
and the removal of ecclesiastical authorities from the educational institution.  In the field 
of education within the U.S., Catholics have advocated for parochial elementary schools 
within all parishes (Herberg, 1955; Williams, 2015).  Also, Catholicism has traditionally 
opposed the separation of Church and state.  Perhaps the strongest evidence of 
Catholicism’s ability to stave off the secularization process stems from its sacraments.  
These sacraments serve as rituals that permit individuals to display their faith through 
collective behavior (Parsons, 1964a).  Sacraments are enacted within the Church which 
serves as a unified body.  These sacraments reduce the chance of secularization by 
reinforcing the mission of religion to connect individuals through the operation of 
religious values at the group level.          
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 Orthodox Christianity has been more receptive to the secularization process than 
Roman Catholicism (Woodhead, 2009).  Woodhead (2009) explains that Roman 
Catholicism opposes the separation of Church and state by granting the Church power 
over the state.  Orthodox Christianity, on the other hand, sees the Church and state 
blended together with the final authority belonging to the state. However, the Orthodox 
Church in Greece through its ties to the state has actually attempted to halt the 
secularization process (Kokosalakis, 1996).  Ultimately, Dobrijevic (2006) explains that 
through their affiliation with the state the eastern Orthodox communities have been able 
to stave off secularization by focusing on spiritual and mystical values.  This promotion 
of otherworldly values has permitted the Orthodox Church to maintain its public 
influence. 
 An emphasis on freedom within Judaism has made it less resistant to the 
secularization process.  This support of freedom has impelled adherents of Judaism to 
encourage the separation of Church and state in the United States (Herberg, 1955).  
Judaism may also facilitate the secularization process through its lack of spirituality and 
connection to the gospel of progress (Whelan, 2008). Also, a rationalistic approach to life 
under Judaism may weaken its ability as a religion to cultivate any supernatural or 
otherworldly considerations at the cultural or institutional levels.  Yet, the historical 
foundations of Judaism have caused it to be more of an inhibitor rather than a facilitator 
of the secularization process.  In particular the foundation of the state of Israel is based on 
a religious ideology unlike other nation states that are born out of secularized ideologies 
(Swatos, 1996).  Also, through their exile from Israel, adherents of Judaism have focused 
on the collective due to their alienation from the political community (Parsons, 1964a).  
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This emphasis on solidarity within Judaism has aided its preservation and development as 
a world religion.  
 Even with its rationalistic tendencies, Islam does not incite the secularization 
process.  For example, Islam does not view the separation of religion and state as feasible 
for normative functioning (Selengut, 2009). In Muslim countries there is a fusion 
between Islam and politics, which inhibits secularization at the institutional level.  This 
bond between Islam and politics also hinders the privatization of religion at the cultural 
level which often times occurs in countries with liberal democracies (Lewis, 1988; Tibi, 
1990).  As a response to the secularization of the West, fundamentalist movements have 
arisen in both Islam and Hinduism (Madan, 1997). Hinduism has also been able to stave 
off secularization through its emphasis on spiritual rather than rationalistic values (Smith, 
1963).  Also, in countries like India high levels of devotion to Hinduism make it less 
likely to lose its influence in the public sphere of that country (Van der Veer, 2001; Van 
der Veer & Lehmann, 1999).  
 Buddhism’s susceptibility to the secularization process is particularly evident in 
the West. There Buddhism emphasizes more worldly ethics and rationalism which 
weakens the public role of religion but is done primarily to attract more western 
adherents (Obadia, 2011).  However, Buddhism in its true form does not facilitate the 
secularization process.  Buddhism through its emphasis on contemplation and meditation 
does not permit the material conditions of a secularized society to dominate the minds of 
individuals (Cantwell & Kawanami, 2009; Parboteeah, 2009).  In fact, Buddhism also 
impedes the development of secularization through its promotion of the idea of self-
renunciation (Weber, 1958).  For the Buddhist true happiness can only be achieved when 
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one’s self is de-emphasized and a sense of society is cultivated, which is line with the 
purpose of religion more broadly.   
 When secularization takes place religion can no longer provide individuals with a 
sense of meaning or cultivate a feeling of interdependency within society (Fenn, 2009).  
In highly secularized societies freedom becomes a prominent theme and the idea of 
choice becomes emphasized particularly in religious matters (Fenn, 2009).  This 
emphasis on individual choice occurs as the secularization process renders religion  
powerless as an authoritative force (Turner, 2011).  Secularization tends to promote a 
pluralistic religious landscape due to the plausibility of religion as an authoritative entity 
being called into question (Berger, 1967).  This lack of credibility surrounding religion 
causes individuals to seek out guidance from new and different types of religious sources 
(Berger, 1967; Turner, 2011).  Due to its association with the secularization process, high 
levels of religious pluralism may be found within the religion of Protestantism (Berger, 
1967).   
 A PLURALISTIC WORLD 
 Protestantism through its various denominations and sects displays a high degree 
of religious pluralism.  Religious pluralism is defined as the toleration and coexistence of 
various religious groups (Wuthnow et al., 1984; Johnstone, 1992), where these groups 
engage in free competition for adherents (Berger, 1967).  Religious diversity on the other 
hand is simply the presence of different religions in the same environment.  Divisions 
within Protestantism have existed since the Reformation (Berger, 1967; Wuthnow, 1988), 
even though it was not the intention of Protestant reformers to create a religiously plural 
environment (MacCulloch, 2003).  Through the Reformation individuals were granted the 
23 
 
freedom to structure religion to fit their interests, which ultimately led to these religious 
divisions.  While the religious pluralism emanating from Protestantism and that of the 
presence of many different religions including Protestantism may be linked to a  
secularized environment, there is one key difference.  An outgrowth of various 
denominations and sects within Protestantism is fueled by the highly individualistic focus 
that has its roots in the Reformation.  Religious pluralism that includes Protestantism as 
one of its religions may be due to the absence of a dominant religion or may be a 
manifestation of the value of democratic virtue within that environment (Lubarsky, 
2005).   
Religious pluralism poses a challenge within societies, because individuals 
become exposed to and confronted with divergent messages stemming from these 
competing value structures (Wuthnow, 1991; 2005).  Individuals are not supported by a 
stable value structure in religiously plural environments, and the presence of competing 
value structures weakens the plausibility of religion as a formative force within society 
(Berger, 1967).  When religion is fragmented it can no longer unite individuals under a 
common value system (Merton, 1957; Yinger, 1970).  Without some sort of unification, 
higher rates of crime and violence will occur as competing values structures create an 
unstable social environment plagued by moral and ethical concerns (Talmon, 1969; 
Wilson, 1969; Budd, 1973).   
 Unlike Protestantism, religious pluralism is absent from Catholicism.  
Catholicism does not promote the toleration of different religious groups and 
denominations that are in competition with each other for adherents in the same manner 
as Protestantism (Herberg, 1955; Yinger, 1957).  Like Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity 
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is not considered religiously plural.  Given its emphasis on the authority and tradition of 
the Church, Orthodox Christianity has not fostered an environment conducive to the 
existence of various religious groups in the same manner as other religions (Makrides, 
2005).  Eastern Orthodoxy has taken a stance against the formation of religious sects 
(Volkov, 2005).  In particular, the Russian Orthodox Church has advocated for legislation 
to limit the growth of religious pluralism stemming from Protestantism and the 
Reformation (Agadjanian & Rousselet, 2005; Fenn, 2009).  This connection between the 
Orthodox Church and the state is also evident in Greece where pluralism and the 
privatization of religion are generally opposed due to public indifference being the 
societal response towards these conditions (Kokosalakis, 1996).  
 Protestant sects were said to have taken their inspiration to form from the ancient  
Hebrews of the Old Testament (Wax, 1960), and in the mid to late 19th century Judaism,  
particularly in America, was divided into Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox 
movements (Marmorstein, 1957; Williams, 2015).  Yet, Orthodox Judaism opposes 
religious pluralism due to its emphasis on authority and tradition (Kunin, 2009).  
Judaism, historically, has been concerned with fostering a sense of unity and does not 
condone the formation of different religious groups.  Judaism, like Christianity, is 
considered an Abrahamic religion tracing its origin back to the tribal patriarch.  Islam is 
also part of the Abrahamic religions and like Judaism and certain forms of Christianity; it 
too can display a certain measure of religious pluralism.  In Islam smaller sects were 
permitted to form (Little, Sachedina, & Kelsay, 1996; Rodinson, 1966; Ruzgar, 2005) 
primarily due to the appeal of different Muslim leaders rather than doctrinal differences 
(Bulliet, 1996). Unlike Protestantism, religious pluralism in Islam can be accounted for 
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by an absence of a central religious authority rather than any innovation in scriptural 
interpretation stemming from the promotion of individualism (Casanova, 2001). 
 Religious pluralism exists in Hinduism as it is often seen as a collection of sects 
rather than a religion (Long, 2005; Smith, 1963).  In countries like India where Hinduism 
is the dominant religion, the state is not completely separated from religion despite the 
presence of religious pluralism (Madan, 1997). This highlights how the pluralism within 
Hinduism differs from the pluralism where Protestantism is prominent, which is an 
environment where the religious and political spheres are distinct from one another. Even 
though pluralism is a part of Hinduism, many traditions within the religion actually 
oppose its growth (Long, 2005).  As an offshoot of Hinduism, Buddhism has similar 
tendencies towards religious pluralism as its predecessor.  Buddhism is considered 
doctrinally pluralistic and has various strands with the Tibetan, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna 
Buddhists (Cantwell & Kawanami, 2009; Hayes, 1991).  However, Hayes (1991) would 
suggest that Buddhism lacks a true spirit of religious pluralism.  Mahāyāna Buddhism 
moves away from the idea of pluralism with its sole focus on achieving nirvana, or the 
ultimate release from one’s self rather than active involvement in the formation and 
coexistence of different religious groups (Hayes, 1991). 
 At face value it would appear that religious pluralism aids the growth and 
development of society by supporting sentiments of peace and harmony. Yet, societal 
models of religious pluralism may have a different effect on a society’s institutional 
structure.  If one ascribes to the idea that religion legitimizes the functioning of social 
institutions (Budd, 1973; Warner, 1973), then religious pluralism within a society’s 
cultural sphere may become reflected in institutional differentiation within a society’s 
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social structure (Berger, 1967).  Institutional differentiation occurs as the profit motive of 
a free market economy differentiates it from the other non-economic institutions 
(Parsons, 1964b; 1966; Troeltsch, 1969).  In particular, the family institution is not based 
on the same utilitarian drives which govern a free market economy (Parsons, 1951; 
Rosenfeld & Messner, 1995). Interdependencies are reduced among institutions when 
they are differentiated (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007), and a lack of institutional 
integration will eventually lead to weakened institutional functioning (Schneider, 1970).  
Higher crime levels will be a result as a weakened institutional order cannot effectively 
socialize individuals (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).  Due to its high level of religious 
pluralism, Protestantism may facilitate institutional differentiation (Eisenstadt, 1969; 
Parsons, 1969; Wuthnow et al., 1984) and unintentionally permit a free market economy 
to dominate a society’s institutional structure.   
AN ECONOMY UNLEASHED 
 A free market economy is able to dominate the other social institutions by 
devaluing them, penetrating them, and forcing them to accommodate to it (Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 2007).  Devaluation occurs as learning within the educational system lacks 
any inherent quality and is done solely to gain a job (Merton, 1957; Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 2007; Rosenfeld & Messner, 2008).  Economic norms are also able to 
penetrate the other institutions as grades become like wages within the educational 
system, and more women adopt the “breadwinner” rather than “homemaker” role within 
the family institution (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).  Non-economic institutions such as 
the family also accommodate to a free market economy when family time is reduced due 
to parents working multiple jobs and non-conventional hours.  Accommodation also 
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occurs within the political structure with political campaigns being dictated by private 
donations and contributions (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).  A dominant free market 
economy will contribute to higher rates of crime and violence by weakening the 
socialization and social control capacities of institutions such as the family and 
educational system (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).  One 
factor which may inhibit or even offset the crime-facilitating effects of a dominant free 
market economy is a society’s social welfare practices. 
 Several studies have shown that social welfare may weaken the link between 
dominant economic conditions and higher rates of crime (Hannon & Defronzo, 1998; 
Pratt & Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000). Measures of social welfare may be associated 
with lower crime levels by strengthening non-economic institutions (Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 2006).  Two ways that social welfare may be assessed are through social 
support coming from the state or social altruism arising from communities (Pratt & 
Cullen, 2005).  Social support is defined as the instrumental or expressive provisions 
stemming from either public or private sources (Cullen, 1994; Pratt & Godsey, 2003), 
whereas social altruism is realized through the provisions which are provided by 
individuals residing within communities (Chamlin & Cochran, 1997).  Not only do 
measures of social welfare weaken the link between economic dominance and higher 
rates of crime, but a direct association has been found between higher levels of social 
welfare and lower rates of homicide (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Pratt & Godsey, 
2002).  One area of research which has not garnered as much attention is whether social 
welfare may condition the relationship between Protestantism and lower rates of 
homicide.  If social welfare conditions the link between economic inequality and lower 
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rates of homicide (Savolainen, 2000), perhaps it may have a similar effect on 
Protestantism.  Given the potential association between Protestantism and the free market 
(Weber, 1904-1905), it would appear plausible that social welfare through its collective 
focus might offset the divisiveness stemming from Protestant pluralism. 
 Non-economic institutions cannot function properly in environments marked by a  
high degree of religious pluralism, because institutional norms are not reinforced by a 
unified and solitary value structure (Berger & Luckmann, 1969; Parsons, 1966; 1982).   
Societal norms lack stability and are less appealing to individuals when they are guided 
by multiple value structures (Parsons, 1982).  Since they are the product of human beings 
and constantly changing, social institutions require the legitimacy from a stable force 
such as religion in order to function properly (Berger, 1967).  Religious legitimacy may 
grant child-bearing practices within the family institution a certain divine creativity and 
bestow a certain divine authority upon the power of the political institution (Berger, 
1967; Eisenstadt, 1973).  However, a religion such as Protestantism that is structurally 
differentiated cannot uniformly legitimize a society’s institutional structure by ensuring 
that economic norms do not take precedence over non-economic norms (Berger, 1967). It 
is not only the structure of Protestantism which legitimizes the dominance of a free 
market economy, but the values and virtues which underlie the religion.  
 In his seminal yet contentious work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, Max Weber (1904-1905) attempts to draw a parallel between the value 
orientations underlying Protestantism and the development of modern day capitalism.  
Weber (1904-1905) is not suggesting that Protestantism caused capitalism, but rather that 
the value orientations which underlie Protestantism are in line with the tenets of a free 
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market economy (Fischoff, 1959).  Through the Reformation Protestants did not intend to 
encourage capitalism (Gerth & Mills, 1964; Hill, 1973), but the emphasis on 
individualism and dedication to one’s calling were in line with the development of a free 
market economy (Weber, 1904-1905).  A key starting point for Weber (1904-1905) in his 
attempt to draw a link between Protestantism and capitalism is the Protestant promotion 
of individualism. 
 Protestant emphasis on personal pursuits of salvation developed in tandem with 
the individualistic focus of a free market economy (Peck, 1993).  This shift from the 
Church to the individual following the Reformation permitted individuals to work 
towards attaining salvation in areas other than religion.  With the focus being on the 
individual, Protestants advocated for a certain ascetic or highly disciplined approach in 
one’s worldly endeavors as a means to attain God’s salvation (Schneider, 1970; Hill, 
1973).  Weber (1959) took notice of this highly disciplined approach to life emphasized 
by Protestants, and he links this approach to the rationalism and methodical behavior 
required for the development of modern day capitalism (Gerth & Mills, 1964; Yinger, 
1970).  This systematic or highly disciplined approach also converted one’s involvement 
in a free market economy into a vocation intended to honor and glorify God (Weber, 
1964).   To overcome the temptations associated with acquiring wealth through one’s 
involvement in a free market economy, Weber (1904-1905) explains how Protestants 
justified this result of their labor through the doctrine of Predestination. 
 Under the doctrine of Predestination Protestants could feel that by gaining 
material wealth through their work, they were serving a higher purpose (Vernon, 1962).  
Weber (1904-1905) discusses how the doctrine characterizes individuals as either blessed 
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or damned in the eyes of God.  Those who are able to attain wealth are viewed as blessed 
or one of God’s chosen elect (Weber, 1904-1905).  Material wealth acquisition was no 
longer seen as an end in itself (Weber, 1964), and religious justification could now be 
applied to the capitalist drive for profit (Weber, 1969).  However, at some point 
Protestant values and virtues could not restrain the temptations stimulated by the accrual 
of material wealth (Hyma, 1959; Bell, 1973).  This Protestant promotion of individualism 
and the freedom it engenders may create an environment where morals are replaced by 
worldly desires (DeTocqueville, 1835; Bell, 1973).   While Protestantism attempts to link 
God’s salvation with the attainment of material wealth, it is difficult to reconcile religious 
virtue with the wants and desires stimulated by this wealth (Yinger, 1970).  Weber (1904-
1905) did not suggest that Protestantism would be linked to higher crime levels through 
its justification of material wealth acquisition (Nelson, 1973).  He did, however, believe 
that over time this justification would undermine the Protestant mission of working to 
glorify God (Vernon, 1962; Schneider, 1970).  Given the fact that material wealth may 
override institutional norms (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997), it is my contention that 
Protestantism contributes to higher rates of crime and violence by legitimizing the 
dominance of a free market economy. 
 Capitalism existed prior to the Reformation and it could be found in Catholic 
monasteries in 9th century Europe (Fenn, 2009; Stark, 2005).  In the 11th and 12th 
centuries Catholic monasteries began to provide credit and lend at interest after amassing 
great wealth by transforming subsistence agriculture into a cash economy through the 
selling of crops (Facchini, 2010; Stark, 2005).  Even though Catholic theologians before 
and after the Reformation were more open to a free market economy than their 
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contemporaries, Catholicism has cautioned against the potential deleterious effects of 
unrestrained capitalism.  Pope John Paul II acknowledged the capacity of capitalism to 
promote human knowledge, creativity, and innovation.  However, to prevent economic 
dominance he warned that a free market economy must be counter-balanced by the 
protection of human rights and the influence of moral and cultural institutions (Novak, 
1993).  Other aspects of Catholicism highlight its lack of compatibility with a free market 
economy.  Unlike Protestantism, Catholicism does not maintain the idea that economic 
success is a sign of God’s approval (Mentzer, 1988).  Within the New Testament 
Catholics are guided by the theme of indifference to worldly matters (Weber, 1993).  
Also, the Catholic approach to salvation which relies on the supernatural contrasts with 
the rationalism that is required within the free market (Weber, 1904-1905).  
 A Catholic social ethic in the 20th century (Face, 1969; Novak, 1993) and during 
the medieval period (Fanfani, 1935; Nanini, 2011; Stark, 2005) was focused on the ideas 
of charity, social justice, responsibility, and character rather than the growth of a free 
market economy.  Societal growth according to Catholicism is not defined by economic 
advancement, and Catholics believed that the state should have the capability to intervene 
in economic activities that might create debilitating social inequalities (Fanfani, 1935; 
Greeley, 1989).  Between 1960 and 1990 Catholic countries displayed higher social 
security expenditure levels than non-Catholic nations (Castles, 1994).  In fact, many 
Catholic nations have become Christian Democratic welfare states that support just 
wages for employees and social insurance schemes to be provided by employers (Esping-
Anderson & Van Kersbergen, 1992). 
 A free market economy was not fully endorsed by the Christian Orthodox Church, 
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but the Church was somewhat receptive to it at the very least.  Due to the association 
between a free market and democratic values, the Orthodox Church can accommodate 
itself to this type of economic system (Kokosalakis, 1996).  For the most part though, 
capitalism developed later in countries where the Orthodox Church is dominant 
compared to Western Europe (Dobrijevic, 2006).  This is due to Weber’s (1978) claim 
that Orthodox Christianity is not structured for the pursuit of wealth due to its mystical 
nature and concern for matters not of this world.  Through its association with mysticism 
(Weber, 1978) and its communitarian focus, Orthodox Christianity does not support the 
rational and individualistic approach required for a free market economy (Makrides, 
2005).  Also, a heavy emphasis on tradition within the Orthodox Church hinders its 
ability to promote an innovative spirit necessary for the free market (Kokosalakis, 1996; 
Makrides, 2005).  A free market economy could never develop in Orthodox countries like 
it did in much of Protestant western Europe due to the fact that the Orthodox Church 
never legitimized economic activity and success as a sign of God’s grace (Buss, 1989a; 
Dobrijevic, 2006).   
 Jewish involvement in a free market economy has historically been linked to their 
exclusion from the political sphere (Muller, 2010).  Judaism has an orientation directed 
toward matters of this world (Troeltsch, 1969; Weber, 1904-1905; 1952), and adherents 
of Judaism in the Middle Ages were engaged in commercial capitalism with their 
banking, money-lending, and investment practices (Weber, 1958).  Within Judaism, 
initiative and economic freedom are highly valued, but an individual’s chances of 
salvation are not predicated upon their economic performance (Goodman, 1996).  Weber 
(1904-1905) explains that Judaism made it possible for the individual to achieve God’s 
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blessing through the study of religious law and not solely through activity in a free 
market economy.  Unlike Puritanism, Judaism did not have a distinct economic ethic or 
the idea of predestination since salvation was a collective phenomenon for the Jewish 
people (Weber, 1904-1905; 1993).  Also, due to their status as pariah people, or those 
with little political power, adherents of Judaism could not be the forerunners for the 
manufacturing and industrial production characteristic of modern capitalism (Bennion, 
1992; Buss, 1989b; Weber, 1993).  Rather than promoting the competitive individualism 
necessary for modern capitalism, Judaism emphasizes an ethic of solidarity and charity 
(Sombart, 1913; Weber, 1952; 1993).  Judaism has historically been linked to the welfare 
state (Lenski, 1963) and has been an ardent supporter of social justice (Morris, 1996).     
 Like Puritanism, Islam has an active and this-worldly ethic which facilitates 
engagement in a free market economy (Turner, 1974a; 1992).  Turner (1974b) notes that 
capitalism under Islam was driven by individualism, an achievement orientation, and a 
division of labor which weakened morality levels in areas like Mecca during the Middle 
Ages.  However, an association between Islam and capitalism is not supported due to the 
type of political structure found in many Islamic societies.  Foreign troops in many 
Islamic countries established patrimonial bureaucracies which hindered the growth of 
capitalism, rational law, and cities in these areas (Turner, 1974b; 1992).  Under 
patrimonial rule, Islamic rulers replaced rational law with arbitrariness and permitted 
their troops to take control of the property within cities (Turner, 1974b; 1992). These 
efforts to move away from rationalism and the individual accumulation of capital assets 
impeded the ability of Islam to facilitate the industrialization characteristic of modern 
capitalism (Turner, 1974b). Restrictions were also placed on the ability to amass great 
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wealth under Islam with  taxation on wealth and income enforced to help those less 
fortunate and to preserve the public good (Hefner, 2008).   
 Hinduism is a religion that is not particularly conducive to the development of a  
free market economy.  Contemplation rather than active involvement in the world is the 
focus of Hinduism (Bennion, 1992; Elder, 1996; Yinger, 1957).  Through its 
disengagement from the world, Hinduism cannot promote the rationalism required for the 
development of a free market economy (Gellner, 1996).  Any semblance of capitalism in 
India during the Middle Ages according to Weber (1958) occurred through the influence 
of outsiders such as the English since Hinduism was primarily based on tradition and 
ritual.  This emphasis on ritual highlights the spiritual and supernatural emphasis within 
Hinduism which creates an impediment toward seeking God’s favor through any 
methodical or rationalized economic ethic (Long, 2005).  Hinduism also has a pragmatic 
view of one’s vocation, seeing it solely as a means to sustain one’s self rather than 
attaching any higher religious meaning to it (Weber, 1993).   
 Certain aspects of Buddhism are conducive to the development of a free market 
economy.  Buddhism values hard work and individual initiative (Parboteeah, 2009), and 
the Buddhist monastic orders in Japan value technological innovation, reinvestment of 
profits, a disciplined work ethic, and an emphasis on saving one’s earnings (Fenn, 2009; 
Obadia, 2011).  On the other hand, there are more aspects of Buddhism which highlight 
how it in fact does not shape a free market economy.  Contrary to other research, Bennion 
(1992) explains that Buddhism offers no divine favor upon individuals who attain 
economic success.  Instead of rationalized economic conduct, Buddhism promotes 
contemplation and meditation as ways to attain salvation (Bennion, 1992; Weber, 1958).  
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A lack of action is promoted by Buddhism in order to temper an individual’s wants and 
desires including those related to material wealth (Weber, 1958). Buddhism also opposes 
capitalism due to the lack of morality that arises from the consumerism, individualism, 
and highly competitive pursuit of wealth in the free market (Obadia, 2011).  Rather than 
encourage the pursuit of economic success, Buddhism focuses on social justice and 
charitable giving with one’s wealth (Pryor, 1990; Whelan, 2008).   
CONCEPTUAL REVIEW 
Individualism: In the present study I examine both egoistic and moral 
individualism.  Egoistic or excessive individualism is characterized by a lack of 
attachments to others (Durkheim, 1897; Stark & Bainbridge, 1996) and is based on self-
interest with individual wants and desires being the focal point (Abercrombie, Hill, & 
Turner, 1986; DeTocqueville, 1835; Pickering, 1984). It is the expectation that the 
Protestant promotion of individualism will eventually lead to more of the egoistic or 
excessive type which may facilitate higher rates of homicide (Kornhauser, 1978; 
Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008).  Moral or cooperative individualism, on the other 
hand, involves compassion for others and a mutual respect between individuals that 
cultivates a sense of social solidarity (Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008).  Durkheim 
(1900) suggests that through its civilizing quality, moral individualism may be linked 
with lower homicide rates. One line of thought is that Protestantism promotes moral 
rather than egoistic individualism (Eisner, 2003a; Messner, 1982). 
Secularization: Secularization refers to the process whereby religion loses its 
influence at both the cultural and institutional levels of society (Berger, 1967; Budd, 
1973; Fenn, 2009).  This process may vary across countries (Davie & Woodhead, 2009) 
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and between different religions (Turner, 1974b).  While secularism refers to sentiments in 
opposition of religion, secularization is the actual or practical realization of this 
opposition within different segments of society (Davie & Woodhead, 2009).  Under 
secularization religious beliefs and values can no longer supply individuals and 
institutions with meaning and legitimacy (Turner, 1974b; 1992).  Religion becomes 
relegated to the private sphere of society through the secularization process (Turner, 
2011).  One of the reasons the secularization process has been able to take shape and 
religion has shifted to the private sphere is the rationalization of religion (Fenn, 2009; 
Makrides, 2005).  With more rationalism, religion loses its sacred character as rituals 
intended to foster collective solidarity are de-emphasized and replaced with more 
individualistic practices (Berger, 1967; Turner, 1974b).  Due to its highly rationalistic 
and individualistic approach to exhibiting one’s faith, Protestantism has been viewed as a 
religion that may serve as a catalyst for the secularization process. 
Religious Pluralism: Religious pluralism refers to the tolerance and acceptance  
of other religions besides one’s own, and the belief that these other religions provide a 
certain measure of truth and value for those who adhere to them (Long, 2005; Williams, 
2015). With religious pluralism there is religious diversity or the presence of different 
religions in the same environment, but religious diversity does not necessarily imply that 
there is religious pluralism.  Ideas related to the development of religious pluralism 
include freedom (Stark, 2005), individual choice (Bellah et al., 1985), and equality 
(Lubarsky, 2005).  Despite appearing to represent pro-social aspects of society, there are 
divergent viewpoints concerning the social outcomes related to religious pluralism.  
Davie and Woodhead (2009) explain that from a rational choice perspective, religious 
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pluralism facilitates the growth of religion and strengthens its influence across societies.  
On the other hand, other research has suggested that higher levels of religious pluralism 
indicate a weakened ability of religion to operate as an influential force within society 
(Berger, 1967).  Durkheim (1915) extended this idea even further and suggested  
that religious pluralism was tied to a lack of societal cohesion.  In line with this idea,  
Protestantism with its high level of religious pluralism may contribute to higher homicide 
rates by disrupting the social bonds within societies.  
Economic Dominance: Economic dominance occurs when a society’s free 
market economy penetrates, devalues, and forces the other non-economic institutions to 
make accommodations to it (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).  A dominant free market 
economy creates an unbalanced institutional structure (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001) 
where non-economic institutions cannot function normally and impart adequate levels of 
social control (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997).  Higher levels of crime and violence occur 
due to the weakened functioning of non-economic institutions coupled with an anomic or 
deregulated social environment stemming from the dominance of a free market economy 
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001).  In particular, Messner and Rosenfeld (2004) suggest that 
economic dominance will be linked to more individualistic and predatory crimes such as 
homicide.  Higher levels of egoistic or disintegrative individualism have been identified 
as facilitating the dominance of a free market economy (Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 
2008), but this may be a somewhat incomplete picture. It may be that Protestant 
individualism becomes egoistic and in turn creates a highly secularized environment 
where religion becomes a matter of choice reflected in higher levels of religious 
pluralism. More religious pluralism legitimizes and becomes reflected in a differentiated 
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institutional structure that permits the free market to exert its dominance.    
Social Welfare: In the present study social welfare is assessed at the public and 
private levels.  Public measures of social welfare may include governmental expenditures 
on matters such as health and education.  Social welfare measured from a nation’s 
political system has been linked with lower rates of homicide (Pratt & Godsey, 2002) and  
has attenuated the link between higher inequality levels and an increase in national 
homicide rates (Pratt & Godsey, 2003).  Social welfare at the private level refers to the 
contributions of individuals to aid other members of society that is distinct from the 
contributions from entities such as the government (Chamlin & Cochran, 1997). Forms of 
social welfare at the private level may include helping others in some manner or donating 
one’s time and or money to charities.  Within the U.S., social welfare assessed at the 
private level has been found to be associated with lower violent and property crime levels 
(Chamlin & Cochran, 1997).  Public measures of social welfare condition the association 
between economic dominance and lower rates of homicide (Savolainen, 2000), but there 
have been fewer studies that examine how private measures may impact this relationship.  
In the present study, the integrative capacity of social welfare may elicit the humanitarian 
aspects of Protestantism that create an environment conducive to lower rates of homicide.         
SUMMARY 
 In figure 1 on page 40 the relationship between Protestantism and homicide is 
examined in several ways.  Before discussing the various ways Protestantism may be 
linked to homicide, a disclaimer must be rendered regarding the nature of this 
association.  This study does not contend that there is anything inherently criminogenic 
within individuals who adhere to Protestantism.  Nor does this study suggest that 
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individuals who adhere to Protestantism are more homicidal than others.  Rather, this 
study is concerned with how Protestantism through its structure and values creates an 
environment that is conducive to the commission of homicide.  Protestantism as a world  
religion does not aim to contribute to higher rates of homicide, but the manifestation of 
the structure of Protestantism and its values within society has transformed them into 
mechanisms that may facilitate homicide.  In effect, this process is similar to Merton’s 
paradox of social action where the realization of values eventually leads to their 
abandonment (Schneider, 1970).  With higher levels of Protestantism there may also be a 
higher likelihood of more Protestant homicide offenders, but higher levels of 
Protestantism may also create an environment that increases the likelihood of homicide 
offenders irrespective of their religious affiliation.   
 In figure 1 below a direct relationship exists between Protestantism and homicide  
with higher levels of Protestantism being associated with higher rates of homicide.   
 Protestantism is also linked to higher rates of homicide indirectly through its promotion 
of a highly individualistic and secularized social environment.  There is also a 
conditioning effect in the figure with Protestantism facilitating the relationship between 
dominant economic conditions and homicide.  Given the connection between 
Protestantism and a free market economy (Weber, 1904-1905) one might surmise that a 
direct relationship between Protestantism and economic dominance would be included in 
the theoretical model.  A lack of a direct relationship between Protestantism and 
economic dominance is further magnified by the fact that a direct relationship is drawn 
between Protestantism and both individualism and secularization in the model.  Yet, there 
are a couple of reasons for not including a direct relationship between Protestantism and  
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model 
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economic dominance in the theoretical model.  Prior cross-national research has 
identified the ability of social welfare to inhibit homicide and to weaken the positive 
relationship between economic dominance and homicide (Pratt & Godsey, 2003; 
Savolainen, 2000).  Based off this prior work, the present study seeks to examine whether 
Protestantism which is anticipated to facilitate homicide might condition the positive 
relationship between economic dominance and homicide.  
Aside from prior work looking at the relationship between economic dominance 
and homicide, a lack of a direct relationship between Protestantism and economic 
dominance is due to the contention surrounding some of Weber’s (1904-1905) claims.  
Critics have levied a litany of objections concerning the connection Weber (1904-1905) 
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attempts to make between Protestantism and the development of modern capitalism.  
Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1986) suggest that Weber (1904-1905) was not clear in 
outlining how individual motives and attitudes mediate the relationship between religious 
doctrines and economic practices. Aside from Weber’s (1904-1905) lack of clarity other  
research has pointed to the fact that the attributes of Protestantism which Weber (1904-
1905) claims facilitate the development of modern capitalism may have actually existed 
before the formation of Protestantism.  Delacroix and Nielsen (2001) note that aspects of 
modern capitalism such as individual enterprise, commercial profit, and speculation 
actually existed in the 12th century in Italian city-states.  Critics have also called into 
question the accuracy of some of Weber’s (1904-1905) claims.  Several researchers have 
pointed out that the idea that economic success is a sign of God’s blessing did not come 
from the leader of Calvinism, John Calvin, but rather is attributed to the Calvinist leader, 
Richard Baxter, 150 years after Calvin (Fullerton, 1959; Hudson, 1959; Johnstone, 1992).   
Even with the inconsistencies that have been identified with Weber’s (1904-1905) 
thesis, researchers have pointed to other factors which may account for the rise of modern 
capitalism.  Rather than religious beliefs and values giving rise to modern capitalism, 
Fanfani (1984) claims that changes and advancements within the economy are 
responsible for the rise of modern capitalism.  Fanfani (1984) also suggests like 
Eisenstadt (1969) and Robertson (1959) that the aspects of Protestantism which Weber 
(1904-1905) claims are conducive to the development of modern capitalism could 
actually be found within Catholicism in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries.  In terms of 
considering the role of other religions, Sombart (1959) even suggests that Judaism rather 
than Puritanism might have aided the development of modern capitalism through its 
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cultivation of a spirit of enterprise and speculation.  Due to the many criticisms of 
Weber’s (1904-1905) thesis, its relevancy as an explanation for the rise of modern 
capitalism has waned over time.  Even contemporary survey research at the individual 
and national levels has not identified Protestants as having more pro-market attitudes or 
beliefs compared to other religious groups (Hayward & Kemmelmeier, 2011).   
Despite the considerable amount of objection to Weber’s (1904-1905) thesis, its 
value for the present study is based on the approach one may take in understanding 
Weber’s (1904-1905) rationale.  Rather than viewing Weber’s (1904-1905) work as an 
attempt to identify Protestantism as the cause of the rise of modern capitalism, it is 
important to consider the idea of elective affinity.  In his attempt to link Protestantism 
with modern capitalism Weber (1904-1905) was basing this connection off the idea of 
elective affinity where individuals select out certain aspects of religion that fit with their 
economic interests (Hansen, 1973; Hill, 1973).  Through the idea of elective affinity, 
Weber (1904-1905) was simply attempting to highlight the congruence between various 
principles of Protestantism and economic motivations.  Thus, capitalism did not arise out 
of Protestantism but rather Protestant beliefs and values were able to condition the 
development of modern capitalism (Tawney, 1959).  Weber (1904-1905) was suggesting 
that Protestantism might be conducive to the growth of the free market.  This idea of 
Protestantism being conducive to rather than responsible for economic dominance is 
consistent with Berger’s (1967) discussion of religion legitimizing but not necessarily 
promoting the functioning of social institutions.  In terms of legitimization, this would 
suggest that Protestantism might validate economic dominance and in turn amplify its 
relationship with cross-national rates of homicide.   
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Thus, Protestantism does not directly promote economic dominance in its 
relationship with homicide but rather supports economic dominance and concomitantly 
incites its positive relationship with homicide.  It is for these reasons that Protestantism 
serves to condition the relationship between economic dominance and homicide rather 
than being directly linked to economic dominance in a mediation model.  Also in the 
theoretical model above, social welfare interacts with Protestantism to produce a decline 
in homicide.  Protestantism through its values orientations may foster a social 
environment that is conducive to homicide, but social welfare may be a means to offset 
the crime facilitating capacities of these values.  Figure 1 above does not include direct, 
indirect, or conditional effects of the other major world religions on the rates of homicide 
cross-nationally. 
 A direct positive relationship between Protestantism and homicide in figure 1  
on page 40 stems from the high degree of religious pluralism that is found within 
Protestantism.  Pluralism emanating from Protestantism is more likely to be linked to 
higher rates of homicide than the pluralism comprised of the different world religions.  
This is due to the fact that unlike the pluralism based on different world religions, the 
pluralism within Protestantism is rooted in both individualism and the secularization 
process.  Unlike Protestantism, religious pluralism is not a defining characteristic of 
Roman Catholicism or Orthodox Christianity.  Orthodox Judaism opposes religious 
pluralism due to its emphasis on authority and tradition (Kunin, 2009). In Islam religious 
pluralism exists with various sects, but Islamic pluralism is based on adherence to 
different spiritual leaders rather than actual differences in scriptural doctrine (Bulliet, 
1996; Casanova, 2001).  Complete acceptance of religious pluralism does not exist in 
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Hinduism (Long, 2005). Religious pluralism which exists in Hinduism differs from that 
of Protestantism since the state exerts a strong influence over religion in countries like 
India (Madan, 1997).  Even though religious pluralism exists in Buddhism, the focus 
within Buddhism is on matters outside of this world (Hayes, 1991).  For the other major 
world religions besides Protestantism, religious pluralism either does not exist or is not 
fully supported to the same degree as it is within Protestantism.   
 Protestantism is linked to higher rates of homicide cross-nationally through its 
promotion of individualism which may become egoistic or excessive.  There may be 
variation in the level of individualism across different Protestant denominations 
(MacCulloch, 2003). Yet, in the present study Protestantism is viewed as cultivating 
individualism due to the shift in focus from the Church to the individual through the 
Reformation.  Each of the major world religions has some level or degree of 
individualism (Durkheim, 1915). For example, the practice of confessing one’s sins 
within Catholicism may have reinforced the idea of the morality of individual 
(Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1986).  In light of this, Catholicism is still able to hinder 
the spread of individualism as the Church serves as an intermediary in the relationship 
between the individual and God (Vernon, 1962; Woodhead, 2009).  This emphasis on the 
Church within Catholicism reinforces the idea of group membership and impedes the 
ability of Catholicism to influence homicide levels through the promotion of 
individualism.  Like Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity de-emphasizes individualism in 
favor of a communitarian focus (Makrides, 2005).  
For Judaism, the Old Testament discusses individualism and freedom in action 
(Berger, 1967) stemming from the historical persecution of the Jewish people in lands 
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such as Egypt (Goodman, 1996).  While individualism is present within Judaism, this 
type of individualism is shaped by the community context which is a central focus for the 
Jewish people (Goodman, 1996; Williams, 2015).  Islam attempts to preserve its unity by 
granting rights not to individuals but rather to its community of believers (Badie, 1986; 
Maila, 1991).  Individualism is also not fully endorsed within Hinduism since one’s 
religious identity within Hinduism is defined through their social connections with others 
(Cohen & Hill, 2007). A certain level of individualism exists within Buddhism due to the 
fact that its adherents must rely on themselves for their own salvation rather than God’s 
saving grace (Thurman, 1996).  Yet, in Buddhism special attention is directed toward 
each individual so that he or she may work to promote an environment of selflessness 
that will translate into an ethic of brotherly love (Weber, 1958; 1993).   
 In figure 1 on page 40 Protestantism is linked to higher rates of homicide through 
its promotion of a highly secularized social environment.  In contrast to Protestantism, 
Catholicism with its sacraments or group rituals has managed to eschew the 
secularization process by reinforcing religion’s goal of promoting collective sentiments 
(Parsons, 1964a).  Orthodox Christianity has also hindered the secularization process by 
promoting mystical and spiritual values through its alliance with the state in many eastern 
European countries (Dobrijevic, 2006).  One religion that may facilitate the secularization 
process to a greater degree than other religions is Judaism.  Among the 15 million Jewish 
people around the world many have become more secular by moving away from 
traditional religious authoritarian structures in favor of more individualistic approaches to 
religion (Kunin, 2009).  At the cultural level, secularization is evident within Judaism as 
modern Jewish individuals tend to score low on measures of religious belief and practice 
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(Beit-Hallahmi, 2007).  From an institutional perspective, Herberg (1955) notes how in 
the U.S. Judaism has ushered in the secularization process through their support of the 
separation of Church and state.  In the early 21st century within the U.S. Williams (2015) 
explains Jewish involvement in the secularization process by describing an internal 
struggle within Judaism. Williams (2015) suggests that the link between Judaism and 
secularization is based on the fact that the mission of Judaism to resolve societal 
injustices must be accomplished without the hindrance of any religious heritage or ethnic 
identity.   
Due to the history of oppression against the Jewish people, modern Judaism has 
become involved in secularized movements to facilitate social justice.  Involvement in 
these movements has permitted adherents of Judaism to promote values of equality and 
justice without having their religious heritage create any social divisions.  In effect, 
Judaism aims to improve society without imposing its religious identity like its 
oppressors throughout history.  This promotion of social justice through secularized 
movements may also be seen as a means for adherents of Judaism to fulfill the prophetic 
mission within the religion (Williams, 2015).   Despite being linked to secularization, 
Judaism has also attempted to impede this process by focusing on themes of solidarity 
and brotherhood following the Jewish exile from Israel (Parsons, 1964a).  Thus, even 
with its link to the secularization process Judaism still reinforces the core principle of 
religion to act as a unifying and collective entity through its promotion of an inclusive 
society.  It would appear unlikely that Judaism would be linked to higher rates of 
homicide through its promotion of the secularization process since fostering a sense of 
community remains an integral part of Judaism. 
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Contemporary research would suggest that Israel is a highly secularized nation 
(Zuckerman, 2009) given that seventy-five percent of its citizens claim to be “not 
religious” (Dashefsky et al., 2003). Yet, the secularization process within modern Israel 
has not been fully embraced due to the fact that Israel as a nation-state is founded upon a 
religious rather than secular ideology (Swatos, 1996). With a religious ideology as its 
foundation, sentiments of nationalism within Israel cannot be fully detached from a 
religious identity centered upon Judaism.  Further evidence of the lack of complete 
acceptance of the secularization process within Israel is seen in the high degree of 
religious pluralism within the country particularly among non-orthodox movements 
(Kunin, 2009).  This highlights how citizens of Israel are receptive to the modern process 
of secularization and have attempted to interweave aspects of it with traditional 
conceptions of religion.  Secularization has also not been able to take shape within Islam 
due to the fact that Islam has aligned itself with a society’s political structure to ensure its 
continued influence within the public sphere (Selengut, 2009).  For Hinduism its spiritual 
rather than rational nature makes it less susceptible to secularization (Smith, 1963).  Like 
Hinduism, Buddhism is able to avoid becoming secularized by moving away from 
rationalistic tendencies and instead emphasizing spirituality and otherworldly matters 
(Weber, 1993).   
 Through its interaction with the dominance of a free market economy,  
Protestantism may contribute to higher rates of homicide.  However, higher levels of 
social welfare may foster a negative relationship between Protestantism and homicide.   
Through its emphasis on the sacraments and their supernatural character, Catholicism 
lacks the rationalism necessary for the growth of a free market economy (Buss, 2000; 
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Cohen, 1980). Also, charity and social justice serve as primary tenets of Catholicism 
(Face, 1969; Novak, 1993).  Capitalism is also not legitimized by Orthodox Christianity, 
since this religion is highly mystical and emphasizes communitarianism over any 
competitive individualism (Weber, 1978).  Like Orthodox Christianity, Judaism does not 
support the competitive individualism necessary for the development of a free market 
economy and instead emphasizes an ethic of social solidarity and charity (Sombart, 1913; 
Weber, 1952; 1993).  
 Robertson (1933) suggests that the rational capitalism displayed by western 
European Christians may have been influenced by Muslim Arabs and Syrians who began 
to acquire business shares through capital investments.  Even with these financial 
practices, the structure of Islam did not permit its adherents to have active and prominent 
roles within the modern free market.  A concern for all of its adherents renders Islam 
incapable of legitimizing the institutional dominance of a free market economy that may 
create extensive financial disparities and lead to an increase in the rates of homicide.  An 
ability to amass great wealth through one’s involvement in the free market does not exist 
within Islam, but rather taxes are imposed on one’s wealth to ensure that those less 
fortunate are granted financial support (Hefner, 2008).  For Hinduism, its focus on 
spirituality and contemplation limit its ability to furnish the rationalism necessary for the 
functioning of a free market economy (Bennion, 1992; Elder, 1996; Yinger, 1957).  Like 
Hinduism, Buddhism is also characterized by contemplation and meditation rather than 
rational conduct.  Through its contemplative focus Buddhism also encourages charity and 
social justice within societies (Pryor, 1990; Whelan, 2008).   
RESEARCH QUESTIONS            
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1.) Are higher levels of any of the major world religions within a country 
associated with higher rates of homicide? Religions like Protestantism that display a high 
level of religious pluralism may promote weakened bonds to conventional values through 
their competing value structures (Wuthnow, 2005). 
2.) Are higher levels of Protestantism within a country associated with higher 
levels of individualism? Protestantism promotes a sense of individualism due to the fact 
that it makes the individual solely responsible for the understanding and implementation 
of their faith in the hope of gaining God’s favor.   
3.) Does individualism mediate the relationship between higher levels of 
Protestantism and higher rates of homicide? Individualism may link Protestantism with 
homicide by attenuating the bonds between society’s members, which in turn reduce the 
stakes in conformity and increase the possibility of violent crimes such as homicide.   
4.) Are higher levels of Protestantism within a country associated with higher 
levels of secularization?  Protestantism has cultivated a secularized social environment by 
removing many of the sacraments that serve as mediations linking the individual with 
God (Berger, 1967).   
   5.) Does secularization mediate the relationship between higher levels of 
Protestantism and higher rates of homicide? Secularization may link Protestantism with 
homicide by inhibiting the promotion of morality which causes societies to become 
unstable (Berger, 1967) and without effective restraints over individual behavior. 
6.) Do higher levels of Protestantism condition the relationship between dominant 
economic conditions and higher rates of homicide? Pluralism within Protestantism will 
become reflected in a differentiated institutional structure (Parsons, 1964a) which is tilted 
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in favor of a free market economy.  This dominant position of the free market economy 
will facilitate homicide by weakening the socialization capabilities of the other social 
institutions (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).  
 7.) Do higher levels of social welfare condition the relationship between higher 
levels of Protestantism and lower rates of homicide? Social welfare through its inclusive 
focus may curtail some of the excessive individualism (Wuthnow, 1991) stemming from 
Protestantism.  When excessive or egoistic individualism subsides, the moral 
individualism within Protestantism may be able to contribute to lower rates of homicide 
(Eisner, 2003).
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In the present study religious and other social data have been collected on eighty-
six countries from three waves of the World Values Survey (WVS).  Survey years in the 
analysis include 1995, 2000, and 2005. Countries are chosen as the unit of analysis since 
concepts such as economic dominance require an examination of the institutional balance 
of power at the national level (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001).  The WVS is a nationally 
representative survey in ninety-seven societies which began in 1981 covering a variety of 
topics including religion, political participation, environmental protection, and work 
motivations (WVS, 2008).  Face to face interviews with individuals ranging in age from 
eighteen to eighty-five are conducted by local field organizations under the supervision of 
academic researchers.  Random probability samples are attempted when possible through 
the use of voting stations, population registers, census units, and statistical regions (WVS, 
2008).  Samples range in size from 500 to 3,500 respondents. 
WVS researchers employ quota sampling in their multi-stage sampling design 
where no fewer than thirty primary sampling units are randomly selected within each 
country (WVS, 2008).  After the selection of primary sampling units, random sampling is 
also used for the selection of smaller clusters within these units.  With quota sampling 
strong efforts are made to interview first contacts, which may explain the high response 
rates for the countries in the sample.  Response rates vary by country, but for the years, 
1995, 2000, and 2005 the average response rate for countries in the current study is 73% 
(WVS, 2014).  For the countries in the sample, response rates ranged from a high of 
100% in Indonesia to a low of 15% in Tanzania. A principal investigator must fill out 
country specific information along with a questionnaire related to their survey methods 
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before accessing data from the surveys.  Internal consistency checks are also conducted 
between the sampling design and the outcome data to ensure reliability in the survey 
(WVS, 2014). 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 In the present study the dependent variable is the homicide rate per 100,000 
population, and it comes from the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime Statistics.  
Homicide is defined by the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime Statistics as 
intentional homicide or unlawful death purposefully inflicted on one individual by 
another.  To limit the effect of yearly fluctuations on the homicide rate, multi-year 
averages are taken over the study period 1995-2005 and for 2006 and 2007 in cases 
where there were missing data.  Limitations with the use of the homicide rate as a sole 
measure of violent crime have been noted in prior research (Felson, Berg, & Rogers, 
2014).  However, homicide is selected as the outcome measure in this study due to its 
definitional consistency (Kick & LaFree, 1985) and reliability in terms of its 
measurement (Rosenfeld, 2009; LaFree, 1999; Gartner, 1990). 
 WORLD RELIGIONS 
 Durkheim (1897) has acknowledged the challenges in attempting to measure 
moral or cultural phenomena such as religion.  Measurement of the major world religions 
and Protestantism in particular has been based on the fact that individualism is a focal 
point of the present study.  Individualism has a main role in facilitating the development 
of the secularization process, religious pluralism, and the dominance of a free market 
economy.  In fact, Durkheim (1897) has suggested that religions may be distinguished 
from one another based on their relationship with the concept of individualism.  This 
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perspective coupled with the fact that Protestantism promotes individualism (Durkheim, 
1897), factors into the selection of the measures used to capture the major world 
religions. In particular, in the present study Protestantism is measured in the WVS 
through the proportion responding Protestant to the question asking respondents if they 
belong to a religious denomination and if so which one?  Prior research has also 
measured Protestantism through the proportion of the population claiming Protestant 
affiliation (Messner, 1982; Taylor & Hudson, 1972).   
In an effort to ensure that the ability of religion to facilitate higher rates of 
homicide is not solely attributed to Protestantism; I have gathered data on the other major 
world religions.  From the WVS, I have gathered data on the proportion Catholic, Jewish, 
Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian Orthodox.  These well-known religions were 
included in an effort to determine whether they may also contain values which are 
conducive to homicide.  If these other religions are shown to be associated with higher 
rates of homicide, then perhaps there may be some facet of organized religion which 
facilitates criminal behavior.  I also include the proportion atheist, or those who do not 
believe in God, from the World Values Survey.  With the proportion atheist included, I 
am able to compare the effect on homicide of those who adhere to the major religions 
with those who lack religious sentiment. 
INDIVIDUALISM 
In the present study egoistic individualism is measured through the proportion 
responding “need to be very careful” in response to the WVS question asking whether 
“most people can be trusted or one must be very careful in dealing with people?” This 
measure involving a lack of trust in others may be representative of egoistic 
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individualism since it captures the lack of social solidarity characteristic of this type of 
individualism (Bellah et al., 1985; Messner, Thome, Rosenfeld, 2008). A lack of trust in 
others may also illustrate egoistic or excessive individualism by highlighting an 
environment marked by weak social bonds between individuals (Hirschi, 1969).  As the 
antithesis of egoistic individualism, moral individualism is assessed with a measure that 
has been shown to be associated with lower homicide rates at the national level (Karstedt, 
2001).  This alternative measure of individualism that is used in supplementary analyses 
comes from Hofstede (1980) who assessed the attitudes of employees at IBM in 39 
countries in the late 60’s and early 70’s.  Through these surveys Hofstede (1980) 
developed an individualism/collectivism dimension with the individualism component 
dealing with concern for one’s self and close family members.  In terms of the 
collectivism dimension, it represents having in-group beliefs and being protected by 
one’s in-group.   
Hofstede’s (1984) individualism/collectivism dimension measures high quality of 
life from an individualistic perspective through individual success, achievement, and self-
actualization. Quality of life from a collectivistic perspective on the other hand is 
grounded within family and group dynamics.  Individualistic goals from the IBM surveys 
focus on one’s time, freedom, and personal challenges and abilities (Hofstede, 2001).  
Hofstede’s (1980) measure of individualism may be used as a measure of moral 
individualism since it distinguishes respect for universal human rights from bonds based 
on kinship or ethnic ties (Karstedt, 1999).  This measure of individualism from Hofstede 
(1980) is in line with Durkheim’s (1893) conception of moral individualism which 
focuses on the dignity and the value of each individual.  Higher scores on this dimension 
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indicate a higher level of individualism with values ranging from 0 to 100 (Hofstede,  
1980; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010).  Hofstede (1980) uses matched and 
representative samples in his survey about culture with similar individuals from 
managerial and non-managerial positions across different countries.  Individualism and 
collectivism are measured as opposite poles of one dimension since Hofstede (1980) used 
societies rather than individuals as his unit of analysis. This is due to the fact that unlike 
individuals, societies do not vary in terms of their values and can only be either 
individualistic or collectivistic but not both (Hofstede  et al., 2010).  While it is true that 
different subgroups within a society may hold differing or conflicting values, Hofstede’s 
(1980) measure of individualism uses aggregate responses to characterize nations as 
either individualistic or collectivistic.  Since nations and not individuals are the unit of 
analysis (Hofstede et al., 2010), Hofstede’s (1980) measure of individualism is examined 
as one dimension for the purpose of examining similarities and differences between 
societal cultures.  Countries are characterized as individualistic if the average of the 
individual responses correlates more strongly with individualistic work goals (Hofstede et 
al., 2010).     
In results not shown I attempted to examine the bivariate relationship between the 
proportion who believe that individuals need to be careful rather than trusting of others 
and Hofstede’s (1980) measure of individualism.  This was done to ensure that each 
measure was a suitable proxy for their respective form of individualism.  As anticipated 
there is a significant negative correlation between Hofstede’s (1980) measure of 
individualism and the lack of trust measure from the WVS (r = -.363, p < .01).  This 
lends some credence to the idea that egoistic individualism serves as the antithesis of 
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moral individualism (Durkheim, 1973) and illustrates how each measure represents 
opposing forms of individualism.  Hofstede’s (1980) measure of individualism and the 
egoistic measure of individualism from the WVS were also assessed with measures of 
family individualism from the WVS in an effort to discern their differential effects.   
Lack of trust in others was negatively correlated with the belief that children 
should be taught independence. Hofstede’s (1980) measure of individualism was 
positively correlated with those that approve of a woman wanting to have a child as a 
single parent.  These concepts focusing on independence and single parenthood may 
illustrate measures of family individualism since they highlight the value placed upon 
autonomy and freedom of choice.  One family individualism measure that highlights the 
differential effects and distinguishing forms of these types of individualism is the 
proportion that disagree that a child needs a mother and father to grow up happily.  
Hofstede’s measure was positively correlated with this measure (r = .380, p < .01), while 
lack of trust from the WVS displayed a negative correlation with this measure (r = -.188, 
p < .10).  Positive correlations between Hofstede’s measure and these measures of family 
individualism illustrate the value and the potential of the individual which is the focus of 
moral individualism (Durkheim, 1973).  Lack of trust in others appears suitable as a 
proxy measure of egoistic individualism since it may represent the antithesis of moral 
individualism. These negative correlations with measures of family individualism 
highlight how the lack of trust measure opposes the value of personal initiative and the 
inherent quality of the individual characteristic of moral individualism (Durkheim, 1973).  
SECULARIZATION 
 In the present analysis secularization as a latent construct is comprised of four 
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measures from the WVS.  These measures are reverse coded and they include the 
proportion who state that religion is very important in their lives; the proportion who state 
that they attend religious service more than once a week or once a week; the proportion 
who state that God is very important in their lives; and the proportion who consider 
themselves to be a religious person.  These measures may provide an indication of the 
level of secularization and link Protestantism with higher rates of homicide by weakening 
the ability of religious values to incite moral behavior.  Measurement parameters for the 
secularization process are presented in Appendix C. Fit indices display good model fit. 
All indicators of secularization are statistically significant with suitable factor loadings.  
There is high internal reliability for our latent construct of secularization (standardized α 
= .94), which permits the use of these indicators to assess the impact of secularization 
with Protestantism and homicide cross-nationally.   
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
 In the current study Protestantism serves as a measure of religious pluralism due 
to the numerous denominations and sects which have arisen from it.  To ensure that 
Protestantism is representative of religious pluralism and not simply religious diversity, I 
have examined whether it is correlated with measures tapping into the ideas of tolerance 
and acceptance from the Varieties of Democracy dataset.  From the Varieties of 
Democracy dataset I examine the potential association between Protestantism and 
whether a country has religious freedom; whether a nation’s government represses 
religious organizations; and whether religious organizations are consulted by 
policymakers regarding policies relevant to them (Coppedge et al., 2017). In models not 
shown Protestantism is positively correlated with countries that protect religious freedom 
58 
 
(r = .356, p < .01) and do not repress religious organizations (r = .229, p < .05).   
This suggests that Protestantism is not simply representative of a diverse religious 
landscape but displays the tolerance and acceptance characteristic of religious pluralism.  
A religiously plural environment has been established through Protestantism due 
to the freedom and flexibility it has granted its adherents (MacCulloch, 2003).  Religious 
pluralism assessed through Protestantism may facilitate higher rates of homicide by 
fostering a differentiated value structure which cannot influence individual behavior in a 
pro-social manner (Wuthnow et al., 1984).  I also create a religious pluralism index for 
each country in the present study which is similar to the religious diversity index from the 
Pew Research Center on religion and public life (Cooperman, Hackett, & Ritchey, 2014).  
Each of the seven major world religions in the present study and the proportion atheist 
are included in the index.  Again, to ensure that this index is actually representative of 
religious pluralism and not simply religious diversity, I examined its relationship with the 
measures from the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al., 2017).  This index is 
positively correlated with countries that protect religious freedom (r = .268, p < .05) 
which supports its use as a measure of religious pluralism.    
This religious pluralism index is similar to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which 
measures market concentration, but the religious pluralism index scores are inverted 
where higher scores indicate a more diverse religious landscape (Cooperman et al., 
2014).  Scores for the religious pluralism index are averaged over the years 1995, 2000, 
and 2005.  These scores are calculated by first squaring and then summing the percentage 
of adherents of each of the religions and those who are atheist within a country. Then, 
scores are inverted by subtracting the sum of the squared percentages from 10,000 which 
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represents no pluralism.  This value is then divided by 875 to get a number that is on or 
near a 0 to 10 scale (Cooperman et al., 2014). The value of 875 is used to get a scale 
value since equal distribution of groups among the seven major world religions and those 
who are atheist would equal 8,750 (10000-1250) while no religious pluralism would 
obviously equal zero (10,000-10,000).      
ECONOMIC DOMINANCE 
Income inequality, as a measure of economic dominance, has been shown to be a 
strong predictor of higher homicide rates at various units of analysis (Krahn, Hartnagel, 
& Gartrell, 1986; Kovandzic, Vieraitis, & Yiesley, 1998; Maume & Lee, 2003).  Income 
inequality measured as the Gini coefficient of household income comes from the World 
Bank and is averaged over the three years in the study.  However, economic inequality 
measured as the Gini coefficient of household income has been shown to be an unreliable 
measure when examined at the cross-national level (Hsieh & Pugh, 1993; Vieraitis, 
2000).  Therefore, economic inequality will also be examined as a ratio of the richest to 
the poorest 20% of citizens within a nation.  Data on economic inequality measured as 
this ratio is gathered from the World Bank.  Due to the inconsistencies associated with 
economic inequality measured as the Gini coefficient at the cross-national level, I have 
also measured economic dominance through the infant mortality rate for each country in 
the sample. Pridemore (2008; 2011) contends that the infant mortality rate as a measure 
of poverty is a better predictor of cross-national rates of homicide than measures of 
economic inequality. As an alternative measure of economic dominance, an index of 
economic discrimination from the Minorities at Risk data file (Messner & Rosenfeld, 
1997) is also included in the present study as a control measure.   
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SOCIAL WELFARE 
To measure social welfare at the public level I have gathered data on government 
expenditures on health as a percentage of GDP (Pratt & Godsey, 2002) from the World 
Bank.  At the private level, I have gathered data from the WVS that may be 
representative of social altruism within societies.  Chamlin and Cochran (1997) define 
social altruism as “the willingness of communities to commit scarce resources to the aid 
and comfort of their members, distinct from the beneficence of the state” (pg. 204).  To 
gauge the effect of social altruism on the relationship between religion and homicide, I 
gather data on the proportion that are active members in charitable or other humanitarian 
organizations from the WVS for the years in the study.            
CONTROLS 
 Control measures from the WVS include the proportion who are an active 
member in a Church or religious organization, and the proportion who rarely or never 
think about the meaning of life.  From a social control perspective this measure 
pertaining to the meaning of life may be linked to homicide by illustrating a lack of 
societal investment and long-term planning (Hirschi, 1969). Other control measures 
include the stability of a nation’s government (Roth, 2009) which comes from the State 
of the World Atlas, and a dummy variable indicating whether a nation is Latin in origin 
or not.  Latin nations are particularly salient for the present study due to the fact that 
traditionally they have been viewed as predominantly Catholic countries.  Yet, Stark 
(2005) contends that there has been marked growth in terms of the influence of 
Protestantism and its values in these countries.   
 From the WVS the proportion single with children is also included in the present 
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study as a control measure.  In the WVS the proportion single with children is based on 
individual responses within each country which is different from other sources that have 
calculated single with children based on family or household composition (e.g., 
Organization for Co-operation and Economic Development, 2016). In the WVS, the 
proportion single with children is distinguished from those who are married, cohabitating, 
divorced, separated, or widowed with children.  Single with children may be 
representative of economic disadvantage due to the preponderance of single parent 
families in environments characterized by high unemployment and poverty levels (Bane, 
1986; Sampson & Wilson, 1995).  Wilson (2012) suggests that within the U.S. higher 
levels of unemployment and lower incomes among urban minority men have made them 
less attractive as potential marriage partners for women.  Efforts by men to find and 
maintain employment along with whether employment was in the legitimate economy 
were also factors that influenced the likelihood of low income single mothers entering 
into marriage according to Edin (2000).  These factors highlight how single-parenthood 
may be representative of the challenges and constraints associated with economic 
conditions. Single with children is also included in the present study due to the fact that 
prior research has found it to be linked to higher rates of homicide (Pridemore & Kim, 
2007; Stickley & Pridemore, 2006).          
METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
 At the bivariate level, Pearson correlation will be used to assess the relationship 
between the variables of interest in the analysis.  Multivariate models in the current study 
will be assessed under the assumptions of structural equation modeling (SEM). SEM has 
been selected since it permits the examination of both direct and indirect effects on the 
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outcome measure.  A built in method to handle missing data also exists within SEM.  
Missing data for each of the variables included in the analyses can be found in the 
descriptives table on page sixty-six in chapter 4.   
In SEM I use the maximum likelihood missing values option or full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) method to estimate models with missing data.  This method 
assumes normality in the multivariate models (Wothke, 1998) and that the missing values 
are missing at random or missing completely at random (Medeiros, 2016).  Missing 
completely at random refers to missing values of a variable not being associated with 
other variables or other missing values of that same variable (Rubin, 1976). Missing at 
random on the other hand refers to missing values of a variable which may be associated 
with other variables but are not associated with other missing values of the same variable 
(Rubin, 1976).  Under the FIML method, casewise log- likelihoods are used to deal with 
missing data (Little et al., 2014). Casewise log-likelihoods permit models to be estimated 
by using the mean and variance values of observed data that are not missing cases to 
account for data that is missing values (Enders, 2006; Little et al., 2014; Wothke 1998).  
With FIML missing values are not imputed, and this method yields only one set of results 
since it relies on the same model (Enders, 2006; Medeiros, 2016).  Advantages of the 
FIML method include parameter estimates and standard errors that are derived from 
observed data, and estimates that are fairly precise due to the fact that data with missing 
values is not removed from the models (Enders, 2006).      
SEM combines a multi-faceted approach which incorporates an examination of 
how constructs are connected and an identification of the direction of significant 
relationships (Schreiber et al., 2006). With SEM exogenous variables are treated like 
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independent variables and endogenous variables like dependent variables.  An advantage 
of SEM is that it provides both exploratory factor analysis and multiple regression.  This 
dual function of SEM is evident in the present study where a latent variable such as 
secularization is specified in both measurement and structural models.  In the 
measurement model the relationship of the measured variables on their latent construct is 
examined, while the structural model looks at the relationship between latent and 
observed variables (Ullman & Bentler, 2003). This structural model of SEM permits the 
examination of direct, indirect, and total effects, or those without the presence of a 
mediator. An indirect effect is the effect of an independent variable on a dependent 
variable through a mediating variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Total effect is the 
summation of the direct and indirect effects.  While direct and indirect relationships can 
be examined with SEM, statistical interactions that represent potential conditioning 
relationships will be assessed with generalized structural equation modeling.   
With a sample of only eighty-six countries, a more relaxed measure of statistical 
significance will be used in the analysis.  In a two-tailed test, statistical significance will 
be reported if the p-value of an estimate is .10 or smaller (Savolainen, 2000).  Diagnostic 
tests on preliminary models reveal the presence of heteroskedasticity, or unequal variance 
in the residuals of the models.  To deal with the issue of heteroskedasticity, the dependent 
variable, homicide, is logged in the present analysis. Models are weighted by the log of 
the respondents in each country due to the variability in sampling error associated with 
the different number of respondents across countries.  All results are based on the 
weighted data (with similar results in the unweighted analyses).  Many of the variables 
are averaged over the three years in the study and standardized to have a common metric 
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for interpretability. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
  To assess the research questions presented in chapter 2 it is necessary to take a 
step by step approach for the specification of the multivariate models.  With at most 
eighty-six observations in any model, a sufficient amount of degrees of freedom does not 
exist to assess each research question with all of the variables of interest in a sole model.  
In the present study I examine each of the major world religions, atheism, and the global 
measure of religious pluralism separately.  Every model for each religious group contains 
a different mechanism that may influence the relationship between each religious group 
and homicide.   
With each religious group, I estimated a baseline model that only contains 
measures of interest pertaining to each research question.  If the baseline model yielded 
significant findings I began to add other predictors to the model which are theoretically 
linked to homicide and follow the order of the discussion in chapter 2.  For example, 
when significant findings were present in the baseline model, I first added the proportion 
single with children as a measure of individualism.  If significant results remained I then 
added the latent construct of secularization to the model, and this was potentially 
followed in order by measures of economic dominance, social welfare, and other 
measures which serve as controls.  Additional measures were added to the baseline model 
based on the predictive power of the variables of interest.  In terms of the models that are 
presented in this study, I have selected the models that are specified in a manner that 
reveals the robustness of the results.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
Univariate statistics display the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values, and percent missing of each variable in table 1 below.  
Across the eighty-six countries included in the analysis the average homicide rate for 
these countries is around 9 per 100,000.  Homicide shows substantial variability cross-
nationally ranging from a rate under one to nearly 79 per 100,000.  On average thirteen 
percent of a nation’s population identify themselves as Protestant.  Protestantism like all 
the other major world religions in the study is not present in several countries in the 
analysis as evidenced by the zero minimum value.  Norway is the country with the largest 
Protestant population in the study at eighty-eight percent. Catholics represent the largest 
religious group among the countries in the analysis with an average of twenty-nine 
percent of a nation’s population identifying themselves as Catholic.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly Italy has the largest Catholic population of the countries in the sample at 
ninety-nine percent with Rome being the home of the Vatican.   
Of the three Christian groups in the study, Orthodox Christianity appears to be the 
smallest with an average of eleven percent of a nation’s population identifying 
themselves as Orthodox Christian. Orthodox Christianity is most prominent in Moldova 
with eighty-eight percent of its population identifying with the religion.  Of the major 
world religions Judaism appears to be the smallest globally with an average of one 
percent of a nation’s population identifying as Jewish.  Islam is the second largest world 
religion among the countries in the sample with an average of twenty percent of a 
nation’s population identifying themselves as Muslim.  In terms of the Indian religions, 
Hinduism and Buddhism on average are relatively small (2% and 4%) compared to the 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Missing 
Variable N Mean SD Minimum Maximum Percent  
Homicide 86 9.38 13.66 0.53 78.66 
 Protestantism 86 0.13 0.19 0 0.88 
 Catholicism 86 0.29 0.32 0 0.99 
 Orthodox 86 0.11 0.24 0 0.88 
 Judaism 86 0.01 0.09 0 0.85 
 Islam 86 0.20 0.32 0 0.98 
 Hinduism 86 0.02 0.09 0 0.77 
 Buddhism 86 0.04 0.14 0 0.97 
 Religious Pluralism 86 5.88 2.70 0.64 10.67 
 Atheism 80 0.05 0.06 0.001 0.29 7 
Lack of Trust 86 0.73 0.14 0.3 0.96 
 Individualism* 69 40.68 23.29 6 91 
 Secularization # # # # # 
 Religion very Important 85 0.69 0.25 0.15 1 1 
Importance of God 85 0.73 0.23 0.27 0.99 1 
Religious Service Attendance 84 0.33 0.26 0.03 0.94 2 
Religious Person 84 0.68 0.19 0.18 0.98 2 
Economic Inequality 83 37.79 8.59 23.07 59.80 3 
Economic Inequality Ratio 82 8.24 5.04 3.40 29.60 5 
Infant Mortality 84 28.29 28.18 3 113 2 
Economic Discrimination 72 1.35 1.28 0 4 16 
Health Benefits 83 5.38 2.93 0 12.40 3 
Charity 80 0.09 0.06 0.003 0.25 7 
Single w/ kids 80 0.03 0.03 0.001 0.13 7 
Religious Member. 80 0.20 0.19 0.01 0.76 7 
Life Meaning 85 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.37 1 
New Govt. 86 0.41 0.49 0 1 
 Latin Nation 86 0.14 0.35 0 1 
                                                                                                                                          Variables in original metrics 
                                                                                                *Individualism measure assessed with smaller data set 
                                                                                                                                              # indicates latent variable 
 
other major world religions.  Hinduism figures prominently in India comprising 
 
seventy-seven percent of its residents as adherents, while Buddhism claims ninety-seven  
 
percent of the residents of Thailand as adherents.  While Buddhism is most prominent  
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within Thailand, this country is also the least religiously pluralistic country in the sample.  
Vietnam, on the other hand, is the most religiously plural country in the study.  On 
average five percent of a nation’s residents identify themselves as atheist or those not 
believing in the existence of God.  South Korea displays the highest percentage of 
atheists at twenty-nine percent, while Bangladesh has the lowest percentage of atheists 
among its residents at less than 1 percent.   
 In terms of the mechanisms that may link Protestantism and the other major world 
religions with homicide, the average percent of those who believe that individuals must 
be careful rather than trusting of others is high at seventy-three percent.  Overall, it 
appears that for many the willingness to trust others is resisted at the cross-national level.  
There is considerable variation in the country scores pertaining to Hofstede’s (1980) 
measure of moral individualism.  With a score of ninety-one the United States displays 
the highest level of moral individualism in terms of an emphasis on individual success 
and self-actualization.  Guatemala, on the other hand, with a score of 6 displays the 
lowest level of moral individualism of any country in the sample.  An examination of the 
measures of economic dominance from table 1 above reveals larger variation related to 
the infant mortality rate among the countries than either measure of economic inequality.  
Sweden displays the lowest infant mortality rate at 3 per 100,000 while Mali has the 
highest infant mortality rate at 113 per 100,000.  
 In table 1 above, the average for expenditures on health is around 5 percent of the 
gross domestic product for countries in the sample.  Also, on average 9 percent of a 
nation’s population is a member in a charitable or voluntary organization.  This measure 
of private social welfare is found most prominently in New Zealand with twenty-five 
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percent of its residents being involved in these organizations.  Azerbaijan, on the other 
hand, displays the lowest membership in these types of organizations at less than 1 
percent.   
In terms of the control measures, it would appear that the average percent of those 
who are single with children for the sample of countries is relatively low at just 3 percent.  
In fact, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development presents an 
average percent of single parent households for a subset of thirty nations in my sample in 
the year 2011 at around 7 (OECD, 2016).  Despite the differences in the number of 
nations and the year for which these estimates are calculated, there is potentially an 
alternative explanation for the disparity between these values.  In the OECD the single 
parent households are those that are living alone with children distinguished from those 
who are married or cohabitating with children (OECD, 2016). It is possible though that 
the OECD data includes those who are divorced, separated, or widowed in the calculation 
of those who are single with children.  In my estimation I exclude those who are 
divorced, separated, or widowed and only tabulate the proportion who state that they are 
single with 1 or more child.  This may explain why my number for the average percent of 
those who are single with children appears to be underestimated in relation to the number 
reported from the OECD data.  It also important to consider the fact that the OECD 
calculates single with children based on household type whereas the WVS calculates this 
measure based on interviews with individuals.  With an understanding of the distribution 
of many of the variables of interest at the univariate level, potential associations between 
these variables are highlighted at the bivariate level. 
 At the bivariate level correlations between the variables are included in table 2  
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix  
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1 Homicide 1.000
2 Protestantism .0773 1.000
3 Catholicism .1374 .1338 1.000
4 Orthodox .1123 -.1839 -.2872** 1.000
5 Judaism -.0239 .0563 -.0662 .1657 1.000
6 Islam -.1326 -.2577** -.4296**** -.0668 -.0926 1.000
7 Hinduism -.1039 .2031* .0438 -.3503*** .2035* -.0423 1.000
8 Buddhism -.1142 .2555** -.0595 -.1786 .0626 -.3497*** .3848**** 1.000
9 Religious Pluralism .1479 .3587*** -.1862* .0591 -.0228 -.1995* .0228 .2220** 1.000
10 Atheism -.5295**** .1589 .0275 .0525 .0984 -.3453*** .1452 .2849** .2415** 1.000
11 Lack of Trust .5321**** -.1250 .3136*** .0458 -.0469 .1484 -.0184 -.1831* -.0351 -.4659**** 1.000
12 Secularization -.4827**** .0282 -.0578 .2115* .0610 -.4440**** .0182 .3310*** .1781 .8247**** -.5589**** 1.000
13 Religion very Important .4512**** -.1423 -.0411 -.1793 -.0998 .4718**** -.0541 -.3205*** -.2294** -.8396**** .5036**** -.9661**** 1.000
14 Importance of God .4525**** -.1031 .0474 -.2125* -.0440 .4334**** -.0066 -.2969*** -.1879* -.7998**** .5053**** -.9601**** .9635**** 1.000
15 Religious Service Attendance .4841**** .1794 .0860 -.3399*** -.1417 .3547*** -.0204 -.2131* -.0415 -.7209**** .4732**** -.8834**** .8009**** .7793****
16 Religious Person .4252**** -.0451 .1524 -.0541 .0442 .3624*** -.0038 -.4362**** -.2067* -.7081**** .5862**** -.8939**** .8118**** .8085****
17 Economic Inequality .5967**** .0875 .2405** -.3256*** -.1531 -.0663 .1672 .0709 .0972 -.4479**** .5418**** -.5083**** .5153**** .5580****
18 Economic Inequality Ratio .6144**** .1361 .2994*** -.2551** -.0656 -.1626 .1386 .0871 .1025 -.3839**** .5285**** -.4407**** .4485**** .5037****
19 Infant Mortality .5958**** -.0915 -.2264** -.1162 -.1377 .3741*** -.0975 -.2622** -.0215 -.6802**** .4091**** -.7124**** .6943**** .6591****
20 Economic Discrimination .1071 -.0895 .1615 -.2059 -.0482 -.0557 .0133 -.0581 -.0056 -.0090 -.0336 .0985 -.0696 -.0547
21 Health Benefits -.3455*** .1626 .2809** .1102 .2314** -.3754*** -.0504 .1028 -.0269 .5291**** -.3203*** .6060**** -.6407**** -.6397****
22 Charity .0875 .4327**** .1222 -.4120**** .1762 .0025 .2310** .1045 .0505 -.1151 -.1932* -.1773 .1039 .1573
23 Single w/ kids .4652**** .4672**** .3082*** .0092 .0840 -.1598 .1098 -.1383 .1891* -.0599 .3072*** -.1871* .0890 .1271
24 Religious Member. .3851**** .5396**** .2571** -.3568*** .0833 -.1053 .2310** .1059 .1298 -.3366*** .1630 -.4591**** .3661**** .4191****
25 Life Meaning -.4265**** .0336 .0700 .0864 -.0248 -.2081* .1199 .1940* -.0809 .6010**** -.4150**** .5838**** -.5741**** -.5714****
26 New Govt. .2216** -.2860** -.1248 .4867**** -.0098 .1484 -.2141** -.1944* -.0407 -.2248** .2174** -.0750 .0760 .0165
27 Latin Nation .4492**** .0262 .4872**** -.2328* -.0520 -.4378**** -.0364 .0394 .0170 -.1565 .2743** -.2027* .2070* .2987***
*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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Table 2 Cont. Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
15 Religious Service Attendance 1.000
16 Religious Person .6870**** 1.000
17 Economic Inequality .4703**** .3538*** 1.000
18 Economic Inequality Ratio .3825**** .3175*** .9567**** 1.000
19 Infant Mortality .6951**** .6282**** .4854**** .3773**** 1.000
20 Economic Discrimination -.0253 -.2121* .1963 .1816 -.0537 1.000
21 Health Benefits -.5106**** -.4377**** -.4390**** -.3141*** -.7194**** .0337 1.000
22 Charity .3417*** .0692 .0813 .1561 .0404 .1314 .0452 1.000
23 Single w/ kids .2634** .2195* .3003*** .4002**** -.0171 .1078 .2846** .3457*** 1.000
24 Religious Member. .6230**** .2950*** .3931**** .4032**** .2062* .0319 -.1139 .6678**** .5151**** 1.000
25 Life Meaning -.5522**** -.4855**** -.2943*** -.2307** -.4910**** .0972 .4715**** -.1002 .0133 -.2529** 1.000
26 New Govt. -.0001 .1945* -.1031 -.1635 .1846* -.1352 -.1235 -.2904*** -.0632 -.1822 -.0094 1.000
27 Latin Nation .1495 .1125 .6280**** .6831**** .0989 .4590**** -.0700 .1712 .3884**** .2906*** -.0267 -.1970* 1.000
*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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above.  Bivariate correlations reveal that Protestantism does not display a significant  
 
association with homicide.  Neither the major world religions nor the measure of 
 
religious pluralism displays a significant association with homicide, but the proportion 
 
atheist is associated with lower rates of homicide (r = -.530, p < .001).  Atheism may be  
 
correlated with lower rates of homicide since it serves as the antithesis of religious  
 
passion which has been linked to higher rates of homicide (Jensen, 2006).  Any partial  
 
correlation between atheism and homicide will be revealed in the multivariate analysis.   
 
As anticipated due to its representation of egoistic individualism, the proportion who  
 
believe individuals should be careful rather than trusting of others displays a significant  
 
positive association with homicide (r = .532, p < .001).  Contrary to what has been  
 
hypothesized, secularization displays a significant negative association with homicide (r  
 
= -.483, p < .001).  This would not support the assertion that Protestantism is linked to  
 
higher rates of homicide through its promotion of the secularization process.  
 
 Both measures of income inequality along with the infant mortality rate display 
strong positive correlations with homicide.  In terms of social welfare, at the bivariate 
level it would appear that public measures of welfare may be more salient as correlates of 
homicide.  Government expenditures on health as a percentage of GDP is negatively 
associated with homicide (r = -.346, p < .01), while the proportion who are members in 
charitable or voluntary organizations is not linked to homicide.  These measures of 
economic dominance and social welfare are linked to homicide at the bivariate level, but 
their consistency as predictors of homicide will be revealed in the presence of other 
covariates at the multivariate level.   
 In table 2 above Protestantism displays differential relationships with some of the 
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other major world religions.  Protestantism is negatively correlated with Islam (r = -.258, 
p < .10) but is positively correlated with both Hinduism and Buddhism.  These 
differential effects may be based on the promotion of freedom and individual autonomy 
found in religions like Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism (Berger, 1967) but not 
within Islam.  This emphasis on freedom and individual choice may also explain the 
positive correlation between Protestantism and the global measure of religious pluralism 
(r = .359, p < .01).  In terms of the control measures that may facilitate higher rates of 
homicide, the proportion single with children is positively correlated with Protestantism. 
Bivariate scatter plots of Protestantism and several of the mechanisms that may link it to 
homicide can be found in Appendix D, pgs. 127-134. Contrary to expectations 
Protestantism is positively correlated with measures of social welfare, particularly those 
of the private type. 
 Catholicism displays significant negative correlations with a few religious groups 
at the bivariate level.  In table 2 above Catholicism is negatively correlated with religious 
pluralism (r = -.186, p < .10) and both Orthodox Christianity and Islam.  In terms of its 
relationship with religious pluralism, Catholicism by focusing on one unified and 
authoritative Church diverges from the Protestant promotion of a pluralistic religious 
landscape (Herberg, 1955).  Unlike Protestantism, Catholicism is positively correlated 
with the egoistic individualism measure represented through the lack of trust (r = .314, p 
< .01).  Through its structure Catholicism may de-emphasize the value of the individual 
while promoting the merits of the Church (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1986; Williams, 
2015).  Catholicism is correlated with the three primary measures of economic 
dominance, but unlike with inequality it displays a significant negative correlation with 
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the infant mortality rate. Like Protestantism, Catholicism is positively correlated with the 
proportion single with children (r = .308, p < .01) which serves as a control measure.  
Potential indirect and conditioning effects involving Catholicism and measures of 
individualism and economic dominance will be highlighted at the multivariate level.  
 Orthodox Christianity displays a significant negative correlation with Hinduism (r 
= -.350, p < .01) in table 2 above.  Unlike Protestantism and Catholicism, Orthodox 
Christianity is positively correlated with the measure of secularization which may be due 
to its close association with the state in many eastern European countries (Woodhead, 
2009).  In terms of economic dominance, Orthodox Christianity is negatively correlated 
with both inequality measures but also displays a significant negative correlation with 
membership in charitable organizations.  Due to its emphasis on mysticism Orthodox 
Christianity may not serve as a catalyst for worldly activities.   
 Other Abrahamic religions such as Judaism and Islam display contrasting findings 
in table 2 above.  Judaism is positively correlated with Hinduism (r = .204, p < .10) and 
also positively correlated with government expenditures on health.  This finding related 
to health underscores the importance placed on social welfare by Judaism (Sombart, 
1913; Weber, 1993).  On the other hand, Islam is negatively correlated with government 
expenditures on health.  With less emphasis on social support perhaps it is not surprising 
that Islam is positively correlated with the infant mortality rate (r = .374, p < .01).  In like 
manner, Islam is negatively correlated with secularization but displays a positive 
correlation with several measures that tap into the intensity of religious belief and 
involvement.  Islam is also negatively correlated with Buddhism, religious pluralism, and 
atheism in table 2. 
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 As an offshoot of Hinduism, it is not surprising that Buddhism is positively 
correlated with its predecessor (r = .385, p < .001).  Hinduism does not correlate with 
many factors in the present study, but it is positively correlated with membership in 
charitable organizations.  Buddhism, on the other hand, displays somewhat unexpected 
findings at the bivariate level. In particular, Buddhism is positively correlated with the 
global measure of religious pluralism but also displays significant positive correlations 
with atheism and secularization.  A positive correlation between Buddhism and 
secularization may be due in part to the former’s link to the rationalism characteristic of 
western culture (Obadia, 2011).  Buddhism is negatively correlated with the lack of trust 
measure which serves as a proxy for egoistic individualism.  It may be that the negative 
association between Buddhism and egoistic individualism is based on the social 
individualism Buddhism cultivates through its promotion of selflessness (Thurman, 
1996).  Buddhism is also negatively correlated with several measures of religious 
intensity or passion and the infant mortality rate. 
 Atheism and the global measure of religious pluralism are positively correlated 
with each other (r = .242, p < .05) which may highlight the role of choice in religious 
matters.  A strong negative correlation in terms of effect size exists between atheism and 
the lack of trust measure (r = -.466, p < .001).  This may reflect how atheism shifts the 
focus from God and religious concerns to cultivating relationships within the secular 
world.  Both atheism and the global measure of religious pluralism are negatively 
correlated with some of the religious intensity or passion measures, which potentially 
contradicts Stark’s (2005) claim that religious pluralism enhances religious commitment.  
Aside from their relationship with measures of religious passion, atheism and the global 
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measure of religious pluralism diverge in their relationships with other factors. Atheism 
displays a significant positive correlation with government expenditures on health, while 
religious pluralism is positively correlated with the proportion single with children.  
Analyses at the multivariate level will reveal whether religious pluralism or atheism 
display any potential relationships with the mechanisms hypothesized to influence rates 
of homicide cross-nationally.  
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES 
 To begin the presentation of the results from the multivariate models I first 
examine the research questions in the present study solely focusing on Protestantism.  In 
table 3 below there are 8 models that examine Protestantism in relation to the 7 research 
questions and an additional model that examines the relationship between Protestantism 
and homicide with the measure of moral individualism.  In model 1 of table 3 I examine 
whether higher levels of Protestantism are directly associated with higher rates of 
homicide or higher levels of egoistic individualism.  Model 1 also permits the 
examination of whether the lack of trust measure mediates the relationship between 
higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide.  Results from model 1 
suggest that with the inclusion of secularization and measures of economic dominance, 
Protestantism is not directly associated with homicide with and without the presence of 
the lack of trust measure in the model.  In model 1 Protestantism is not associated with 
lack of trust as a measure of egoistic individualism, and this measure of individualism 
does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates 
of homicide.  Despite not linking Protestantism with higher rates of homicide in model 1, 
the lack of trust measure is still a relevant predictor of homicide.  In fact, when  
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & Generalized 
Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Protestantism on Homicide Rates:  
Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects 
 
 
Protestantism, the index of secularization, the Gini index, and the infant mortality rate  
 
are held at their sample means, the predicted homicide rate in countries where the lack of  
 
trust measure is one standard deviation above the sample mean is fifty percent  
 
higher than in countries where the lack of trust measure is one standard deviation below  
 
the mean (11.4 vs. 7.6 per 100,000 population).   
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Protestantism .059 -.020 .039 .081 -.033 .048 .024 -.020
(.043) (.016) (.047) (.054) (.029) (.057) (.082) (.085)
Lack of Trust 2.23*** — — — — — — —
(.701)
Secularization .185 2.23*** .131 .471**** — 1.00f — —
(.135) (.701) (.961) (.096)
Economic Inequality .047*** .017*** .064**** — — — .580**** —
(.015) (.006) (.014) (.075)
Economic Inequality Ratio — — — — — — — .609****
(.069)
Infant Mortality .562**** .059 .621**** — — — — —
(.148) (.036) (.150)
Prot x Econ Ineq. — — — — — — .088 —
(.083)
Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio — — — — — — — .110
(.087)
Adjusted R² .354 .383
N 78 77
χ² — —
χ²/df — —
RMSEA — —
CFI — —
                                                           Only model 2 not saturated. 
.224
86
.543
86
— .183
— .948
            *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                    — Indicates parameter or fit statistic not estimated
— 30.97 (p < .001)
— 3.87
Model 1 Model 2
Model 3 Model 4
          Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3 Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & 
Generalized Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Protestantism on 
Homicide Rates:  Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects 
 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Direct Indirect Total 
Protestantism -.121 -.193* .069 -.111 -.033 -.144* 
 
(.108) (.106) (.116) (.069) (.026) (.075) 
Secularization — — — -.025* -.017**** -.042**** 
    
(.013) (.005) (.012) 
Infant Mortality .587**** — — — — — 
 
(.079) 
     Health Benefits — -.548**** — — — — 
  
(.069) 
    Charity — — .069 — — — 
   
(.112) 
   Individualism — — — -.017**** — — 
    
(.005) 
  Single w/ kids .485**** .692**** — .593**** -.036 .557**** 
 
(.116) (.105) 
 
(.106) (.042) (.112) 
Prot x Mortality .058 — — — — — 
 
(.094) 
     Prot x Health — -.034 — — — — 
  
(.078) 
    Prot x Charity — — -.121 — — — 
   
(.096) 
   Adjusted R² .561 .474 -.014 .507 
N 75 74 77 69 
  
                               *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
  
                                                              — Indicates parameter not estimated 
  
                    Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
In model 2 of table 3 I examine whether higher levels of Protestantism are  
associated with higher levels of secularization, and if secularization mediates the 
relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide.  Even 
before the addition of any covariates, non-significant findings are present in model 2.  
Higher levels of Protestantism are not associated with higher levels of secularization, and 
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secularization does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism 
and higher rates of homicide.  Fit indices present contradictory support regarding whether 
overall model fit is satisfactory in model 2.  From one perspective, good model fit is 
indicated by the fact that the comparative fit index (CFI) is above .90, but evidence of 
poor model fit is seen with the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) being 
above .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  An inability to include more variables due to a sample 
size under 100 and the inclusion of secularization as a latent variable may contribute to  
the RMSEA indicating poor model fit in model 2.  Models 1 and 2 of table 3 are 
represented in figures 2 and 3 below.  Figures 2 and 3 provide a visual representation of 
the path diagrams in the structural equation models as they highlight the direct and 
indirect relationships between Protestantism, egoistic individualism, secularization, and 
homicide. 
 In models 3, 4, and 5 of table 3 I examine whether higher levels of Protestantism 
condition the relationship between dominant economic conditions and higher rates of 
homicide.  Model 3 includes the Gini index as a measure of economic dominance, and    
without the inclusion of any covariates higher levels of Protestantism do not condition the 
relationship between higher levels of the Gini index and higher rates of homicide.  A 
similar finding is found in model 4 with economic dominance being measured through 
the economic inequality measure as a ratio of the richest to the poorest 20% of a nation’s 
residents.  Again, without any covariates in model 4, higher levels of Protestantism do 
not condition the relationship between the economic inequality ratio measure and higher 
rates of homicide.  In model 5, the infant mortality rate as a measure of poverty rather 
than a measure of economic inequality is used to capture the dominance of the economy.  
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Figure 2: Structural Equation Model of the Relationship between Protestantism and Homicide Rates: Direct & Indirect 
Effects w/ Egoistic Individualism 
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Note: Nonsignificant paths to lack of trust and homicide are not shown. 
Correlations between exogenous variables are also not included. 
 
“ns” indicates a nonsignificant coefficient. 
*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
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Figure 3: Structural Equation Model of the Relationship between Protestantism and Homicide Rates: Direct & Indirect 
Effects w/ Secularization 
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Note: Secularization is a latent construct measured by the indicators religion very 
important, religious service attendance, importance of God, and religious person. 
Nonsignificant paths to secularization and homicide are not shown. Correlations 
between exogenous variables are also not included. 
 
“ns” indicates a nonsignificant coefficient. 
*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
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However, controlling for the proportion single with children, higher levels of 
Protestantism do not condition the relationship between the infant mortality rate and  
higher rates of homicide cross-nationally. In model 5 with infant mortality as a measure 
of economic dominance the amount of variance in the rates of homicide that is explained 
is considerably higher than models 3 and 4 with measures of economic inequality.  This 
may lend some support to Pridemore’s (2008; 2011) claim that the infant mortality rate as 
a measure of poverty should be included in cross-national studies of homicide, but the 
inclusion of the proportion single with children in model 5 may also explain the 
difference in the adjusted r-squared. 
Models 6 and 7 of table 3 examine the final research question of whether higher  
levels of social welfare condition the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism 
and lower rates of homicide.  Model 6 includes expenditures on health as a public 
measure of social welfare, and membership in a voluntary or charitable organization is 
included as a private measure of social welfare in model 7.  Neither measure of social 
welfare serves to condition a significant negative relationship between Protestantism and 
homicide.  Model 7 with charitable membership does not include any covariates, while 
the proportion single with children is included in model 6 which may explain the 
disparity in the amount of variance explained in these models.  In model 8 of table 3 I 
examine the relationship between Protestantism and homicide with Hofstede’s (1980) 
measure of moral individualism.  This measure of individualism is anticipated to link 
Protestantism with lower rather than higher rates of homicide.  Yet, controlling for the 
proportion single with children and secularization there are no significant findings related 
to the measures of interest in model 8.  Higher levels of Protestantism are not associated 
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with higher levels of Hofstede’s (1980) measure of individualism, and this measure of 
individualism does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism 
and lower rates of homicide.   
In table 4 below I examine the research questions in the present study with  
Catholicism.  This study attempts to identify a direct relationship between any of the  
 
Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & Generalized 
Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Catholicism on Homicide Rates:  
Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Catholicism .190 .210 .400 .575 -.015 .559 -.096 -.045
(.284) (.127) (.271) (.387) (.179) (.425) (.077) (.078)
Lack of Trust 1.50** — — — — — — —
(.759)
Secularization .00001**** 1.50** .989 .454**** — 1.00f — —
(.000001) (.759) (.874) (.091)
Economic Inequality — — — — — — .502**** —
(.099)
Economic Inequality Ratio 1.00**** .127** 1.13**** — — — — .591****
(.225) (.062) (.212) (.103)
Infant Mortality .722**** .062 .785**** — — — — —
(.132) (.045) (.124)
Health Benefits .068 -.007 .061 — — — — —
(.042) (.010) (.041)
Single w/ kids — — — — — — .327**** —
(.087)
Cath x Econ Ineq. — — — — — — .067 —
(.080)
Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio — — — — — — — .070
(.081)
Adjusted R² .446 .360
N 78 82
χ² — —
χ²/df — —
RMSEA — —
CFI — —
            *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                           Only model 2 not saturated. 
.576
86
— 20.12 (p < .01)
.227
86
                    — Indicates parameter or fit statistic not estimated
— 2.52
— .133
— .972
Model 1 Model 2
Model 3 Model 4
          Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4 Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & 
Generalized Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Catholicism on 
Homicide Rates:  Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects 
 
 
 
major world religions and homicide, and it looks at potential mechanisms that may link 
 
Protestantism and homicide.  Yet, it remains worthwhile to examine how the other major 
world religions such as Catholicism may be linked to the mechanisms that facilitate or 
inhibit rates of homicide.  In model 1 of table 4 I examine whether Catholicism is directly 
associated with homicide, and whether higher levels of Catholicism are associated with a 
Direct Indirect Total
Catholicism .073 .054 .093 .145 -.131 .015
(.100) (.097) (.113) (.395) (.224) (.438)
Economic Inequality .167 — — — — —
(.114)
Infant Mortality .500**** — — — — —
(.101)
Economic Discrimination .044 — — — — —
(.083)
Health Benefits — -.566**** — — — —
(.073)
Charity — — .099 — — —
(.107)
Individualism — — — -.025**** — —
(.005)
Single w/ kids .387**** .618**** — .532**** -.074 .457****
(.097) (.095) (.100) (.056) (.107)
Cath x Mortality .139 — — — — —
(.096)
Cath x Health — .035 — — — —
(.079)
Cath x Charity — — .124 — — —
(.141)
Adjusted R² .567 .452 -.016
N 65 77 80
             *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                             — Indicates parameter not estimated
   Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
.397
69
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Model 8
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higher proportion of those who believe individuals must be careful rather than trusting of 
others.  Model 1 also reveals whether the lack of trust measure mediates the relationship 
between higher levels of Catholicism and higher rates of homicide.  With secularization, 
measures of economic dominance, and expenditures on health included in model 1, 
higher levels of Catholicism are not associated with higher rates of homicide with or 
without the inclusion of the lack of trust measure.  Also, in model 1 higher levels of  
Catholicism are not associated with a higher proportion of those who believe individuals  
 
must be careful rather than trusting of others, and this measure of egoistic individualism  
 
does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and higher rates  
 
of homicide.   
 
In model 2 of table 4 I examine whether higher levels of Catholicism are  
associated with higher levels of secularization, and if secularization mediates the 
relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and higher rates of homicide. In similar 
fashion to Protestantism, non-significant findings related to secularization are found in 
model 2 before it is necessary to include any covariates in the model.  Higher levels of 
Catholicism are not associated with higher levels of secularization, and secularization 
does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and higher rates 
of homicide.  In models 3, 4, and 5 of table 4 I examine whether Catholicism conditions 
the relationship between dominant economic conditions and higher rates of homicide.  In 
model 3 controlling for the proportion single with children, Catholicism does not 
condition the relationship between the Gini index and higher rates of homicide.  No other 
measures aside from those in the interaction term are included in model 4, and 
Catholicism does not condition the relationship between higher levels of the economic 
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inequality ratio measure and higher rates of homicide.  Measures of economic dominance 
along with the proportion single with children are controlled for in model 5, but the 
results remain the same.  Higher levels of Catholicism do not condition the relationship 
between the infant mortality rate and higher rates of homicide.   
In the final 3 models of table 4 I examine whether higher levels of Catholicism  
are associated with lower rates of homicide in nations with more social welfare, and 
whether Hofstede’s (1980) measure of moral individualism mediates the relationship 
between higher levels of Catholicism and higher rates of homicide.  In model 6, 
controlling for the proportion single with children, expenditures on health does not 
condition the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and lower rates of 
homicide.  Without any additional covariates in model 7 of table 4, charitable 
membership as a private measure of social welfare does not condition a significant 
negative relationship between Catholicism and homicide.  In model 8 controlling for the 
proportion single with children, higher levels of Catholicism are not associated with 
higher levels of Hofstede’s (1980) measure of moral individualism. Hofstede’s (1980) 
measure also does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and 
lower rates of homicide.  Of note in model 8 is that the proportion single with children 
displays a stronger relationship with homicide in terms of the magnitude of its parameter 
estimate (β = .532, p < .001) compared to that of Hofstede’s (1980) measure of moral 
individualism (β = - .025, p < .001).  Yet, both measures while representing different 
constructs appear salient as explanatory factors for the variation in cross-national rates of 
homicide. 
In table 5 below I examine the possible link between Islam and homicide 
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Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & Generalized 
Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Islam on Homicide Rates:  Direct, 
Indirect, & Conditioning Effects 
 
 
 
and the mechanisms which may influence this potential relationship.  In model 1 of table 
5 I examine whether higher levels of Islam are directly associated with higher rates of  
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Islam -.038 .014 -.025 -.082 .064 -.019 -0.039 -.001
(.038) (.011) (.039) (.056) (.040) (.035) (.087) (.086)
Lack of Trust 1.45** — —
(.739)
Secularization — — — .248* — 1.00f — —
(.143)
Economic Inequality .053*** .014* .067**** — — — .529**** —
(.017) (.008) (.014) (.097)
Economic Inequality Ratio — — — — — — — .541****
(.097)
Charity — — — -2.04 -.842 -2.88* — —
(1.54) (.651) (1.59)
Single w/ kids .201*** .039 .239*** .309**** -.028 .282*** — —
(.076) (.025) (.080) (.085) (.024) (.084)
Religious Member. .101 -.019 .081 .061 .116 .177 — —
(.105) (.019) (.105) (.133) (.078) (.111)
Life Meaning — — — -4.55**** -1.37* -5.93**** — —
(1.15) (.774) (.991)
New Govt. .664*** .097 .761**** .650*** .049 .699**** — —
(.206) (.062) (.184) (.189) (.054) (.186)
Latin Nation .139 -.001 .138 .683* .446 1.13**** — —
(.383) (.076) (.384) (.409) (.275) (.290)
Islam x Econ Ineq. — — — — — — -.145 —
(.111)
Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio — — — — — — — -.145
(.105)
Adjusted R² .347 .368
N 83 82
χ² — —
χ²/df — —
RMSEA — —
CFI — —
            *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
          Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
                                                           Only model 2 not saturated. 
Model 1 Model 2
Model 3 Model 4
— 89.99 (p < .001)
— 3.46
.542 .573
86 86
—
—
.169
.896
                                         — Indicates parameter or fit statistic not estimated
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Table 5 Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & 
Generalized Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Islam on Homicide 
Rates:  Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects 
 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Direct Indirect Total 
Islam -.255*** -.146 -.078 -.045 .039 -.006 
 
(.080) (.096) (.099) (.043) (.031) (.055) 
Secularization 1.00f — — — — — 
       Economic Inequality  .149 — — — — — 
 
(.090) 
     Infant Mortality .658**** — — — — — 
 
(.080) 
     Health Benefits — -.593**** — — — — 
  
(.079) 
    Charity — — .083 — — — 
   
(.104) 
   Individualism — — — -.026**** — — 
    
(.004) 
  Single w/ kids .331**** .587**** — .522**** -.067 .455**** 
 
(.066) (.084) 
 
(.095) (.053) (.103) 
Islam x Mortality -.130 — — — — — 
 
(.088) 
     Islam x Health — .030 — — — — 
  
(.097) 
    Islam x Charity — — .148 — — — 
   
(.091) 
   Adjusted R² .655 .467 .001 .459 
N 86 77 80 69 
  
                         *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
  
                                                        — Indicates parameter not estimated 
  
             Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
    
                                  f = fixed coefficient. 
 
homicide, and whether higher levels of Islam are linked with a higher proportion of those 
 
who believe individuals must be careful rather than trusting of others. Model 1 also 
 
examines if the lack of trust measure mediates the relationship between higher levels of  
 
Islam and higher rates of homicide.  With the Gini index, the proportion single with
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children, and several other control measures included in model 1; higher levels of Islam 
are not significantly associated with higher rates of homicide.  Model 1 also reveals that 
Islam is not significantly associated with the lack of trust measure, and this measure of 
egoistic individualism does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Islam 
and higher rates of homicide.  Model 2 of table 5 examines whether higher levels of 
Islam are associated with higher levels of secularization, and whether secularization 
mediates the relationship between higher levels of Islam and higher rates of homicide.  
With the proportion single with children, charitable membership, and several other 
control measures included in model 2; Islam is not linked with secularization.  
Secularization also does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Islam and 
higher rates of homicide in model 2.  Despite the inclusion of the private measure of 
social welfare and various control measures, poor model fit is reported from the CFI and 
RMSEA statistics in model 2.   
In model 2 of table 5 one of the control measures, the proportion who are an  
active member in a church or religious organization, impacts the relationship between 
Islam, secularization, and homicide.  Also, this religious measure operates to influence 
the relationship between Islam, the lack of trust measure, and homicide in model 1 of 
table 5.  Aside from its role as a control measure in the above table, measures of religious 
involvement, practice, or belief may have a more prominent role as predictors of 
homicide through their association with the major world religions.  Given the link 
between religious passion or intensity and homicide (Jensen, 2006), it may be that 
Protestantism conditions the relationship between higher levels of religiosity and higher 
rates of homicide.  I examine whether Protestantism, the other major world religions, 
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atheism, and the global measure of religious pluralism condition the positive relationship 
between religious intensity and homicide (see Appendix E, pgs. 135-144).  Results 
suggest that neither Protestantism nor any of the other religious groups conditions the 
relationship between any of the religious intensity measures and homicide.  It may be that 
the relationship between Protestantism or any of the other religious groups and measures 
of religious intensity only serves to reinforce religious objectives. 
Models 3, 4, and 5 of table 5 examine whether Islam conditions the relationship  
between dominant economic conditions and higher rates of homicide.  In models 3 and 4 
without the inclusion of any additional covariates, Islam does not condition the 
relationship between either measure of economic inequality and higher rates of homicide.  
In model 5, Islam also does not condition the positive relationship between the infant 
mortality rate and homicide after the Gini index, secularization, and the proportion single 
with children have been included in the model.  Models 6 and 7 examine whether social 
welfare conditions the relationship between higher levels of Islam and lower rates of 
homicide.  In model 6 controlling for the single with children measure, expenditures on 
health do not condition a significant negative relationship between Islam and homicide.  
Without the presence of any control measures, charitable membership as a private 
measure of social welfare also does not condition this potential relationship in model 7.  
In the final model of table 5, I examine whether Islam is associated with Hofstede’s 
(1980) measure of moral individualism, and whether this measure mediates the 
relationship between Islam and homicide. In the presence of the proportion single with 
children, Islam is not significantly associated with Hofstede’s (1980) measure in model 8. 
Hofstede’s (1980) measure of moral individualism also does not mediate the relationship  
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between higher levels of Islam and lower rates of homicide. 
Results involving Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, atheism,  
and the global measure of religious pluralism are not presented here due to the fact  
that each religion or group did not display any significant effects with homicide.  Also, in 
most of the models involving these groups, the inclusion of additional covariates as 
controls was not necessary.  Like Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam; higher levels of 
the other religions, atheism, and religious pluralism are not associated with higher rates 
of homicide.  These other religions and groups are not associated with the lack of trust 
measure, and this measure of egoistic individualism does not mediate the relationship 
between higher levels of any of these groups and higher rates of homicide.  Also, these 
religions and groups besides Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam were not found to be 
associated with higher levels of secularization, and secularization did not mediate the 
positive relationship between these groups and homicide.  None of the religions or groups 
conditioned the positive relationship between any of the economic dominance measures 
and rates of homicide cross-nationally.  Neither the public nor the private measure of 
social welfare conditioned the relationship between higher levels of any of the religions 
or groups and lower rates of homicide.  Also, these religions and groups besides 
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam were not linked with Hofstede’s (1980) measure of 
moral individualism, and this measure of individualism did not mediate the relationship 
between higher levels of any of the groups and lower rates of homicide.   
As a way to assess the robust nature of the findings, I conducted an influential 
case analysis where models were examined without 7 country outliers (see Appendices 
H-O, pgs.147-239).   In the influential case analysis added variable or partial regression 
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plots are included that highlight the effect of each religion on homicide holding all other 
religions constant.  In the added variable plots (see Appendix F, pg. 145) it is difficult to 
discern the outliers in the analysis. Outliers are more clearly distinguishable in the 
leverage versus squared residual plot (see Appendix G, pg. 146).  In the leverage versus 
squared residual plot one can see that Israel, Norway, Thailand, El Salvador, South 
Africa, Colombia, and Zambia are outliers.  Israel, Norway, and Thailand have high 
leverage values which indicates that if a regression line was fitted on the data plot these 
country values would influence the line.  El Salvador, South Africa, Colombia, and 
Zambia display high residual values, which indicate that they would be further from a 
fitted regression line.  As evidenced in Appendices (H-O), results do not change with 
each of the country outliers removed separately or collectively from the analyses. 
 Overall, results suggest that neither Protestantism nor any of the major world 
religions is associated with the variation in cross-national rates of homicide.  Higher 
levels of pluralism within Protestantism do not facilitate higher rates of homicide, and 
mechanisms such as individualism and the secularization process do not link any of the 
world religions and homicide.  In terms of the interaction effects, Protestantism does not 
condition a positive relationship between the dominance of a free market economy and 
homicide, and social welfare does not condition a negative relationship between 
Protestantism and homicide. Homicide levels are also not influenced by the interplay 
between any of the other world religions, economic dominance, or social welfare.  Even 
with the removal of country outliers, none of the major world religions are linked with 
homicide through any of the proposed mechanisms.  These findings raise questions 
regarding what factor or factors may link religion and homicide. Yet, this study more 
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broadly raises the issue of religion’s role within contemporary society.    
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
 
 In the present study the focus was on examining the relationship between the 
major world religions and rates of homicide cross-nationally. In particular, I was 
interested in whether higher levels of any of the major world religions would be 
associated with higher rates of homicide.  This study also attempted to identify the 
mechanisms that may influence the relationship between Protestantism and homicide.  I 
also examined whether egoistic individualism or the secularization process might mediate 
the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide.  
This study also attempted to assess whether Protestantism conditions the relationship 
between dominant economic conditions and higher rates of homicide, and whether social 
welfare might condition the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and 
lower rates of homicide.  Results from this study suggest that none of the major world 
religions are significantly associated with homicide cross-nationally.  Neither egoistic 
individualism nor the secularization process mediates the relationship between higher 
levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide.  Also, Protestantism did not 
condition the relationship between dominant economic conditions and homicide, and 
social welfare did not serve to condition the negative relationship between Protestantism 
and homicide. 
 Based off of the findings and some of the fit statistics such as the adjusted r-
squared values, the fit of the models in this study might be characterized as modest to 
average at best.  A small sample size in the present study certainly poses some 
challenges, but there may be more substantive explanations for the lack of significant 
findings.  A lack of association between any of the major world religions, religious 
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pluralism, or atheism and the rate of homicide cross-nationally requires a deeper 
inspection of these religions and groups.  As the largest of the major world religions, it 
might be expected that Catholicism (Pew, 2011) may contribute somehow to higher rates 
of homicide cross-nationally.  It is also rather surprising that Catholicism is not linked to 
higher rates of homicide given the fact that it is positively correlated with the lack of trust 
measure, measures of economic dominance, and Latin nations at the bivariate level.  
Despite being linked to factors at the bivariate level that may facilitate higher rates of 
homicide, there are aspects of Catholicism which render it less likely to stimulate 
homicide at the cross-national level.  In particular, the individualism promoted by 
Catholicism is not unbound and is in fact curbed by the idea of one unified Church 
(Fichter, 1957). This facet of Catholicism coupled with its sacraments which reinforce 
group membership through collective ritualized practices (Vernon, 1962) make it less 
likely to facilitate homicide.  Contemporary Catholicism for the most part has been a 
proponent of a free market economy (Dobrijevic, 2006). Yet, it has also attempted to 
thwart the debilitating effects that may arise from the free market through its efforts 
promoting social welfare cross-nationally (Castles, 1994; Esping-Anderson & Van 
Kersbergen, 1992).   
 Results at the bivariate level may also shed some light on why some of the other 
major world religions are not linked to higher rates of homicide cross-nationally.  A lack 
of association between Orthodox Christianity and higher rates of homicide might be due 
to the fact that this religion is not correlated with some of the mechanisms that have 
traditionally been viewed as fostering higher rates of homicide.  These mechanisms 
include, egoistic or disintegrative individualism, poverty, and income based inequalities.  
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Even though contemporary Judaism has become more secularized, social justice has 
continued to be a focal point of Judaism (Williams, 2015).  This emphasis on social 
justice is evident with the positive correlation between Judaism and social welfare at the 
bivariate level.  Adaptations to the secularization process have not impeded the ability of 
Judaism to reinforce the mission of religion to promote more collectivism.  Due to its 
relationships at the bivariate level one might surmise that Islam would be linked with 
higher rates of homicide.  At the bivariate level, Islam is positively correlated with the 
infant mortality rate as a measure of poverty (r = .374, p < .01) and several of the 
measures tapping into religious intensity which have been linked to higher rates of 
homicide (Jensen, 2006).  While Islam does promote active engagement in the free 
market (Turner, 1992) which could lend itself to higher poverty levels, Islam does not 
permit unrestrained financial gain that would disrupt the common good (Hefner, 2008).  
Religious intensity stemming from Islam also does not result in homicidal behavior since 
this religious fervor is held in check through an emphasis on solidarity coupled with 
informal social controls (Neapolitan, 1997; Neumayer, 2003).   
 In terms of the non-Abrahamic religions, Hinduism and Buddhism do not 
correlate at the bivariate level with factors that may contribute to higher rates of 
homicide.  Neither Hinduism nor Buddhism is positively correlated with the lack of trust 
measure, and Buddhism is negatively correlated with the infant mortality rate (r = -.262, 
p < .05).  Another reason for the lack of a significant association between higher levels of 
Hinduism and higher rates of homicide is that Hinduism is positively correlated with the 
private measure of social welfare at the bivariate level.  A positive relationship between 
the global measure of religious pluralism and homicide was not anticipated, and this 
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expectation was confirmed at the multivariate level. At the bivariate level the measure of  
religious pluralism is negatively correlated with measures tapping into religious intensity 
or passion which have been linked to higher rates of homicide (Jensen, 2006).  Aside 
from this negative correlation, the global measure of religious pluralism implies a certain 
amount of accepted coexistence. On the other hand, the pluralism emanating from 
Protestantism has as its foundation more of an individualistic influence.  Based on the 
bivariate results it should come as no surprise that higher levels of atheism are not 
associated with higher rates of homicide at the multivariate level.  Atheism displays a 
significant negative correlation with measures of religious intensity and economic 
dominance, while being positively correlated with the public measure of social welfare.   
 A lack of association between Protestantism as a measure of religious pluralism 
and higher rates of homicide may illustrate the hypothesized link between religious 
pluralism and higher levels of religiosity (Stark, 2005).  This diffusion of religiosity may 
also explain why Protestantism was not linked to homicide through an association with 
the secularization process.  Collective sentiments stemming from the growth of religious 
pluralism may also shed light on why Protestantism did not facilitate homicide through 
an association with higher levels of egoistic individualism. A lack of consensus among 
prior research concerning the link between Protestantism and a free market economy 
(Fanfani, 1935; Johnstone, 1992; Sombart, 1959) may also explain why Protestantism 
does not legitimize a free market economy and condition its relationship with homicide.  
This lack of connection between Protestantism and a free market economy highlights 
further support of contemporary research which has suggested that Protestants do not 
display any unique pro-market values or outlook compared to other religious groups 
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(Hayward & Kemmelmeier, 2011).  A positive relationship between Protestantism and 
measures of social welfare at the bivariate level may explain why social welfare does not 
exert any external or conditional influence on the potential relationship between higher 
levels of Protestantism and lower rates of homicide at the multivariate level. In effect, 
social welfare may not be required to elicit the moral individualism within Protestantism 
if the inclusive societal focus characteristic of social welfare may also be a focal point of 
Protestantism.  Since neither Protestantism nor any of the major world religions is 
directly or indirectly linked to homicide, this study lends credence to the claim that it is 
human interests rather than cultural values stemming from religion that determine 
behavior (Kornhauser, 1978).  Modest to average model fit may be due to the 
examination of homicide with religions that do not influence this type of violent crime 
coupled with the inclusion of social factors which display or have displayed a strong link 
with homicide in prior research.  
It is worth taking note of the time period under examination in the present study.  
This study looks at homicide rates in the late 20th and early 21st centuries where rates of 
homicide were declining or beginning to display some stability.  In the time period prior 
to this study, homicide had been on the rise since the early 60’s in both the U.S. and 
Europe (Eisner, 2001; 2003a; Spierenburg; 2012). Yet, the social role of religion has 
diminished since the 1960’s in terms of lower church attendance rates, fewer priests per 
population, less participation of young people, and overall less knowledge of the different 
faiths (Bruce, 2002; Davie, 2000).  Given these factors, perhaps it is not surprising that 
neither Protestantism nor any of the other world religions facilitates homicide in the 
present study.  For many of the world religions, their public role has declined in two eras 
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where homicide was both on the rise and the decline.  A diminished social role of religion 
may also be due to the growth of religious pluralism within many countries.  Stark (2005) 
contends that religious pluralism is actually beneficial for societies since it enhances 
religious commitment and involvement.  However, given the lack of association between 
various religions and homicide in the present study, it is more likely that the growth of 
religious pluralism in the second half of the 20th century not only attenuated religion’s 
role within the public sphere but also paved the way for the secularization process 
(Berger, 1967).     
As societies become more secularized this raises questions about the modern 
social role of religion.  In particular, in the western world where Christianity tends to 
predominate, secularization is evident with the influence of religion over societal 
institutions becoming attenuated over time (Sampson, 2000; Selengut, 2009).  Religion 
has become differentiated from the other institutions (Casanova, 1994), and this has led 
to the separation of Church and state in countries like the U.S. (Bellah et al., 1985).  This 
weakened influence of religion over a society’s institutional structure has even led Turner 
(2011) to claim that within the modern world economic conditions shape religious 
matters and not vice versa.  Secularization at the institutional level has occurred within 
the modern western world, but this has yielded different results in terms of the level of 
religious involvement and participation when one compares Europe and the U.S. (Davie 
& Woodhead, 2009).  Within the U.S. institutional differentiation has not deterred 
religious involvement and participation (Cannell, 2010). Yet, in Europe the weakened 
influence of religion over the institutional sphere has led to a decline in church 
attendance, church membership, and belief in God (Davis & Robinson, 1999; Halman & 
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Draulens, 2006). A secularized environment not only inhibits the ability of religion to 
influence behaviors such as homicide, but it also contributes to the growth of atheism 
(Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012) as religion begins to lose its social plausibility (Berger, 
1967).  
 Atheism is particularly salient in the present study because unlike the major 
world religions, it displays a significant negative correlation with homicide at the 
bivariate level (r = -.530, p < .001).  This finding is consistent with prior research that has 
found higher homicide rates in countries where belief in God is more prevalent (Jensen 
2006; Paul 2005; Fajnzylber et al. 2002).  One of the reasons why atheism may be linked 
with lower homicide rates is the fact that it reflects the opposite of the intensity of 
religious beliefs which have been linked to higher rates of homicide (Jensen, 2006).  
Another reason for the negative correlation between atheism and homicide may be due to 
the fact that atheism displays a strong positive correlation with secularization at the 
bivariate level (r = .825, p < .001).  Given this positive correlation, nations with secular 
democracies tend to score higher on measures of societal well-being (Kamenev, 2006; 
Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Zuckerman, 2008) and have lower rates of violent crime (Paul, 
2005).  This link between atheism and the secularization process may also explain the 
crime inhibiting effect of atheism given the fact that secular nations tend to promote more 
political and civic liberties among their citizens (Nationmaster, 2009).  Zuckerman 
(2009) estimates that there are between 500 and 750 million atheists around the world, 
and research suggests that the number of atheists in countries like the U.S. is on the rise 
(Cannell, 2010; Kosmin and Keysar 2009; Paul 2009).  With the growth of atheism, 
religion will not become absent within society but instead will adopt a more 
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individualistic character to sustain itself.   
Over time individualism within societies will begin to influence and shape 
religious life (Durkheim, 1915).  Durkheim (1897) suggests that the individualistic 
influence over religion will foster a religion of humanity that will contribute to lower 
rates of homicide over time.  This religion of humanity is a form of moral individualism 
focused on the liberty and the rights of individuals with a focus on social justice 
(Durkheim, 1906).  Moral individualism has been linked to lower rates of homicide 
(DiCristina, 2004; Huang, 1995) by promoting a highly civilized environment 
(Durkheim, 1900) characterized by respect, freedom, and honor (DiCristina, 2004).  In 
the present study Hofstede’s (1980) measure of moral individualism is found to be 
associated with lower rates of homicide.  In results not shown Hofstede’s (1980) measure 
is positively correlated with secularization and atheism (r = .429, p < .001) but still 
reinforces the collective mission of religion by promoting social capital within societies 
(Allik & Realo, 2004). Hofstede’s (1980) measure illustrates how the religion of 
humanity may be a form of constitutive individualism found within communities and 
institutions (Bellah et al., 1985) that shape pro-social behavior (Bond, 2004). Prior 
research has associated Protestantism with moral individualism (Eisner, 2003b; Messner, 
1982), but in the present study Protestantism may also be linked with a form of 
individualism that is of the egoistic or excessive type.  
In the present study neither form of individualism nor the secularization process 
mediates the relationship between Protestantism or any of the major world religions and 
homicide.  Before I ran structural equation models to examine potential mediation effects, 
I ran ordinary least squares models to identify any possible indirect relationships.  In 
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results not shown Protestantism was found to be indirectly linked with higher rates of 
homicide through its association with the proportion single with children.  Even though 
there was not a mediating effect, it is still worth taking a closer look at this indirect 
relationship.  My expectation was that egoistic individualism or secularization would 
mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of 
homicide, but it is unlikely that being single with children represents these mediating 
mechanisms. Poor economic conditions, lack of trust, and fear of domestic violence have 
been cited as reasons for lower marriage rates (Edin, 2000), which suggests that being 
single with children may illustrate levels of economic disadvantage or family disruption.   
In the present study the single with children measure is positively correlated with 
homicide at the bivariate level (r = .465, p < .001) and positively associated with 
homicide at the multivariate level.  This link between the single with children measure 
and homicide may be due to the weakened social bond (Hirschi, 1969) between parent 
and child stemming from the challenges of balancing home and work life by the single 
parent. If being single with children is representative of economic disadvantage or family 
disruption then the question becomes what aspect of Protestantism may trigger these 
conditions.  Individualism has been a well-documented value orientation of Protestantism 
(Buss, 2000; Herberg, 1955; Turner, 2011), but it is unlikely that the link between 
Protestantism and the proportion single with children involves egoistic individualism.  
Rather, it may be that the relationship between Protestantism and the proportion single 
with children is based on their connection to moral individualism.  In results not shown 
Protestantism is positively correlated with Hofstede’s (1980) measure of moral 
individualism (r = .403, p < .001), and Hofstede’s (1980) measure is positively correlated 
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with some of the same measures that highlight the value of the individual as the single 
with children measure. For example, in results not shown both Hofstede’s (1980) 
measure and the single with children measure are positively correlated with the 
proportion that do not believe a child needs a mother and father to grow up happily and 
the proportion that approve of a woman wanting to have a child as a single parent.  These 
measures highlight the value and the rights of the individual which are the foundations of 
moral individualism (Lukes, 1973).   
Yet, if the link between Protestantism and the single with children measure is 
based on their connection to moral individualism, it would appear unlikely that either 
measure would contribute to higher rates of homicide.  To understand how Protestantism 
may be indirectly linked with homicide through its association with the proportion single 
with children, it is necessary to recognize some of the contingencies associated with 
moral individualism.  Prior research has noted that moral individualism is only associated 
with lower rates of homicide at the national level when inequality levels are low and 
wealth is high (Karstedt, 2001, Messner, 1982). Also, and perhaps even more salient as 
an explanation for why Protestantism and the proportion single with children may be 
linked with higher rates of homicide is Durkheim’s (1893) discussion of moral 
individualism. Durkheim (1893) suggests that moral individualism represented through 
the contractual relations of organic solidarity can only be preserved when they are 
supported by the non-contractual relations of mechanical solidarity. In essence, without 
the support of traditional and less individualized religion within society Durkheim (1893) 
believes that a religion of humanity will not be sufficient to promote social solidarity.  
This is one potential explanation for the indirect relationship between Protestantism, the 
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proportion single with children, and homicide.  Yet, further research is needed to not only 
understand the relationship between family dynamics and homicide but also to identify 
what factors may help shed light on the relationship between religion and homicide cross-
nationally.    
Even though none of the major world religions and Protestantism in particular 
was linked to higher rates of homicide, religion still may play a vital role in explaining 
the variation in cross-national rates of homicide.  It may be that the major world religions 
such as Protestantism are significantly linked to homicide through their relationship with 
specific religious beliefs.  In terms of these beliefs, one study found that belief in heaven 
was associated with higher homicide rates while belief in hell was linked to lower 
homicide rates cross-nationally (Shariff & Rhemtulla, 2012).  These effects related to 
belief in heaven and belief in hell remain controlling for some of the major world 
religions, the Gini index, and measures tapping into religious intensity or passion (Shariff 
& Rhemtulla, 2012).  A higher proportion of individuals believe in heaven rather than 
hell and as this gap increases the rate of crime tends to increase in predominantly Roman 
Catholic and non-Catholic Christian countries (Shariff, Rhemtulla, 2012).  Belief in 
heaven may facilitate higher rates of homicide by making individuals feel less concerned 
about the consequences of their actions in the afterlife, while belief in hell may contribute 
to lower rates of homicide by restraining behavior through the fear of punishment in the 
afterlife (Shariff & Rhemtulla, 2012). Given these results, future research might be well 
served to examine whether belief in heaven or hell mediates the relationship between the 
major world religions and rates of homicide cross-nationally.  Future research might also 
examine whether any of the major world religions conditions the differential effects that 
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belief in heaven and belief in hell display on cross-national rates of homicide.   
 Not only does this study raise questions about the influence of religion on 
variation in cross-national rates of homicide, but it has also more broadly highlighted the 
issue of what exactly may account for higher homicide rates.  Prior research has 
identified economic inequality as a leading correlate of higher rates of homicide (Jacobs 
& Richardson, 2008; Lee & Bankston, 1999; Messner, 1980). In the present study, both 
measures of economic inequality are positively linked with homicide, but questions 
remain regarding the consistency of these measures within different model specifications.  
Other measures such as the proportion who believe that individuals must be careful rather 
than trusting of others, Hofstede’s (1980) individualism measure, and social welfare 
assessed as health benefits also do not display consistent effects under various model 
specifications.  There are several factors which are not included in the present study 
which may be promising as explanations for the cross-national variation in rates of 
homicide.  Factors that future studies would be wise to examine include drug market 
activity (Blumstein, 1995), incarceration (Fukuyama, 1999), and perceptions of 
government (Roth, 2009).  This study also suggests that economic conditions which are 
thought to be linked to homicide (Pridemore, 2011) may actually be more suited to 
explain changes in property crime levels. In results not shown, the finding that 
Protestantism is indirectly linked with higher rates of homicide through its effect on the 
single with children measure suggests more research is needed to identify how the family 
institution may impact violent crime levels. 
 In an examination of thirty-four cross-national studies of homicide Lafree (1999) 
identifies three dominant perspectives that seek to explain the variation in cross-national 
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rates of homicide.  Modernization or social disorganization theory which stems from the 
work of Durkheim (1893) views homicide as the result of an absence of social controls as 
the environmental landscape changes from agricultural to urban.  An economic stress 
perspective highlights how poverty and inequality levels may contribute to higher rates of 
homicide through its influence on compositional changes within a society’s population 
(Bursik, 1988).  Situational perspectives such as routine activities (Cohen & Felson, 
1979; Cohen, Felson, & Land, 1980) point to an increase in criminal opportunities as 
individuals spend more time away from their homes.  In my estimation these perspectives  
can be blended to identify what may account for the variation in cross-national rates of 
homicide.  In models not shown I looked at the effect of time spent working per week on 
homicide and did not find any significant effects, but I think a more salient measure 
might be time spent at home by parents and both teenagers and adolescents.  Time spent 
at home for parents may be dictated by economic stresses, and for young people time 
spent at home may not only reduce opportunities for violent behavior but also highlight 
the type of relationship between the parent and the child.  Just as religious beliefs may 
impel or restrain behavior (Shariff & Rhemtulla, 2012); time spent at home may indicate 
the nature of familial bonds and their likelihood of facilitating or inhibiting violent 
behaviors such as homicide.   
 It would appear that this study provides more questions than answers.  This study 
may be viewed as a stepping stone or a potential building block for future research 
examining the potential link between religion and crime.  Through its value structure and 
influence on a society’s institutional structure, Protestantism was viewed as a potential 
contributor to the higher rates of homicide cross-nationally.  None of the other major 
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world religions were thought to be linked with homicide due to their partial rather than 
full association with the mechanisms that might produce or deter homicide.  
Protestantism has been the focus of this study primarily due to its foundation which 
distinguishes it from many of the other world religions.  A shift in focus from the Church 
to the individual under Protestantism was thought to be the catalyst for higher rates of 
homicide cross-nationally. This thought stems from the idea that shifting the emphasis 
from the Church to the individual attenuates the traditional conception of religion as a 
force that serves to unite individuals (DeTocqueville, 1835; Durkheim, 1897; Wuthnow, 
2005).  Findings from this study suggest that more research is needed to delineate the 
factor or factors which account for the variation in cross-national homicide rates.  Future 
research examining the relationship between the major world religions and cross-national 
rates of homicide would be well served to consider both the foundational principles of 
these religions and the historical transformations that have shaped their evolution.
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Appendix A: Sample of Nations (N=86) 
 
Nation     Nation 
Albania Lithuania 
Andorra Macedonia 
Argentina Malaysia 
Armenia Mali 
Australia Mexico 
Azerbaijan Moldova 
Bangladesh Montenegro 
Belarus Morocco 
Bosnia Netherlands 
Brazil New Zealand 
Bulgaria Nigeria 
Burkina Faso Norway 
Canada Pakistan 
Chile Peru 
China Philippines 
Colombia Poland 
Croatia Puerto Rico 
Cyprus Romania 
Czech Republic Russia 
Dominican Republic Rwanda 
Egypt Saudi Arabia 
El Salvador Serbia 
Estonia Singapore 
Ethiopia Slovakia 
Finland Slovenia 
France South Africa 
Georgia South Korea 
Germany Spain 
Ghana Sweden 
Great Britain Switzerland 
Guatemala Taiwan 
Hong Kong Tanzania 
Hungary Thailand 
India Trinidad 
Indonesia Turkey 
Iran Uganda 
Iraq Ukraine 
Israel Uruguay 
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Italy USA 
Japan Venezuela 
Jordan Vietnam 
Kyrgyzstan Zambia 
Latvia Zimbabwe 
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Appendix B: World Value Survey Items  
 
1. Protestantism: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion 
responding “Protestant”) 
2. Catholicism: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion 
responding “Catholic”) 
3. Orthodox: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion 
responding “Orthodox”) 
4. Judaism: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion 
responding “Jewish”) 
5. Islam: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion 
responding “Muslim”) 
6. Hinduism: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion 
responding “Hindu”) 
7. Buddhism: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion 
responding “Buddhist”) 
8. Atheism: Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you 
are…(Proportion responding “A convinced atheist”) 
9. Religious Pluralism: Scores based on percentage of adherents to Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Atheism. Measure calculated in similar manner to religious diversity index from 
the Pew Research Center.  
10. Trust: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you need to be very careful in dealing with people? (Proportion responding “Need 
to be very careful”) 
11. Secularization: Comprised of variables, How important is religion in your life 
(Proportion responding “Very Important”), Apart from weddings and funerals, 
about how often do you attend religious services these days? (Proportion 
responding “Once a week” or “More than once a week”), How important is God 
in your life? (Proportion responding “very important”), and Independently of 
whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are a religious 
person, not a religious person, an atheist? (Proportion responding “a religious 
person”).  All of the variables comprising this measure are reverse-coded to 
illustrate the secularization process. 
12. Charity: Could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive 
member or not a member of that type of organization? (Proportion responding 
“Active member of humanitarian or charitable organization)  
13. Single with Kids: Comprised of variables, are you currently? (Proportion 
responding “Single”) & have you had any children? (Proportion responding “One 
or more children”).  Responses to the question “are you currently?” include 
“married,” “living together as married,” “divorced,” “separated,” “widowed,” and 
“single.”  
14. (Religious Membership) Religious Member.: Are you an active member, inactive 
member, or not a member of a church or religious organization? (Proportion 
responding “active member”) 
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15. Life Meaning: How often, if at all, do you think about the meaning and purpose of 
life? (Proportion responding “rarely” or “never”) 
126 
 
Appendix C: Measurement Parameter Estimates for Secularization 
 
 
Latent Construct Observed Variable Metric Slope Validity Coefficient 
    Secularization Religion very Importantᵃ 1.00f .966**** 
    
 
Importance of God .911**** .960**** 
  
(.033) 
 
 
Religious Service Attendance .865**** .883**** 
  
(.083) 
 
 
Religious Person .659**** .894**** 
  
(.062) 
 N 86 
 χ² 1.03, 2 d.f., (p = .598) 
 RMSEA .000 
 CFI 1.00   
*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
ᵃ Marker variable for latent construct. 
 Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses. Model includes error  
correlations between the indicators of Religion very Important and Importance of God and  
Religion very important and Religious Service Attendance. 
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Appendix D. Protestantism and Lack of Trust Scatterplot 
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Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Hofstede’s Individualism Measure Scatterplot 
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Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Gini Index Scatterplot 
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Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Economic Inequality Ratio Scatterplot 
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Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Infant Mortality Rate Scatterplot 
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Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Health Expenditures Scatterplot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norway
Germany
Nigeria
Switzerland
New Zealand
RussiaThailand
Australia
Great Britain
Netherlands
Guatemala
Finland
Hungary
MaliDominican Republic
BrazilIndia Ukraine Colombia
China
Mexico Argentina
Canada
Kyrgyzstan
Venezuela
Belarus
UruguayMoldova
Sweden
Pakistan Lithuania
Slovakia
France
South Korea
AlbaniaB gladeshGeorgia Turkey
Estonia
Philippi es
MalaysiaIndonesia
Peru
Bulgaria
Chile
Iran
Egypt
Singapore
Az rbaijan Isra lMacedoniaMontenegro
USA
Slovenia
BosniIr q
Latvia
Jord nCyprus Poland
Romania
MoroccoVietnam Serbi
Burkina Faso
Arm ni C atiaCzech Republic
Zimbabwe
S di ArabiaAndorra Sp inIt ly
Ethiopia
El Salvador
Trinidad
Tanzania
Rwanda
Ghana
Japan
South Africa
Zambia
Uganda
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
P
ro
te
st
an
tis
m
0 5 10 15
Health Expenditures
133 
 
Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Charitable Organization Membership Scatterplot 
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Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Single with Children Scatterplot 
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Appendix E. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Importance of Religion 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .122 Protestantism .064 Protestantism .040 Hinduism -.056 Protestantism .068
(.086) (.089) (.084) (.078) (.085)
Religion very Important .528**** Religion very Important .515**** Religion very Important .527**** Religion very Important .579**** Religion very Important .511****
(.091) (.095) (.085) (.089) (.097)
Prot x Religion Import. .259*** Prot x Religion Import. .311*** Prot x Religion Import. .269*** Hinduism x Religion Import. .110 Prot x Religion Import. .240***
(.096) (.093) (.089) (.072) (.087)
Catholicism .195* Catholicism .136 Catholicism -.014 Catholicism -.055 Buddhism -.055
(.107) (.099) (.108) (.125) (.087)
Cath x Religion Import. .322*** Cath x Religion Import. .346**** Cath x Religion Import. .212* Cath x Religion Import. .158 Buddhism x Religion Import. -.001
(.094) (.096) (.109) (.112) (.069)
Orthodox .193* Judaism .016 Islam -.156 Islam -.237* Islam -.197*
(.102) (.081) (.109) (.123) (.109)
Orthodox x Religion Import. -.150 Judaism x Religion Import. .101 Islam x Religion Import. -.232* Islam x Religion Import. -.315*** Islam x Religion Import. -.293***
(.108) (.081) (.124) (.118) (.107)
Adjusted R² .470 Adjusted R² .431 Adjusted R² .467 Adjusted R² .391 Adjusted R² .434
N 80 N 80 N 80 N 85 N 80
                                                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                          Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Importance of 
Religion 
 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Protestantism .055 Protestantism .128 Protestantism -.111 Protestantism -.113
(.087) (.084) (.102) (.111)
Religion very Important .551**** Religion very Important .156 Religion very Important .291** Religion very Important -.071
(.087) (.179) (.114) (.115)
Prot x Religion Import. .260*** Prot x Religion Import. .276*** Prot x Religion Import. .189** Prot x Religion Import. .125
(.089) (.088) (.085) (.082)
Religious Pluralism .082 Atheism -.412*** Single w/ kids .284*** Single w/ kids .356***
(.105) (.136) (.107) (.114)
Pluralism x Religion Import. -.122 Atheism x Religion Import. .114 Economic Inequality .296*** Economic Inequality .307***
(.083) (.089) (.103) (.094)
Islam -.182* Islam -.087 Islam -.067 Infant Mortality .453****
(.103) (.101) (.108) (.117)
Islam x Religion Import. -.322*** Islam x Religion Import. -.281*** Islam x Religion Import. -.103 Individual Responsibility .029
(.105) (.102) (.107) (.086)
Adjusted R² .453 Adjusted R² .528 Adjusted R² .533 Adjusted R² .607
N 80 N 78 N 75 N 74
                                              *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                   Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Importance of God 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .147* Protestantism .086 Protestantism .059 Protestantism .098 Buddhism .045
(.085) (.084) (.083) (.084) (.092)
Importance of God .511**** Importance of God .471**** Importance of God .479**** Importance of God .467**** Importance of God .462****
(.082) (.085) (.081) (.081) (.085)
Prot x God Important .258*** Prot x God Important .334**** Prot x God Important .301**** Prot x God Important .329**** Buddhism x God Important .185**
(.088) (.081) (.082) (.082) (.074)
Catholicism .133 Catholicism .080 Catholicism -.038 Catholicism .084 Catholicism .086
(.111) (.103) (.115) (.101) (.102)
Cath x God Important .251*** Cath x God Important .270*** Cath x God Important .176* Cath x God Important .276*** Cath x God Important .317****
(.091) (.091) (.104) (.088) (.091)
Orthodox .204** Judaism -.007 Islam -.143 Hinduism -.112 Hinduism -.118
(.102) (.083) (.115) (.081) (.086)
Orthodox x God Important -.132 Judaism x God Important .089 Islam x God Important -.149 Hinduism x God Important .155** Hinduism x God Important .107
(.104) (.073) (.126) (.070) (.080)
Adjusted R² .435 Adjusted R² .394 Adjusted R² .410 Adjusted R² .420 Adjusted R² .290
N 80 N 80 N 80 N 80 N 85
                                               *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                    Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Importance of God 
 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Buddhism -.032 Religious Pluralism .032 Atheism -.377*** Single w/ kids .321*** Single w/ kids .352***
(.102) (.115) (.142) (.115) (.114)
Importance of God .416**** Importance of God .448**** Importance of God .157 Importance of God .211** Importance of God -.105
(.082) (.087) (.153) (.100) (.111)
Buddhism x God Important .139 Pluralism x God Important .041 Atheism x God Important .164 Economic Inequality .367*** Economic Inequality .324***
(.086) (.092) (.101) (.111) (.099)
Catholicism .049 Catholicism .082 Catholicism .044 Catholicism -.087 Infant Mortality .468****
(.102) (.102) (.090) (.081) (.110)
Cath x God Important .311*** Cath x God Important .277*** Cath x God Important .210** Cath x God Important .030 Individual Responsibility .032
(.094) (.091) (.083) (.074) (.085)
Protestantism .108 Protestantism .058 Protestantism .161* Protestantism -.110 Protestantism -.100
(.086) (.091) (.083) (.105) (.112)
Prot x God Important .308**** Prot x God Important .325**** Prot x God Important .334**** Prot x God Important .204** Prot x God Important .122
(.084) (.088) (.083) (.079) (.079)
Adjusted R² .407 Adjusted R² .389 Adjusted R² .498 Adjusted R² .518 Adjusted R² .608
N 80 N 80 N 78 N 75 N 74
                                              *p<.10,**p  < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                       Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Service 
Attendance 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .024 Judaism .082 Hinduism -.086 Hinduism -.103 Hinduism -.012
(.092) (.088) (.082) (.085) (.083)
Religious Service Attendance .548**** Religious Service Attendance .724**** Religious Service Attendance .695**** Religious Service Attendance .697**** Religious Service Attendance .511****
(.096) (.094) (.098) (.099) (.144)
Prot x Religious Service .154 Judaism x Religious Service .094 Hinduism x Religious Service .205** Hinduism x Religious Service .213** Hinduism x Religious Service .163
(.110) (.075) (.091) (.092) (.104)
Catholicism .185 Catholicism -.147 Buddhism -.048 Religious Pluralism .109 Atheism -.323***
(.114) (.116) (.092) (.092) (.111)
Cath x Religious Service .251* Cath x Religious Service .107 Buddhism x Religious Service .038 Pluralism x Religious Service -.003 Atheism x Religious Service .145
(.150) (.121) (.102) (.104) (.099)
Orthodox .235* Islam -.343*** Islam -.327*** Islam -.284*** Islam -.261***
(.125) (.109) (.101) (.102) (.098)
Orthodox x Religious Service -.042 Islam x Religious Service -.263** Islam x Religious Service -.228** Islam x Religious Service -.250** Islam x Religious Service -.198*
(.137) (.102) (.093) (.109) (.106)
Adjusted R² .348 Adjusted R² .345 Adjusted R² .351 Adjusted R² .360 Adjusted R² .426
N 79 N 84 N 84 N 84 N 79
                                                          *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                                             Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: 
Conditional Effects w/ Religious Service Attendance 
 
 
  Model 6 
  
Single w/ kids .383**** 
 
(.083) 
Religious Service Attendance -.081 
 
(.103) 
Economic Inequality .142 
 
(.104) 
Infant Mortality .716**** 
 
(.106) 
Economic Freedom -.001 
 
(.081) 
Islam -.272**** 
 
(.077) 
Islam x Religious Service -.102 
 
(.106) 
Adjusted R² .653 
N 75 
                                                            *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Person 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .131 Protestantism .135 Protestantism .109 Protestantism .172** Protestantism .151*
(.082) (.085) (.083) (.080) (.079)
Religious Person .404**** Religious Person .430**** Religious Person .428**** Religious Person .373**** Religious Person .380****
(.102) (.100) (.088) (.085) (.107)
Prot x Religious Person .323**** Prot x Religious Person .352**** Prot x Religious Person .324**** Prot x Religious Person .332**** Prot x Religious Person .312****
(.090) (.088) (.087) (.084) (.077)
Catholicism .061 Catholicism .035 Islam -.162 Hinduism -.047 Hinduism -.120
(.118) (.110) (.102) (.087) (.093)
Cath x Religious Person .211* Cath x Religious Person .188 Islam x Religious Person -.161 Hinduism x Religious Person .198** Hinduism x Religious Person .229***
(.125) (.125) (.107) (.090) (.076)
Orthodox .090 Judaism -.092 Judaism -.113 Judaism -.081 Buddhism .123
(.099) (.097) (.097) (.094) (.145)
Orthodox x Religious Person -.031 Judaism x Religious Person .188** Judaism x Religious Person .187** Judaism x Religious Person .122 Buddhism x Religious Person .041
(.114) (.079) (.084) (.079) (.093)
Adjusted R² .280 Adjusted R² .309 Adjusted R² .340 Adjusted R² .316 Adjusted R² .309
N 79 N 79 N 79 N 79 N 79
                                                       *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                                    Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Person 
 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Protestantism .104 Protestantism .224** Single w/ kids .369**** Single w/ kids .365***
(.093) (.087) (.071) (.118)
Religious Person .384**** Religious Person .139 Religious Person -.044 Religious Person -.100
(.084) (.144) (.098) (.100)
Prot x Religious Person .250*** Prot x Religious Person .247** Private Ownership -.034 Individual Responsibility -.024
(.096) (.098) (.087) (.075)
Hinduism -.071 Hinduism -.046 Hinduism -.093 Protestantism -.072
(.090) (.081) (.067) (.114)
Hinduism x Religious Person .235*** Hinduism x Religious Person .170** Hinduism x Religious Person .137 Prot x Religious Person .129
(.086) (.077) (.088) (.085)
Religious Pluralism .151 Atheism -.352*** Infant Mortality .392*** Infant Mortality .432****
(.109) (.130) (.118) (.114)
Pluralism x Religious Person .068 Atheism x Religious Person .101 Economic Inequality .323**** Economic Inequality .323***
(.085) (.094) (.083) (.097)
Adjusted R² .320 Adjusted R² .401 Adjusted R² .597 Adjusted R² .608
N 79 N 78 N 73 N 73
                                                 *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                       Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Member 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism -.072 Protestantism -.094 Protestantism -.123 Protestantism -.080 Protestantism -.090
(.102) (.107) (.116) (.106) (.116)
Religious Member .665**** Religious Member .616**** Religious Member .601**** Religious Member .626**** Religious Member .554****
(.126) (.115) (.122) (.125) (.113)
Prot x Religious Member .137* Prot x Religious Member .161** Prot x Religious Member .178** Prot x Religious Member .164** Prot x Religious Member .182*
(.082) (.082) (.080) (.080) (.094)
Catholicism .086 Judaism -.175 Islam -.098 Hinduism -.181* Buddhism -.070
(.106) (.109) (.104) (.109) (.106)
Cath x Religious Member .328** Judaism x Religious Member -.011 Islam x Religious Member -.033 Hinduism x Religious Member .037 Buddhims x Religious Member -.092
(.166) (.097) (.094) (.134) (.150)
Orthodox .217* Orthodox .219* Orthodox .176 Orthodox .130 Orthodox .131
(.121) (.120) (.119) (.120) (.122)
Orthodox x Religious Member -.190* Orthodox x Religious Member -.204* Orthodox x Religious Member -.207* Orthodox x Religious Member -.258** Orthodox x Religious Member -.213*
(.110) (.115) (.112) (.125) (.117)
Adjusted R² .270 Adjusted R² .233 Adjusted R² .217 Adjusted R² .237 Adjusted R² .218
N 77 N 77 N 77 N 77 N 77
                                                                                                                             Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
                                                           *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Member 
 
 
  Model 6   Model 7   Model 8 
      Protestantism -.107 Protestantism .086 Single w/ kids .434**** 
 
(.131) 
 
(.117) 
 
(.107) 
Religious Member .583**** Religious Member .287** Religious Member -.127 
 
(.114) 
 
(.135) 
 
(.116) 
Prot x Religious Member .171* Prot x Religious Member .128 Economic Inequality .303*** 
 
(.093) 
 
(.092) 
 
(.105) 
Religious Pluralism .042 Atheism 
-
.383**** Catholicism .024 
 
(.112) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.075) 
Pluralism x Religious Member -.013 Atheism x Religious Member -.140 Cath x Religious Member -.089 
 
(.098) 
 
(.102) 
 
(.125) 
Orthodox .161 Orthodox .137 Infant Mortality .445**** 
 
(.116) 
 
(.101) 
 
(.124) 
Orthodox x Religious Member -.209* Orthodox x Religious Member -.151 Economic Freedom -.055 
 
(.116) 
 
(.111) 
 
(.116) 
Adjusted R² .210 Adjusted R² .342 Adjusted R² .582 
N 77 N 75 N 73 
  
                                                                        *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
  
                                                            Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix F. Added Variable Plots 
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Appendix G. Leverage Versus Squared Residual Plot 
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Appendix H. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates 
w/o El Salvador:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .471**** — .471**** Single w/ kids .412**** — .412**** Single w/ kids .452**** — .452**** Single w/ kids .376**** — .376****
(.127) (.127) (.098) (.098) (.081) (.081) (.098) (.098)
Protestantism -.098 .146*** .048 Protestantism -.090 .125*** .034 Economic Discrimination .104 -.017 .087 Economic Discrimination .065 .024 .089
(.070) (.051) (.063) (.064) (.045) (.052) (.086) (.069) (.093) (.081) (.050) (.080)
Catholicism -.155 .489** .334 Catholicism .480* .577** 1.06*** Catholicism .068 .681*** .749** Catholicism .390 .564** .954***
(.458) (.242) (.463) (.278) (.237) (.329) (.292) (.239) (.340) (.268) (.219) (.302)
Orthodox .053 .054* .107 Orthodox .091** .050** .141*** Orthodox .058 .069** .127** Orthodox .095** .047* .142***
(.066) (.030) (.072) (.044) (.025) (.054) (.050) (.031) (.057) (.045) (.025) (.053)
Judaism -.038 .007 -.031 Religious Pluralism .110*** .024 .135**** Charity -3.07* 3.73**** .660 Religious Pluralism .103*** .021 .124***
(.063) (.039) (.074) (.035) (.023) (.038) (1.62) (.982) (1.75) (.037) (.023) (.037)
Islam -.051 -.020 -.071 Atheism -.516**** -.038 -.554**** Atheism -.504**** .015 -.489**** Atheism -.493**** -.059 -.552****
(.056) (.025) (.060) (.069) (.038) (.078) (.067) (.052) (.088) (.073) (.038) (.081)
Hinduism -.016 .041* .026 Hinduism -.003 .036** .034 Hinduism -.012 .032 .020 Hinduism .012 .021 .033
(.050) (.023) (.055) (.032) (.018) (.035) (.032) (.025) (.041) (.030) (.016) (.034)
Buddhism -.020 -.075*** -.095 Buddhism .059 -.055*** .004 Buddhism .063 -.042 .022 Protestantism -.060 .108** .048
(.059) (.029) (.060) (.037) (.020) (.041) (.041) (.028) (.046) (.063) (.047) (.049)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                               — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                      Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
85 85 85 85
                                                                               *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.362 .539 .515 .536
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Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o El Salvador:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .225** — .225** Single w/ kids .258*** — .258*** Single w/ kids .404**** — .404**** Single w/ kids .205** — .205**
(.094) (.094) (.082) (.082) (.099) (.099) (.096) (.096)
Protestantism -.018 .052* .034 Protestantism .019 .080** .099*** Protestantism -.042 .103*** .061 Religious Pluralism .010 .015 .025
(.049) (.031) (.040) (.042) (.033) (.032) (.049) (.039) (.045) (.028) (.012) (.027)
Catholicism .218 .268** .485** Catholicism .631*** .296** .928**** Catholicism .268 .113 .381 Charity 5.29*** 1.67** 6.96****
(.227) (.135) (.237) (.227) (.146) (.248) (.328) (.164) (.343) (1.67) (.834) (1.71)
Orthodox .194**** .056** .250**** Orthodox .219**** .040** .258**** Orthodox .190**** .043** .233**** Orthodox .225**** .037** .262****
(.045) (.022) (.044) (.032) (.016) (.037) (.039) (.022) (.045) (.044) (.018) (.046)
Religious Pluralism .043 .0001 .043 Economic Discrimination .091 .013 .103 Economic Discrimination .040 .009 .050 Economic Discrimination -.031 .010 -.021
(.033) (.012) (.034) (.067) (.030) (.072) (.072) (.044) (.075) (.080) (.024) (.087)
Atheism -.303**** .019 -.284**** Atheism -.060 -.003 -.063 Economic Inequality Ratio .928**** .523*** 1.45**** Charitable Giving -2.69*** .140 -2.55***
(.067) (.022) (.072) (.068) (.039) (.079) (.247) (.165) (.190) (.846) (.306) (.900)
Economic Inequality .069**** .013** .083**** Economic Inequality .048**** .012** .060**** Health Benefits -.158**** .076*** -.083** Economic Inequality .091**** .014* .105****
(.011) (.006) (.010) (.009) (.005) (.010) (.037) (.026) (.038) (.011) (.007) (.010)
Charity 1.20 1.56** 2.76* Infant Mortality .562**** -.006 .555**** Educ. Benefits -.041 -.026 -.068 Educ. Benefits -.039 .028 -.011
(1.51) (.718) (1.60) (.099) (.058) (.120) (.048) (.034) (.054) (.049) (.018) (.047)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
.681 .788 .656 .638
85 85 85 85
                                                                               *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                               — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                      Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador:  Direct, Indirect, & Total 
Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
  Model 9 
 
Direct Indirect Total 
Single w/ kids .486**** — .486**** 
 
(.094) 
 
(.094) 
Economic Freedom -.023* -.002 -.025* 
 
(.012) (.007) (.015) 
Individual Responsibility .078 .119 .197 
 
(.115) (.093) (.138) 
Orthodox .054 .038 .091 
 
(.054) (.036) (.059) 
Economic Discrimination .136 .048 .184 
 
(.108) (.061) (.117) 
Charitable Giving -.894 1.28 .389 
 
(1.43) (.790) (1.65) 
Income Differences 1.43* -.114 1.32 
 
(.751) (.535) (.933) 
Private Ownership -1.98* .414 -1.57 
 
(1.04) (.632) (1.27) 
Adjusted R² .385 
N 85 
                                                                         *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                        — Indicates parameter not estimated 
                                                             Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o El Salvador:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Secularization .704**** — 1.00f Secularization .160 — 1.00f Secularization .039 — 1.00f Secularization .404*** — 1.00f
(.099) (.144) (.111) (.125)
Protestantism .067 -.021 .046 Religious Pluralism .052* -.003 .049* Economic Discrimination .103 -.005 .099* Economic Freedom -.005 -.011** -.015
(.047) (.039) (.062) (.028) (.004) (.027) (.063) (.013) (.057) (.012) (.005) (.011)
Catholicism .300 .126 .426 Atheism -.238** -.084 -.322**** Atheism -.043 -.022 -.065 Competition -1.77 -.346 -2.11
(.348) (.365) (.464) (.092) (.075) (.065) (.095) (.061) (.066) (1.24) (.546) (1.32)
Orthodox .212**** -.104** .108 Orthodox .184**** -.007 .176**** Orthodox .169**** -.003 .166**** Orthodox .076 -.039 .037
(.060) (.053) (.066) (.042) (.009) (.041) (.039) (.008) (.036) (.053) (.025) (.049)
Judaism -.070 .037 -.033 Single w/ kids .216*** .004 .220*** Single w/ kids .276**** .002 .277**** Single w/ kids .387**** .054* .441****
(.053) (.051) (.073) (.062) (.010) (.064) (.057) (.005) (.058) (.079) (.032) (.085)
Islam -.148*** .095* -.053 Islam -.067* .014 -.054 Islam -.127**** .003 -.124**** Islam -.145*** .058* -.087**
(.052) (.053) (.061) (.037) (.014) (.034) (.036) (.009) (.034) (.042) (.031) (.043)
Hinduism .028 -.006 .023 Economic Inequality .062**** .006 .068**** Economic Inequality Ratio .641**** .014 .655**** Charitable Giving -2.51*** .354 -2.15**
(.036) (.037) (.053) (.012) (.005) (.009) (.173) (.041) (.159) (.946) (.410) (1.01)
Buddhism .016 -.096* -.080 Buddhism -.00003 -.009 -.009 Infant Mortality .685**** .007 .691**** Life Meaning -3.66*** -2.71*** -6.37****
(.043) (.053) (.061) (.037) (.010) (.036) (.081) (.018) (.084) (1.18) (.906) (1.09)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
χ² χ² χ² χ²
χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df
RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA
CFI CFI CFI CFI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.453 .698 .810 .591
85 85 85 85
83.01 (p < .001) 58.19 (p < .001) 66.61 (p < .001) 61.22 (p < .001)
3.19 2.24 2.56 2.35
.161 .121 .136 .126
                                                                    Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
.886 .948 .939 .936
                                                                     *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                      — Indicates parameter not estimated
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Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador:  Direct, Indirect, & Total 
Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
  Model 5 
 
Direct Indirect Total 
Secularization .250* — 1.00f 
 
(.147) 
  
Religious Member .062 .113 .175 
 
(.134) (.077) (.111) 
New Govt. .609*** .045 .654*** 
 
(.191) (.053) (.188) 
Latin Nation .606 .431 1.04**** 
 
(.406) (.274) (.293) 
Single w/ kids .308**** -.027 .281*** 
 
(.085) (.023) (.084) 
Islam -.082 .063 -.019 
 
(.056) (.040) (.035) 
Charity -2.17 -.834 -3.00* 
 
(1.56) (.649) (1.61) 
Life Meaning -4.63**** -1.35* -5.98**** 
 
(1.15) (.774) (.987) 
Adjusted R² .548 
N 85 
χ²  89.99 (p < .001) 
χ²/df 3.46 
RMSEA .170 
CFI .893 
                                                                        *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                       — Indicates parameter not estimated 
                                                                    Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix H Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .054 Single w/ kids .255**** Single w/ kids .343**** Judaism .087 Buddhism -.140
(.073) (.073) (.090) (.107) (.086)
Economic Inequality .693**** Economic Inequality .371**** Economic Inequality .438**** Economic Inequality .566**** Economic Inequality .452****
(.079) (.084) (.084) (.092) (.089)
Prot x Econ Ineq. .042 Infant Mortality .461**** Infant Mortality .320** Judaism x Econ Ineq. .034 Buddhism x Econ Ineq. -.002
(.082) (.072) (.128) (.123) (.114)
Catholicism .107 Catholicism .149** Health Benefits -.087 Islam -.027 Religious Pluralism .137*
(.074) (.059) (.106) (.085) (.079)
Cath x Econ Ineq. .125* Cath x Econ Ineq. .089 Educ. Benefits -.034 Islam x Econ Ineq. -.096 Pluralism x Econ Ineq. -.037
(.074) (.055) (.084) (.111) (.074)
Orthodox .460**** Orthodox .364**** Orthodox .356**** Hinduism -.152 Atheism -.291***
(.095) (.075) (.077) (.096) (.104)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .244** Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .193* Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .181 Hinduism x Econ Ineq. -.009 Atheism x Econ Ineq. -.058
(.118) (.102) (.115) (.082) (.092)
Adjusted R² .484 Adjusted R² .692 Adjusted R² .680 Adjusted R² .313 Adjusted R² .449
N 77 N 76 N 75 N 82 N 77
                                         *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                              Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix H Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Protestantism .017 Judaism .033 Buddhism -.152* Protestantism .071 Judaism .061
(.078) (.103) (.088) (.075) (.063)
Economic Inequality Ratio .668**** Economic Inequality Ratio .551**** Economic Inequality Ratio .469**** Infant Mortality .759**** Infant Mortality .785****
(.083) (.093) (.074) (.072) (.069)
Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio .075 Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.113 Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio .034 Prot x Mortality -.008 Judaism x Mortality .040
(.088) (.104) (.087) (.082) (.057)
Catholicism .047 Islam .028 Religious Pluralism .141* Catholicism .418**** Catholicism .193*
(.077) (.088) (.075) (.104) (.101)
Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio .061 Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio -.108 Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.003 Cath x Mortality .341**** Cath x Mortality .218**
(.072) (.109) (.070) (.086) (.084)
Orthodox .380**** Hinduism -.139 Atheism -.307*** Orthodox .280*** Islam -.262***
(.089) (.099) (.094) (.088) (.086)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio .091 Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio .053 Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.043 Orthodox x Mortality .132 Islam x Mortality -.149**
(.112) (.093) (.084) (.086) (.074)
Adjusted R² .444 Adjusted R² .327 Adjusted R² .475 Adjusted R² .589 Adjusted R² .566
N 76 N 81 N 76 N 77 N 83
                          *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                        Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix H Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Islam -.260*** Islam -.271*** Islam -.263*** Islam -.209** Single w/ kids .360****
(.087) (.090) (.088) (.091) (.099)
Infant Mortality .766**** Infant Mortality .771**** Infant Mortality .783**** Infant Mortality .670**** Infant Mortality .516****
(.071) (.069) (.065) (.102) (.122)
Islam x Mortality -.142** Islam x Mortality -.131* Islam x Mortality -.143* Islam x Mortality -.102 Economic Inequality .168
(.071) (.067) (.087) (.082) (.114)
Catholicism .194* Catholicism .183* Catholicism .201** Catholicism .176* Catholicism .126
(.101) (.099) (.099) (.100) (.088)
Cath x Mortality .225*** Cath x Mortality .225*** Cath x Mortality .205** Cath x Mortality .207** Cath x Mortality .127
(.083) (.084) (.084) (.088) (.082)
Hinduism .020 Buddhism -.032 Religious Pluralism .021 Atheism -.133 Health Benefits -.032
(.067) (.078) (.082) (.098) (.123)
Hinduism x Mortality .077 Buddhism x Mortality .031 Pluralism x Mortality -.024 Atheism x Mortality .107 Charity -.123
(.062) (.076) (.072) (.071) (.076)
Adjusted R² .569 Adjusted R² .563 Adjusted R² .561 Adjusted R² .584 Adjusted R² .592
N 83 N 83 N 83 N 77 N 73
                         *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                           Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix H Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador: Conditional Effects w/ 
Social Welfare 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Protestantism .130 Judaism .093 Hinduism -.057 Religious Pluralism .196** Protestantism .070 Protestantism -.079
(.096) (.089) (.117) (.086) (.120) (.098)
Health Benefits -.481**** Health Benefits -.452**** Health Benefits -.404**** Health Benefits -.158 Charity .142 Charity -.099
(.086) (.079) (.073) (.145) (.134) (.076)
Prot x Health -.122 Judaism x Health -.073 Hinduism x Health -.014 Pluralism x Health -.077 Prot x Charity -.157* Prot x Charity -.023
(.084) (.079) (.078) (.071) (.089) (.069)
Catholicism .307** Catholicism .211 Catholicism .277*** Catholicism .196** Catholicism .144 Single w/ kids .393****
(.132) (.131) (.105) (.090) (.123) (.109)
Cath x Health -.173* Cath x Health -.175* Cath x Health -.243*** Cath x Health -.102 Cath x Charity .129 Economic Inequality .245**
(.089) (.095) (.084) (.083) (.134) (.098)
Orthodox .258** Islam -.088 Buddhism -.067 Atheism -.487*** Orthodox .175 Infant Mortality .468****
(.108) (.114) (.117) (.154) (.155) (.097)
Orthodox x Health -.064 Islam x Health .129 Buddhism x Health -.041 Atheism x Health -.124 Orthodox x Charity -.095 —
(.117) (.095) (.102) (.121) (.139)
Adjusted R² .257 Adjusted R² .198 Adjusted R² .175 Adjusted R² .371 Adjusted R² -.006 Adjusted R² .590
N 76 N 82 N 82 N 76 N 76 N 71
                                                                     Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
                                           *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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Appendix H Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador: Conditional Effects w/ 
Social Welfare 
 
 
  Model 7   Model 8   Model 9   Model 10 
        Judaism .017 Buddhism -.182 Religious Pluralism .107 Atheism -.553**** 
 
(.119) 
 
(.118) 
 
(.105) 
 
(.104) 
Charity .123 Charity .128 Charity .104 Charity -.051 
 
(.113) 
 
(.107) 
 
(.103) 
 
(.095) 
Judaism x Charity -.027 Buddhism x Charity .133 Pluralism x Charity .152 Atheism x Charity -.059 
 
(.116) 
 
(.169) 
 
(.118) 
 
(.114) 
Islam -.036 Islam -.073 Islam .001 Islam -.205* 
 
(.095) 
 
(.096) 
 
(.108) 
 
(.109) 
Islam x Charity .179** Islam x Charity .217*** Islam x Charity .253** Islam x Charity -.039 
 
(.082) 
 
(.082) 
 
(.112) 
 
(.095) 
Hinduism -.043 Hinduism .047 Hinduism -.029 Hinduism .108 
 
(.122) 
 
(.119) 
 
(.109) 
 
(.095) 
Hinduism x Charity -.191 Hinduism x Charity -.289** Hinduism x Charity -.209** Hinduism x Charity -.125 
 
(.120) 
 
(.131) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.117) 
Adjusted R² -.005 Adjusted R² .037 Adjusted R² .025 Adjusted R² .289 
N 79 N 79 N 79 N 76 
   
                                                     *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
   
                                          Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o El Salvador:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.025**** — -.025**** Individualism -.024**** — -.024**** Individualism -.025**** — -.025**** Individualism -.023**** — -.023****
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Protestantism .043 -.084** -.041 Protestantism .050 -.089** -.039 Protestantism .013 -.088** -.075 Protestantism -.165*** -.087** -.251****
(.069) (.039) (.068) (.065) (.036) (.059) (.076) (.037) (.075) (.061) (.038) (.071)
Catholicism .869* -.147 .723 Catholicism 1.13*** -.194 .940** Catholicism .114 -.227 -.113 Religious Pluralism .086 .008 .094
(.462) (.249) (.496) (.395) (.193) (.434) (.521) (.247) (.583) (.061) (.023) (.067)
Orthodox .116 .019 .135* Orthodox .164** .025 .188** Orthodox .018 .011 .029 Single w/ kids .476**** .034 .510****
(.074) (.033) (.072) (.082) (.034) (.078) (.091) (.038) (.093) (.127) (.070) (.142)
Judaism .102 -.123** -.021 Judaism .076 -.131*** -.054 Judaism .083 -.125*** -.042 Judaism .038 -.110*** -.072
(.067) (.048) (.073) (.080) (.049) (.077) (.071) (.045) (.070) (.053) (.039) (.056)
Islam -.039 .016 -.024 Hinduism .022 .011 .033 Buddhism -.257*** .004 -.253** Buddhism -.128 .019 -.109
(.054) (.037) (.067) (.050) (.018) (.049) (.086) (.045) (.101) (.104) (.046) (.122)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                      — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                             Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
68 68 68 68
                                                                      *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.193 .221 .352 .491
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Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o El Salvador:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.012** — -.012** Individualism -.004 — -.004 Individualism -.004 — -.004
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005)
Protestantism -.080 -.024 -.104 Infant Mortality .654**** .003 .656**** Infant Mortality .379** .041 .420***
(.071) (.018) (.074) (.176) (.010) (.178) (.166) (.050) (.155)
Atheism -.254*** -.033 -.286*** Health Benefits .114** -.012 .102** Atheism -.111 .0002 -.111
(.091) (.029) (.098) (.050) (.019) (.044) (.097) (.008) (.098)
Single w/ kids .443**** -.034 .409**** Educ. Benefits -.019 -.016 -.035 Single w/ kids .397**** -.022 .375****
(.106) (.034) (.104) (.078) (.026) (.073) (.076) (.027) (.071)
Judaism .049 -.042* .007 Judaism .087 -.006 .081 Economic Freedom -.007 -.0004 -.008
(.047) (.023) (.045) (.057) (.011) (.057) (.010) (.001) (.010)
Economic Inequality .030** .010* .040*** Economic Inequality .059**** .0004 .059**** Economic Inequality .031** .003 .034***
(.014) (.006) (.013) (.012) (.001) (.012) (.013) (.004) (.012)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N
                                                               Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
.569 .465 .612
68 68 68
                                                                         *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                        — Indicates parameter not estimated
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Appendix I. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates 
w/o South Africa:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .474**** — .474**** Single w/ kids .410**** — .410**** Single w/ kids .336**** — .336**** Single w/ kids .227** — .227**
(.129) (.129) (.098) (.098) (.074) (.074) (.095) (.095)
Protestantism -.104 .146*** .042 Protestantism -.094 .122*** .028 Economic Discrimination .111 -.008 .103 Protestantism -.018 .051 .033
(.070) (.051) (.063) (.064) (.044) (.051) (.080) (.050) (.087) (.049) (.031) (.041)
Catholicism -.080 .522** .442 Catholicism .539* .598** 1.14**** Catholicism .493* .632** 1.13*** Catholicism .222 .278** .500**
(.460) (.250) (.459) (.277) (.239) (.325) (.291) (.245) (.324) (.236) (.139) (.243)
Orthodox .054 .055* .109 Orthodox .092** .051** .143*** Orthodox .106** .029 .135** Orthodox .198**** .055** .253****
(.067) (.031) (.074) (.044) (.025) (.055) (.048) (.027) (.054) (.045) (.021) (.044)
Judaism -.050 .002 -.048 Religious Pluralism .110*** .025 .135**** Religious Pluralism .088** .053** .141**** Religious Pluralism .049 .001 .050
(.064) (.038) (.076) (.035) (.023) (.038) (.038) (.026) (.039) (.033) (.012) (.034)
Islam -.049 -.019 -.069 Atheism -.517**** -.039 -.556**** Atheism -.515**** -.034 -.549**** Atheism -.303**** .017 -.286****
(.058) (.025) (.063) (.068) (.038) (.077) (.071) (.041) (.082) (.068) (.022) (.073)
Hinduism -.040 .032 -.008 Hinduism -.020 .029* .009 Hinduism -.020 .026 .006 Economic Inequality .071**** .013** .084****
(.049) (.021) (.054) (.032) (.017) (.033) (.032) (.018) (.033) (.012) (.006) (.012)
Buddhism .003 -.067** -.064 Buddhism .074** -.048*** .026 Buddhism .057 -.026 .030 Charity 1.36 1.57** 2.93*
(.059) (.027) (.059) (.037) (.018) (.041) (.040) (.019) (.042) (1.53) (.722) (1.60)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                       — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                               Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
85 85 85 85
                                                                       *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.221 .550 .533 .678
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Appendix I Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o South Africa:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .259*** — .259*** Single w/ kids .399**** — .399**** Single w/ kids .484**** — .484****
(.082) (.082) (.100) (.100) (.090) (.090)
Protestantism .024 .079** .103*** Protestantism -.036 .100*** .064 Economic Freedom -.018 .001 -.016
(.043) (.032) (.033) (.049) (.038) (.045) (.012) (.007) (.014)
Catholicism .633*** .309** .941**** Catholicism .272 .127 .399 Individual Responsibility .082 .134 .216
(.238) (.151) (.256) (.343) (.165) (.358) (.111) (.088) (.140)
Orthodox .224**** .039** .263**** Orthodox .193**** .041** .234**** Orthodox .028 .045 .073
(.032) (.016) (.037) (.039) (.021) (.045) (.050) (.033) (.057)
Economic Discrimination .109 .015 .124* Economic Discrimination .058 .009 .068 Income Differences 1.31* -.168 1.14
(.066) (.030) (.072) (.072) (.042) (.076) (.782) (.556) (.982)
Atheism -.063 -.005 -.068 Economic Inequality Ratio .908**** .492*** 1.40**** Private Ownership -1.67 .373 -1.29
(.069) (.039) (.079) (.250) (.162) (.189) (1.21) (.624) (1.53)
Economic Inequality .049**** .011** .060**** Health Benefits -.153**** .074*** -.079** Competition -1.02 -.530 -1.55
(.010) (.005) (.011) (.036) (.025) (.038) (1.69) (1.18) (2.11)
Infant Mortality .560**** -.006 .554**** Educ. Benefits -.058 -.027 -.086 Charitable Giving -1.85 .953 -.896
(.101) (.058) (.120) (.047) (.033) (.053) (1.26) (.769) (1.57)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N
                                       *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                              Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
85 85 85
                                                                      — Indicates parameter not estimated
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
.786 .656 .364
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Appendix I Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o South Africa:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Secularization .704**** — 1.00f Secularization .181 — 1.00f Secularization .121 — 1.00f Secularization .419*** — 1.00f
(.096) (.156) (.158) (.121)
Protestantism .063 -.022 .041 Religious Pluralism .039 -.002 .038 Religious Pluralism .026 -.002 .024 Economic Freedom -.002 -.010* -.012
(.047) (.040) (.062) (.031) (.005) (.031) (.030) (.004) (.030) (.012) (.005) (.011)
Catholicism .372 .166 .537 Atheism -.214** -.099 -.313**** Atheism -.015 -.063 -.078 Competition -2.07* -.527 -2.59*
(.345) (.372) (.466) (.103) (.085) (.072) (.109) (.084) (.082) (1.25) (.589) (1.35)
Orthodox .209**** -.104* .104 Orthodox .187**** -.008 .179**** Orthodox .178**** -.008 .171**** Orthodox .079 -.039 .040
(.060) (.054) (.068) (.043) (.010) (.041) (.044) (.010) (.040) (.052) (.026) (.051)
Judaism -.076 .029 -.047 Single w/ kids .237**** .005 .242**** Economic Discrimination .103 -.013 .090 Single w/ kids .381**** .061* .442****
(.053) (.052) (.075) (.064) (.012) (.066) (.068) (.017) (.062) (.080) (.036) (.087)
Islam -.144*** .096* -.048 Islam -.072* .016 -.057 Islam -.138*** .009 -.129**** Islam -.147*** .060* -.087*
(.052) (.055) (.065) (.040) (.015) (.036) (.040) (.012) (.036) (.043) (.032) (.045)
Hinduism .006 -.020 -.014 Economic Inequality .062**** .006 .069**** Economic Inequality Ratio .929**** .061 .990**** Charitable Giving -2.70*** .239 -2.46**
(.035) (.038) (.052) (.014) (.006) (.011) (.208) (.080) (.183) (.949) (.420) (1.05)
Buddhism .036 -.082 -.047 Buddhism .012 -.010 .002 Infant Mortality .589**** .021 .611**** Life Meaning -3.51*** -2.86*** -6.37****
(.043) (.053) (.061) (.038) (.010) (.036) (.111) (.029) (.114) (1.19) (.915) (1.09)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
χ² χ² χ² χ²
χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df
RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA
CFI CFI CFI CFI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.467 .684 .745 .597
85 85 85 85
84.04 (p < .001) 60.25 (p < .001) 50.31 (p < .01) 61.01 (p < .001)
3.23 2.32 1.94 2.35
.162 .124 .105 .126
                                                                    Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
.884 .945 .961 .936
                                                                     *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                     — Indicates parameter not estimated
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Appendix I Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o South Africa:  Direct, Indirect, & Total 
Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
  Model 5 
 
Direct Indirect Total 
Secularization .239 — 1.00f 
 
(.146) 
  Religious Member .050 .106 .157 
 
(.132) (.076) (.111) 
New Govt. .630*** .043 .673**** 
 
(.190) (.051) (.186) 
Latin Nation .759* .427 1.19**** 
 
(.415) (.277) (.294) 
Single w/ kids .291*** -.028 .263*** 
 
(.087) (.024) (.085) 
Islam -.077 .060 -.017 
 
(.055) (.040) (.035) 
Charity -1.81 -.755 -2.57 
 
(1.53) (.626) (1.60) 
Life Meaning -4.57**** -1.29* -5.86**** 
 
(1.14) (.770) (.972) 
Adjusted R² .558 
N 85 
χ²  91.21 (p < .001) 
χ²/df 3.51 
RMSEA .172 
CFI .892 
                                                              *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                             — Indicates parameter not estimated 
                                                         Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix I Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o South Africa: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .078 Judaism .060 Buddhism -.118 Protestantism .031 Judaism .020
(.080) (.103) (.087) (.082) (.101)
Economic Inequality .705**** Economic Inequality .540**** Economic Inequality .454**** Economic Inequality Ratio .682**** Economic Inequality Ratio .523****
(.093) (.098) (.097) (.095) (.097)
Prot x Econ Ineq. .068 Judaism x Econ Ineq. .006 Buddhism x Econ Ineq. .046 Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio .100 Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.132
(.094) (.120) (.125) (.099) (.104)
Catholicism .094 Islam -.031 Religious Pluralism .164* Catholicism .035 Islam .025
(.079) (.086) (.084) (.081) (.088)
Cath x Econ Ineq. .112 Islam x Econ Ineq. -.109 Pluralism x Econ Ineq. -.003 Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio .049 Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio -.115
(.083) (.113) (.096) (.078) (.109)
Orthodox .425**** Hinduism -.175* Atheism -.309*** Orthodox .351**** Hinduism -.166
(.094) (.099) (.106) (.088) (.101)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .182 Hinduism x Econ Ineq. -.087 Atheism x Econ Ineq. -.081 Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio .028 Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.025
(.119) (.124) (.098) (.111) (.107)
Adjusted R² .443 Adjusted R² .317 Adjusted R² .433 Adjusted R² .430 Adjusted R² .347
N 77 N 82 N 77 N 76 N 81
                                                  *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                        Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix I Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o South Africa: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Buddhism -.133 Protestantism .065 Judaism .027 Hinduism -.022 Buddhism -.009
(.088) (.075) (.068) (.065) (.081)
Economic Inequality Ratio .472**** Infant Mortality .753**** Infant Mortality .783**** Infant Mortality .768**** Infant Mortality .773****
(.077) (.072) (.070) (.072) (.071)
Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio .076 Prot x Mortality -.016 Judaism x Mortality .023 Hinduism x Mortality .051 Buddhism x Mortality .046
(.087) (.082) (.060) (.059) (.077)
Religious Pluralism .156** Catholicism .430**** Catholicism .199* Catholicism .203** Catholicism .198**
(.077) (.104) (.102) (.101) (.100)
Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio .029 Cath x Mortality .362**** Cath x Mortality .231*** Cath x Mortality .235*** Cath x Mortality .243***
(.083) (.087) (.086) (.083) (.085)
Atheism -.317*** Orthodox .254*** Islam -.275*** Islam -.271*** Islam -.271***
(.095) (.091) (.091) (.090) (.090)
Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.068 Orthodox x Mortality .116 Islam x Mortality -.143* Islam x Mortality -.137* Islam x Mortality -.122*
(.089) (.088) (.075) (.074) (.066)
Adjusted R² .474 Adjusted R² .559 Adjusted R² .556 Adjusted R² .558 Adjusted R² .557
N 76 N 77 N 83 N 83 N 83
                                                  *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                   Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix I Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o South Africa: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
  Model 11   Model 12   Model 13 
      Religious Pluralism .028 Atheism -.148 Single w/ kids .371**** 
 
(.084) 
 
(.098) 
 
(.101) 
Infant Mortality .783**** Infant Mortality .658**** Infant Mortality .505**** 
 
(.067) 
 
(.101) 
 
(.127) 
Pluralism x Mortality -.034 Atheism x Mortality .116 Economic Inequality .179 
 
(.072) 
 
(.072) 
 
(.131) 
Catholicism .214** Catholicism .183* Catholicism .125 
 
(.099) 
 
(.101) 
 
(.097) 
Cath x Mortality .215** Cath x Mortality .220** Cath x Mortality .130 
 
(.085) 
 
(.089) 
 
(.089) 
Islam  -.272*** Islam  -.220** Health Benefits -.040 
 
(.090) 
 
(.096) 
 
(.125) 
Islam x Mortality -.143 Islam x Mortality -.098 Charity -.114 
 
(.087) 
 
(.083) 
 
(.076) 
Adjusted R² .557 Adjusted R² .578 Adjusted R² .572 
N 83 N 77 N 73 
  
                                                          *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
  
                                               Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix I Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o South Africa: Conditional Effects w/ 
Social Welfare 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Protestantism .118 Judaism .049 Hinduism -.169 Religious Pluralism .210** Protestantism .064 Judaism -.017
(.093) (.094) (.113) (.091) (.119) (.121)
Health Benefits -.473**** Health Benefits -.451**** Health Benefits -.427**** Health Benefits -.159 Charity .140 Charity .171
(.086) (.079) (.075) (.145) (.137) (.113)
Prot x Health -.128 Judaism x Health -.062 Hinduism x Health -.027 Pluralism x Health -.074 Prot x Charity -.131 Judaism x Charity -.055
(.086) (.079) (.077) (.071) (.091) (.116)
Catholicism .314** Catholicism .211 Catholicism .312*** Catholicism .213** Catholicism .162 Islam -.055
(.133) (.133) (.103) (.091) (.122) (.098)
Cath x Health -.187** Cath x Health -.178* Cath x Health -.256*** Cath x Health -.105 Cath x Charity .139 Islam x Charity .162*
(.090) (.097) (.084) (.083) (.135) (.086)
Orthodox .221* Islam -.112 Buddhism .016 Atheism -.491*** Orthodox .119 Hinduism -.114
(.114) (.120) (.126) (.154) (.170) (.115)
Orthodox x Health -.066 Islam x Health .122 Buddhism x Health -.031 Atheism x Health -.123 Orthodox x Charity -.144 Hinduism x Charity -.184
(.116) (.094) (.105) (.121) (.153) (.116)
Adjusted R² .244 Adjusted R² .199 Adjusted R² .199 Adjusted R² .377 Adjusted R² -.007 Adjusted R² .017
N 76 N 82 N 82 N 76 N 76 N 79
                                                                     Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
                                           *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
167 
 
Appendix I Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o South Africa: Conditional Effects w/ 
Social Welfare 
 
 
  Model 7   Model 8   Model 9 
      Buddhism -.119 Religious Pluralism .109 Atheism -.550**** 
 
(.115) 
 
(.106) 
 
(.103) 
Charity .167 Charity .137 Charity -.017 
 
(.109) 
 
(.102) 
 
(.099) 
Buddhism x Charity .182 Pluralism x Charity .163 Atheism x Charity -.071 
 
(.167) 
 
(.121) 
 
(.110) 
Islam -.073 Islam -.013 Islam -.227** 
 
(.096) 
 
(.110) 
 
(.112) 
Islam x Charity .221*** Islam x Charity .244** Islam x Charity -.055 
 
(.080) 
 
(.114) 
 
(.099) 
Hinduism -.047 Hinduism -.099 Hinduism .040 
 
(.111) 
 
(.105) 
 
(.088) 
Hinduism x Charity -.314** Hinduism x Charity -.216** Hinduism x Charity -.122 
 
(.129) 
 
(.098) 
 
(.112) 
Adjusted R² .045 Adjusted R² .046 Adjusted R² .290 
N 79 N 79 N 76 
 
                                                                                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                                                Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix I Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o South Africa:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.029**** — -.029**** Individualism -.028**** — -.028**** Individualism -.029**** — -.029**** Individualism -.025**** — -.025****
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Protestantism .042 -.090** -.048 Protestantism .057 -.096** -.039 Protestantism .028 -.094** -.066 Protestantism -.162*** -.096** -.258****
(.070) (.041) (.069) (.067) (.038) (.059) (.073) (.040) (.070) (.060) (.040) (.070)
Catholicism 1.01** -.186 .825 Catholicism 1.25*** -.233 1.02** Catholicism .453 -.274 .179 Religious Pluralism .080 .012 .092
(.465) (.282) (.504) (.381) (.219) (.429) (.476) (.288) (.573) (.059) (.025) (.066)
Orthodox .138* .021 .159** Orthodox .159* .032 .190** Orthodox .053 .011 .063 Single w/ kids .495**** .055 .550****
(.080) (.036) (.078) (.086) (.038) (.082) (.100) (.042) (.105) (.128) (.071) (.148)
Judaism .085 -.145*** -.060 Judaism .082 -.157*** -.075 Judaism .066 -.148*** -.081 Judaism .025 -.123*** -.098
(.068) (.051) (.078) (.080) (.053) (.081) (.069) (.050) (.076) (.054) (.041) (.060)
Islam -.042 .017 -.025 Hinduism -.013 .015 .002 Buddhism -.198** .004 -.194* Buddhism -.103 .025 -.078
(.058) (.041) (.073) (.045) (.021) (.047) (.084) (.052) (.106) (.102) (.048) (.122)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                      — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                             Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
68 68 68 68
                                                                      *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.279 .301 .355 .507
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Appendix I Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o South Africa:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.015*** — -.015*** Individualism -.019** — -.019** Individualism -.007 — -.007
(.005) (.005) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.006)
Protestantism -.079 -.024 -.103 Economic Discrimination .143 .036 .179 Infant Mortality .370** .071 .441***
(.070) (.022) (.075) (.113) (.037) (.115) (.168) (.061) (.155)
Atheism -.249*** -.038 -.288*** Atheism -.369*** -.034 -.403*** Atheism -.121 .005 -.116
(.090) (.033) (.099) (.133) (.033) (.141) (.097) (.013) (.098)
Single w/ kids .467**** -.038 .428**** Health Benefits .038 -.085** -.048 Single w/ kids .416**** -.030 .386****
(.108) (.039) (.106) (.061) (.034) (.049) (.078) (.028) (.074)
Judaism .035 -.051** -.106 Judaism .100 -.043 .058 Economic Freedom -.004 -.001 -.005
(.048) (.024) (.047) (.067) (.027) (.069) (.010) (.002) (.010)
Economic Inequality .023 .015** .039*** Charity 1.46 -1.27 .191 Economic Inequality .028** .007 .035***
(.015) (.006) (.014) (2.28) (.795) (2.14) (.014) (.006) (.013)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
.569 .296 .600
68 68 68
                                                             — Indicates parameter not estimated
                              *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                    Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix J. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates 
w/o Columbia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .503**** — .503**** Single w/ kids .427**** — .427**** Single w/ kids .354**** — .354**** Single w/ kids .386**** — .386****
(.131) (.131) (.098) (.098) (.074) (.074) (.099) (.099)
Protestantism -.091 .161*** .070 Protestantism -.093 .131*** .038 Economic Discrimination .086 -.011 .075 Economic Discrimination .066 .029 .096
(.071) (.054) (.063) (.065) (.046) (.052) (.081) (.054) (.087) (.083) (.051) (.081)
Catholicism -.213 .534** .321 Catholicism .357 .605** .962*** Catholicism .335 .652** .987*** Catholicism .278 .576** .854***
(.458) (.261) (.462) (.255) (.252) (.307) (.280) (.260) (.312) (.254) (.227) (.286)
Orthodox .061 .061* .122 Orthodox .088* .053** .141** Orthodox .098** .030 .127** Orthodox .089* .049* .138**
(.070) (.033) (.078) (.045) (.026) (.055) (.048) (.029) (.054) (.046) (.026) (.054)
Judaism -.046 .001 -.046 Religious Pluralism .119*** .029 .148**** Religious Pluralism .098** .061** .159**** Religious Pluralism .114*** .022 .137****
(.064) (.041) (.076) (.035) (.024) (.038) (.038) (.028) (.039) (.037) (.024) (.037)
Islam -.022 -.019 -.041 Atheism -.511**** -.044 -.556**** Atheism -.512**** -.040 -.552**** Atheism -.485**** -.061 -.547****
(.055) (.028) (.062) (.067) (.041) (.077) (.071) (.044) (.083) (.072) (.040) (.080)
Hinduism -.024 .041* .016 Hinduism -.006 .035* .029 Hinduism -.007 .034* .027 Hinduism .010 .021 .030
(.050) (.024) (.056) (.032) (.018) (.035) (.032) (.020) (.035) (.031) (.016) (.035)
Buddhism .016 -.073** -.067 Buddhism .073* -.052*** .021 Buddhism .055 -.030 .025 Protestantism -.059 .113** .054
(.058) (.030) (.060) (.037) (.020) (.042) (.040) (.020) (.043) (.064) (.048) (.050)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                               — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                      Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
85 85 85 85
                                                                               *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.219 .554 .529 .541
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Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Columbia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .234** — .234** Single w/ kids .267*** — .267*** Single w/ kids .434**** — .434**** Single w/ kids .204** — .204**
(.094) (.094) (.082) (.082) (.098) (.098) (.101) (.101)
Economic Inequality .069**** .015** .084**** Economic Inequality .048**** .013** .062**** Economic Inequality Ratio .852*** .633**** 1.48**** Economic Inequality .090**** .013* .103****
(.012) (.007) (.012) (.010) (.006) (.011) (.247) (.157) (.214) (.011) (.007) (.010)
Catholicism .201 .291** .492** Catholicism .590** .318** .908**** Catholicism .205 .136 .340 Charitable Giving -3.16**** -.128 -3.29***
(.236) (.141) (.247) (.234) (.153) (.257) (.333) (.176) (.348) (.905) (.270) (.950)
Orthodox .192**** .060*** .252**** Orthodox .219**** .043** .262**** Orthodox .181**** .051** .232**** Orthodox .228**** .041* .269****
(.047) (.023) (.045) (.033) (.017) (.039) (.040) (.023) (.046) (.039) (.022) (.041)
Religious Pluralism .051 -.001 .050 Economic Discrimination .103 .017 .120 Economic Discrimination .050 .015 .065 Economic Discrimination -.054 .024 -.030
(.033) (.013) (.034) (.067) (.030) (.073) (.071) (.046) (.075) (.083) (.028) (.085)
Atheism -.305**** .020 -.285**** Atheism -.055 -.006 -.060 Health Benefits -.169**** .091**** -.078* Charity 5.66**** 1.33* 6.99****
(.067) (.023) (.072) (.070) (.042) (.081) (.036) (.026) (.040) (1.62) (.760) (1.68)
Charity 1.35 1.63** 2.98* Infant Mortality .568**** -.011 .557**** Educ. Benefits -.039 -.036 -.075 Educ. Benefits -.040 .019 -.021
(1.52) (.736) (1.61) (.102) (.062) (.124) (.048) (.035) (.054) (.049) (.018) (.051)
Protestantism -.020 .054* .034 Protestantism .023 .083** .106*** Protestantism -.040 .108*** .067 Protestantism .024 .051 .075
(.049) (.032) (.040) (.043) (.033) (.033) (.050) (.040) (.045) (.053) (.031) (.047)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                                — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                       Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
85 85 85 85
                                                                                *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
.674 .784 .653 .662
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Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Columbia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total 
Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
  Model 9 
 
Direct Indirect Total 
Single w/ kids .490**** — .490**** 
 
(.092) 
 
(.092) 
Economic Freedom -.020* .0002 -.020 
 
(.012) (.007) (.014) 
Charitable Giving -1.79 1.03 -.762 
 
(1.37) (.813) (1.61) 
Orthodox .033 .036 .069 
 
(.052) (.037) (.058) 
Economic Discrimination .100 .054 .154 
 
(.105) (.065) (.114) 
Individual Responsibility .119 .143 .262* 
 
(.114) (.093) (.140) 
Income Differences 1.65** -.075 1.58* 
 
(.721) (.549) (.906) 
Private Ownership -1.57* .383 -1.19 
 
(.949) (.676) (1.21) 
Adjusted R² .402 
N 85 
                                                                 *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                — Indicates parameter not estimated 
                                                      Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Columbia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Secularization .718**** — 1.00f Secularization .191 — 1.00f Secularization .137 — 1.00f Secularization .237* — 1.00f
(.096) (.154) (.162) (.143)
Protestantism .083* -.013 .069 Religious Pluralism .041 -.003 .038 Religious Pluralism .028 -.002 .026 Religious Pluralism .008 -.024* -.016
(.047) (.039) (.062) (.033) (.005) (.032) (.031) (.005) (.031) (.036) (.014) (.033)
Catholicism .300 .104 .404 Atheism -.206** -.103 -.310**** Atheism .003 -.071 -.068 Life Meaning -2.76** -1.36* -4.12****
(.353) (.366) (.462) (.103) (.084) (.071) (.111) (.087) (.084) (1.25) (.800) (.996)
Orthodox .218**** -.099* .119* Orthodox .184**** -.007 .177**** Orthodox .180**** -.008 .171**** Orthodox .191**** -.005 .186****
(.060) (.055) (.070) (.043) (.009) (.042) (.046) (.010) (.042) (.042) (.011) (.042)
Judaism -.075 .029 -.046 Single w/ kids .241**** .004 .246**** Economic Inequality Ratio .992**** .073 1.06**** Single w/ kids .235**** .004 .239****
(.053) (.052) (.074) (.063) (.012) (.065) (.217) (.086) (.195) (.062) (.016) (.062)
Islam -.125** .107* -.018 Islam -.068* .014 -.054 Islam -.134*** .010 -.124*** Islam -.065 .026 -.038
(.052) (.057) (.063) (.040) (.013) (.038) (.041) (.012) (.037) (.041) (.020) (.037)
Hinduism .022 -.011 .011 Economic Inequality .061**** .007 .068**** Economic Discrimination .108 -.014 .094 Economic Inequality .065**** .016 .081****
(.036) (.037) (.054) (.013) (.006) (.010) (.069) (.018) (.064) (.014) (.010) (.009)
Buddhism .041 -.081 -.040 Buddhism .013 -.011 .002 Infant Mortality .590**** .023 .613**** Buddhism .009 -.021 -.012
(.044) (.054) (.061) (.039) (.011) (.037) (.113) (.029) (.116) (.041) (.015) (.039)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
χ² χ² χ² χ²
χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df
RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA
CFI CFI CFI CFI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                      Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
.867 .936 .954 .936
                                                                        *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                       — Indicates parameter not estimated
3.67 2.57 2.12 2.49
.177 .136 .115 .132
85 85 85 85
95.54 (p < .001) 66.91 (p < .001) 55.19 (p < .001) 64.76 (p < .001)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.465 .681 .739 .680
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Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Columbia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Secularization .423**** — 1.00f Secularization .144 — 1.00f
(.121) (.105)
Economic Freedom -.001 -.009* -.011 Protestantism .007 -.023 -.017
(.012) (.005) (.012) (.065) (.023) (.056)
Life Meaning -3.26*** -2.78*** -6.04**** Life Meaning -4.58**** -.986 -5.56****
(1.18) (.916) (1.07) (1.10) (.721) (.983)
Orthodox .075 -.040 .035 Charity -2.32 -.370 -2.69*
(.053) (.026) (.052) (1.55) (.363) (1.58)
Single w/ kids .402**** .061* .463**** Single w/ kids .300*** -.007 .293***
(.079) (.034) (.087) (.098) (.013) (.099)
Islam -.129*** .064* -.066 Religious Member .112 .078 .190*
(.042) (.033) (.043) (.136) (.072) (.110)
Competition -2.06 -.506 -2.56* New Govt. .676**** .014 .690****
(1.26) (.586) (1.37) (.193) (.032) (.194)
Charitable Giving -2.87*** .216 -2.65** Latin Nation 1.02**** .086 1.10****
(.958) (.413) (1.06) (.272) (.064) (.279)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N
χ² χ²
χ²/df χ²/df
RMSEA RMSEA
CFI CFI.929 .878
                                                                     *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                    — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                   Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
98.26 (p < .001)65.49 (p < .001)
2.52 3.78
.134 .181
Model 5 Model 6
.592 .537
85 85
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Appendix J Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Columbia: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .075 Judaism .069 Buddhism -.108 Protestantism .034 Judaism .024
(.075) (.107) (.093) (.077) (.103)
Economic Inequality .726**** Economic Inequality .570**** Economic Inequality .437**** Economic Inequality Ratio .692**** Economic Inequality Ratio .558****
(.081) (.094) (.087) (.082) (.094)
Prot x Econ Ineq. .069 Judaism x Econ Ineq. .002 Buddhism x Econ Ineq. .085 Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio .108 Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.140
(.083) (.124) (.132) (.085) (.103)
Catholicism .108 Islam -.033 Religious Pluralism .190** Catholicism .034 Islam .025
(.087) (.087) (.079) (.089) (.089)
Cath x Econ Ineq. .136 Islam x Econ Ineq. -.100 Pluralism x Econ Ineq. .062 Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio .048 Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio -.113
(.097) (.113) (.076) (.097) (.110)
Orthodox .448**** Hinduism -.158 Atheism -.306*** Orthodox .357*** Hinduism -.145
(.111) (.098) (.105) (.103) (.101)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .225 Hinduism x Econ Ineq. -.007 Atheism x Econ Ineq. -.051 Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio .038 Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio .052
(.156) (.105) (.102) (.150) (.095)
Adjusted R² .441 Adjusted R² .301 Adjusted R² .437 Adjusted R² .425 Adjusted R² .326
N 77 N 82 N 77 N 76 N 81
                                                  *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                        Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix J Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Columbia: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Buddhism -.120 Protestantism .101 Judaism .044 Hinduism .019 Buddhism .011
(.094) (.079) (.067) (.067) (.083)
Economic Inequality Ratio .447**** Infant Mortality .739**** Infant Mortality .794**** Infant Mortality .778**** Infant Mortality .784****
(.076) (.072) (.070) (.073) (.072)
Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio .109 Prot x Mortality .025 Judaism x Mortality .031 Hinduism x Mortality .070 Buddhism x Mortality .054
(.092) (.087) (.059) (.063) (.079)
Religious Pluralism .185** Catholicism .363*** Catholicism .143 Catholicism .144 Catholicism .146
(.075) (.108) (.099) (.098) (.098)
Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio .094 Cath x Mortality .316*** Cath x Mortality .187** Cath x Mortality .193** Cath x Mortality .202**
(.066) (.091) (.083) (.082) (.083)
Atheism -.313*** Orthodox .232** Islam -.297*** Islam -.294*** Islam -.286***
(.094) (.092) (.092) (.092) (.092)
Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.044 Orthodox x Mortality .109 Islam x Mortality -.163** Islam x Mortality -.159** Islam x Mortality -.136**
(.089) (.093) (.076) (.074) (.067)
Adjusted R² .476 Adjusted R² .539 Adjusted R² .554 Adjusted R² .558 Adjusted R² .553
N 76 N 77 N 83 N 83 N 83
                               *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                     Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix J Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Columbia: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
  Model 11   Model 12   Model 13 
      Religious Pluralism .063 Atheism -.125 Single w/ kids .413**** 
 
(.085) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.099) 
Infant Mortality .784**** Infant Mortality .688**** Infant Mortality .468**** 
 
(.065) 
 
(.105) 
 
(.125) 
Pluralism x Mortality -.005 Atheism x Mortality .095 Economic Inequality .152 
 
(.074) 
 
(.069) 
 
(.113) 
Catholicism .160* Catholicism .130 Catholicism .085 
 
(.096) 
 
(.099) 
 
(.086) 
Cath x Mortality .171** Cath x Mortality .178** Cath x Mortality .088 
 
(.082) 
 
(.087) 
 
(.078) 
Islam -.278*** Islam -.242** Health Benefits -.097 
 
(.091) 
 
(.097) 
 
(.116) 
Islam x Mortality -.145 Islam x Mortality -.123 Charity -.108 
 
(.089) 
 
(.085) 
 
(.076) 
Adjusted R² .555 Adjusted R² .569 Adjusted R² .585 
N 83 N 77 N 73 
  
                                                             *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                                                    Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix J Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Columbia: Conditional Effects w/ Social 
Welfare 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Protestantism .152 Protestantism -.221** Judaism .070 Hinduism -.089 Religious Pluralism .250*** Protestantism .115
(.097) (.097) (.094) (.122) (.091) (.120)
Health Benefits -.479**** Health Benefits -.631**** Health Benefits -.465**** Health Benefits -.431**** Health Benefits -.207 Charity .138
(.091) (.092) (.082) (.077) (.142) (.138)
Prot x Health -.151* Prot x Health -.077 Judaism x Health -.055 Hinduism x Health -.011 Pluralism x Health -.069 Prot x Charity -.144
(.089) (.086) (.078) (.084) (.071) (.093)
Catholicism .231* Single w/ kids .758**** Catholicism .150 Catholicism .250** Catholicism .185** Catholicism .083
(.124) (.105) (.129) (.097) (.087) (.114)
Cath x Health -.214** Educ. Benefits .122 Cath x Health -.191* Cath x Health -.280*** Cath x Health -.124 Cath x Charity .184
(.091) (.098) (.098) (.087) (.082) (.131)
Orthodox .186* Charitable Giving -.134 Islam -.111 Buddhism .026 Atheism -.448*** Orthodox .091
(.112) (.099) (.123) (.134) (.150) (.169)
Orthodox x Health -.101 — Islam x Health .161 Buddhism x Health -.005 Atheism x Health -.068 Orthodox x Charity -.143
(.113) (.099) (.117) (.119) (.154)
Adjusted R² .259 Adjusted R² .603 Adjusted R² .219 Adjusted R² .186 Adjusted R² .370 Adjusted R² -.007
N 76 N 65 N 82 N 82 N 76 N 76
                                                                     Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
                     *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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Appendix J Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Columbia: Conditional Effects w/ Social 
Welfare 
 
 
 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Judaism -.003 Buddhism -.108 Religious Pluralism .168 Atheism -.529****
(.122) (.116) (.105) (.100)
Charity .172 Charity .167 Charity .137 Charity -.019
(.113) (.109) (.102) (.098)
Judaism x Charity -.062 Buddhism x Charity .184 Pluralism x Charity .157 Atheism x Charity -.090
(.118) (.170) (.119) (.111)
Islam -.035 Islam -.052 Islam .018 Islam -.207*
(.095) (.092) (.107) (.109)
Islam x Charity .150* Islam x Charity .212*** Islam x Charity .236** Islam x Charity -.070
(.085) (.080) (.112) (.096)
Hinduism -.043 Hinduism .019 Hinduism -.030 Hinduism .102
(.122) (.119) (.111) (.097)
Hinduism x Charity -.208* Hinduism x Charity -.339** Hinduism x Charity -.236** Hinduism x Charity -.145
(.121) (.133) (.102) (.117)
Adjusted R² .010 Adjusted R² .035 Adjusted R² .055 Adjusted R² .277
N 79 N 79 N 79 N 76
                                                                     Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
                     *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Columbia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.025**** — -.025**** Individualism -.024**** — -.024**** Individualism -.026**** — -.026**** Individualism -.022**** — -.022****
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Protestantism .070 -.076** -.006 Protestantism .071 -.084** -.013 Protestantism .043 -.084** -.041 Protestantism -.168*** -.083** -.251****
(.071) (.037) (.070) (.069) (.035) (.062) (.078) (.036) (.075) (.061) (.035) (.068)
Catholicism .823* -.179 .644 Catholicism .995** -.249 .746* Catholicism .065 -.272 -.206 Religious Pluralism .101* .011 .112*
(.460) (.246) (.490) (.390) (.199) (.403) (.517) (.253) (.560) (.060) (.022) (.065)
Orthodox .114 .016 .131 Orthodox .165* .023 .187** Orthodox .011 .008 .019 Single w/ kids .515**** .035 .550****
(.080) (.032) (.079) (.088) (.032) (.086) (.101) (.037) (.104) (.124) (.063) (.138)
Judaism .086 -.122** -.036 Judaism .060 -.131*** -.071 Judaism .064 -.127*** -.063 Judaism .023 -.106*** -.084
(.068) (.047) (.076) (.081) (.049) (.080) (.072) (.046) (.076) (.053) (.038) (.058)
Islam -.020 .024 .004 Hinduism .019 .011 .031 Buddhism -.236*** .010 -.225** Buddhism -.095 .024 -.071
(.057) (.038) (.070) (.052) (.018) (.052) (.090) (.045) (.105) (.102) (.042) (.118)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.163 .202 .284 .488
68 68 68 68
                                                                      *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                     — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                            Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Columbia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.016*** — -.016*** Individualism -.013** — -.013** Individualism -.010 — -.010 Individualism -.004 — -.004
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.008) (.008) (.005) (.005)
Protestantism -.142** -.036 -.179** Protestantism -.070 -.024 -.094 Economic Discrimination .114 .015 .128 Infant Mortality .456*** .046 .502***
(.068) (.024) (.072) (.070) (.019) (.074) (.113) (.020) (.115) (.158) (.054) (.146)
Religious Pluralism .054 .003 .057 Atheism -.246*** -.034 -.280*** Atheism -.341** -.007 -.348*** Atheism -.085 .002 -.083
(.045) (.015) (.048) (.089) (.030) (.097) (.134) (.014) (.134) (.096) (.008) (.097)
Single w/ kids .497**** -.041 .456**** Single w/ kids .459**** -.034 .426**** Health Benefits -.028 -.049 -.077* Single w/ kids .411**** -.022 .389****
(.114) (.038) (.110) (.107) (.034) (.106) (.065) (.042) (.045) (.079) (.026) (.074)
Judaism .024 -.060** -.036 Judaism .035 -.045* -.011 Judaism .103 -.024 .079 Economic Freedom -.002 -.0002 -.003
(.052) (.028) (.050) (.048) (.023) (.047) (.067) (.023) (.070) (.010) (.001) (.010)
Economic Inequality .036** .015** .051**** Economic Inequality .028* .011* .039*** Charity 1.02 -.591 .431 Economic Inequality .025** .003 .029***
(.015) (.008) (.013) (.015) (.006) (.013) (2.30) (.587) (2.12) (.012) (.004) (.011)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
.505 .557 .231 .611
68 68 68 68
                                                                         *p<.10,**p  < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                        — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                               Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix K. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates 
w/o Zambia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .479**** — .479**** Single w/ kids .419**** — .419**** Single w/ kids .343**** — .343**** Single w/ kids .218** — .218**
(.132) (.132) (.100) (.100) (.076) (.076) (.097) (.097)
Protestantism -.101 .147*** .046 Protestantism -.094 .124*** .030 Economic Discrimination .119 .001 .120 Protestantism -.021 .047 .026
(.071) (.052) (.064) (.064) (.045) (.052) (.082) (.051) (.086) (.049) (.030) (.040)
Catholicism -.137 .511** .374 Catholicism .500* .600** 1.10*** Catholicism .458 .628** 1.09*** Catholicism .231 .260* .491**
(.463) (.252) (.466) (.279) (.243) (.328) (.296) (.246) (.325) (.231) (.136) (.238)
Orthodox .066 .062* .127* Orthodox .097** .056** .152*** Orthodox .113** .034 .147*** Orthodox .202**** .056** .257****
(.067) (.032) (.074) (.045) (.026) (.055) (.049) (.027) (.054) (.047) (.023) (.044)
Judaism -.054 .001 -.053 Religious Pluralism .115*** .027 .142**** Religious Pluralism .093** .055** .148**** Religious Pluralism .048 -.00003 .048
(.065) (.039) (.076) (.035) (.024) (.039) (.039) (.027) (.041) (.033) (.012) (.034)
Islam -.051 -.019 -.070 Atheism -.519**** -.037 -.556**** Atheism -.514**** -.031 -.545**** Atheism -.297**** .022 -.275****
(.058) (.026) (.065) (.069) (.039) (.078) (.073) (.042) (.083) (.068) (.022) (.072)
Hinduism -.028 .037 .009 Hinduism -.011 .033* .022 Hinduism -.011 .030 .019 Economic Inequality .071**** .013** .083****
(.050) (.023) (.056) (.032) (.018) (.035) (.032) (.019) (.036) (.011) (.006) (.010)
Buddhism -.0004 -.068** -.069 Buddhism .071* -.051*** .020 Buddhism .054 -.028 .025 Charity 1.53 1.60** 3.14*
(.059) (.028) (.060) (.037) (.019) (.042) (.040) (.020) (.043) (1.59) (.765) (1.63)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                          — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
85 85 85 85
                                                                          *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.221 .546 .530 .682
183 
 
Appendix K Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Zambia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .268**** — .268**** Single w/ kids .372**** — .372**** Single w/ kids .499**** — .499****
(.063) (.063) (.088) (.088) (.094) (.094)
Economic Discrimination .132** -.002 .130* Economic Discrimination .105 -.008 .097 Economic Freedom -.017 .003 -.014
(.063) (.035) (.073) (.067) (.049) (.076) (.012) (.007) (.014)
Catholicism .808*** .396** 1.20**** Catholicism .292 .218 .510 Individual Responsibility .668 1.12* 1.79*
(.251) (.173) (.291) (.338) (.192) (.351) (.810) (.659) (1.00)
Orthodox .221**** .022 .243**** Orthodox .206**** .017 .223**** Orthodox .028 .050 .078
(.037) (.017) (.042) (.040) (.021) (.047) (.050) (.034) (.056)
Religious Pluralism .046 .033* .079** Religious Pluralism -.009 .038* .029 Income Differences 1.18 -.326 .852
(.031) (.017) (.033) (.035) (.020) (.035) (.774) (.579) (.991)
Atheism -.064 -.011 -.075 Economic Inequality Ratio .933**** .500*** 1.43**** Private Ownership -1.65 .429 -1.22
(.081) (.044) (.095) (.240) (.147) (.192) (1.20) (.640) (1.51)
Economic Inequality .045**** .011* .055**** Health Benefits -.157**** .068*** -.089** Competition -.789 -.205 -.994
(.010) (.005) (.011) (.037) (.025) (.039) (1.68) (1.15) (2.02)
Infant Mortality .583**** -.035 .549**** Educ. Benefits -.048 .013 -.035 Charitable Giving -2.04 .744 -1.30
(.108) (.072) (.139) (.047) (.028) (.050) (1.25) (.763) (1.55)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N
                                                                        Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
85 85 85
                                                                                 *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                                 — Indicates parameter not estimated
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
.791 .660 .355
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Appendix K Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Zambia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Secularization .703**** — 1.00f Secularization .176 — 1.00f Secularization .138 — 1.00f Secularization .420**** — 1.00f
(.095) (.157) (.158) (.119)
Protestantism .065 -.020 .045 Religious Pluralism .037 -.001 .036 Religious Pluralism .026 -.002 .024 Single w/ kids .387**** .063* .450****
(.047) (.040) (.063) (.031) (.004) (.031) (.030) (.004) (.029) (.081) (.037) (.088)
Catholicism .326 .145 .471 Atheism -.210** -.097 -.307**** Atheism .004 -.073 -.069 Economic Freedom -.001 -.010* -.010
(.351) (.372) (.470) (.103) (.087) (.071) (.112) (.086) (.082) (.012) (.005) (.012)
Orthodox .219**** -.098* .121* Orthodox .188**** -.008 .180**** Orthodox .186**** -.009 .177**** Orthodox .083 -.039 .044
(.060) (.054) (.069) (.043) (.010) (.042) (.045) (.011) (.041) (.053) (.027) (.052)
Judaism -.078 .026 -.052 Single w/ kids .230**** .005 .235**** Infant Mortality .575**** .025 .600**** Competition -1.86 -.494 -2.36*
(.053) (.052) (.075) (.065) (.012) (.067) (.114) (.031) (.117) (1.26) (.612) (1.36)
Islam -.145*** .097* -.049 Islam -.071* .015 -.056 Islam -.132*** .010 -.121*** Islam -.145*** .061* -.085*
(.053) (.055) (.066) (.039) (.015) (.035) (.040) (.012) (.036) (.043) (.032) (.045)
Hinduism .017 -.014 .003 Economic Inequality .062**** .006 .068**** Economic Inequality Ratio .964**** .072 1.04**** Charitable Giving -2.82*** .222 -2.60**
(.036) (.038) (.055) (.013) (.006) (.010) (.200) (.082) (.177) (.952) (.419) (1.06)
Buddhism .033 -.084 -.051 Buddhism .010 -.009 .0004 Economic Discrimination .117* -.016 .101 Life Meaning -3.56*** -2.90*** -6.46****
(.044) (.053) (.062) (.038) (.010) (.036) (.070) (.019) (.065) (1.19) (.924) (1.10)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
χ² χ² χ² χ²
χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df
RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA
CFI CFI CFI CFI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                     Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
.888 .948 .964 .937
                                                                       *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                       — Indicates parameter not estimated
3.15 2.23 1.86 2.30
.159 .120 .101 .124
85 85 85 85
81.81 (p < .001) 58.03 (p < .001) 48.40 (p < .01) 59.84 (p < .001)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.466 .688 .750 .594
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Appendix K Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Zambia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total 
Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
  Model 5 
 
Direct Indirect Total 
Secularization .210 — 1.00f 
 
(.143) 
  Single w/ kids .278*** -.028 .250*** 
 
(.085) (.025) (.082) 
Religious Member .051 .090 .141 
 
(.130) (.069) (.108) 
New Govt. .703**** .050 .754**** 
 
(.188) (.052) (.183) 
Latin Nation .853** .391 1.24**** 
 
(.405) (.284) (.280) 
Islam -.068 .053 -.015 
 
(.054) (.039) (.035) 
Charity -1.58 -.578 -2.16 
 
(1.49) (.516) (1.50) 
Life Meaning -4.74**** -1.14 -5.89**** 
 
(1.13) (.756) (.985) 
Adjusted R² .570 
N 85 
χ² 87.45 (p < .001) 
χ²/df 3.36 
RMSEA .167 
CFI .898 
                                                              *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                             — Indicates parameter not estimated 
                                                          Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix K Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Zambia: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .064 Judaism .069 Buddhism -.121 Protestantism .018 Judaism .026
(.077) (.107) (.088) (.079) (.103)
Economic Inequality .700**** Economic Inequality .563**** Economic Inequality .463**** Economic Inequality Ratio .683**** Economic Inequality Ratio .545****
(.079) (.096) (.090) (.083) (.095)
Prot x Econ Ineq. .046 Judaism x Econ Ineq. .006 Buddhism x Econ Ineq. .050 Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio .079 Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.134
(.086) (.122) (.120) (.089) (.103)
Catholicism .095 Islam -.032 Religious Pluralism .166** Catholicism .034 Islam .027
(.075) (.086) (.082) (.078) (.088)
Cath x Econ Ineq. .110 Islam x Econ Ineq. -.106 Pluralism x Econ Ineq. .013 Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio .045 Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio -.115
(.075) (.113) (.079) (.072) (.109)
Orthodox .430**** Hinduism -.170* Atheism -.299*** Orthodox .357**** Hinduism -.156
(.098) (.098) (.106) (.090) (.100)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .189 Hinduism x Econ Ineq. -.038 Atheism x Econ Ineq. -.072 Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio .037 Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio .025
(.125) (.110) (.100) (.115) (.100)
Adjusted R² .457 Adjusted R² .323 Adjusted R² .440 Adjusted R² .444 Adjusted R² .352
N 77 N 82 N 77 N 76 N 81
                                                   *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                          Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix K Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Zambia: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Buddhism -.137 Protestantism .087 Judaism .037 Hinduism .008 Buddhism -.006
(.089) (.081) (.067) (.070) (.083)
Economic Inequality Ratio .479**** Infant Mortality .756**** Infant Mortality .808**** Infant Mortality .793**** Infant Mortality .797****
(.074) (.073) (.077) (.079) (.078)
Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio .075 Prot x Mortality .001 Judaism x Mortality .030 Hinduism x Mortality .072 Buddhism x Mortality .046
(.087) (.090) (.059) (.064) (.079)
Religious Pluralism .159** Catholicism .407**** Catholicism .179* Catholicism .182* Catholicism .178*
(.076) (.106) (.104) (.103) (.102)
Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio .043 Cath x Mortality .340**** Cath x Mortality .212** Cath x Mortality .218** Cath x Mortality .223**
(.073) (.088) (.086) (.085) (.086)
Atheism -.307*** Orthodox .252*** Islam -.295*** Islam -.292*** Islam -.291***
(.095) (.092) (.093) (.093) (.094)
Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.059 Orthodox x Mortality .124 Islam x Mortality -.167** Islam x Mortality -.164** Islam x Mortality -.144**
(.089) (.094) (.078) (.078) (.070)
Adjusted R² .481 Adjusted R² .535 Adjusted R² .542 Adjusted R² .546 Adjusted R² .542
N 76 N 77 N 83 N 83 N 83
                              *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                               Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix K Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Zambia: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
  Model 11   Model 12   Model 13 
      Religious Pluralism .042 Atheism -.149 Single w/ kids .383**** 
 
(.084) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.100) 
Infant Mortality .803**** Infant Mortality .676**** Infant Mortality .507**** 
 
(.073) 
 
(.110) 
 
(.134) 
Pluralism x Mortality -.019 Atheism x Mortality .114 Economic Inequality .210* 
 
(.073) 
 
(.076) 
 
(.115) 
Catholicism .194* Catholicism .160 Catholicism .105 
 
(.100) 
 
(.102) 
 
(.088) 
Cath x Mortality .196** Cath x Mortality .197** Cath x Mortality .115 
 
(.085) 
 
(.089) 
 
(.084) 
Islam -.286*** Islam -.240** Health Benefits -.024 
 
(.092) 
 
(.099) 
 
(.128) 
Islam x Mortality -.158* Islam x Mortality -.116 Charity -.119 
 
(.090) 
 
(.090) 
 
(.077) 
Adjusted R² .542 Adjusted R² .560 Adjusted R² .575 
N 83 N 77 N 73 
  
                                                          *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                                             Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix K Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Zambia: Conditional Effects w/ Social 
Welfare 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Protestantism .126 Judaism .057 Hinduism -.132 Religious Pluralism .227** Protestantism .067 Judaism -.010
(.096) (.094) (.123) (.093) (.121) (.121)
Health Benefits -.474**** Health Benefits -.453**** Health Benefits -.420**** Health Benefits -.161 Charity .150 Charity .164
(.087) (.080) (.075) (.147) (.135) (.113)
Prot x Health -.134 Judaism x Health -.067 Hinduism x Health -.024 Pluralism x Health -.078 Prot x Charity -.141 Judaism x Charity -.054
(.087) (.079) (.078) (.071) (.092) (.116)
Catholicism .295** Catholicism .188 Catholicism .287*** Catholicism .201** Catholicism .142 Islam -.051
(.134) (.134) (.104) (.090) (.123) (.098)
Cath x Health -.179** Cath x Health -.167* Cath x Health -.249*** Cath x Health -.099 Cath x Charity .135 Islam x Charity .162*
(.090) (.098) (.084) (.083) (.135) (.085)
Orthodox .230** Islam -.122 Buddhism .004 Atheism -.489*** Orthodox .140 Hinduism -.087
(.114) (.121) (.129) (.158) (.166) (.121)
Orthodox x Health -.070 Islam x Health .130 Buddhism x Health -.032 Atheism x Health -.121 Orthodox x Charity -.129 Hinduism x Charity -.191
(.117) (.096) (.107) (.123) (.149) (.119)
Adjusted R² .238 Adjusted R² .191 Adjusted R² .176 Adjusted R² .363 Adjusted R² -.010 Adjusted R² .010
N 76 N 82 N 82 N 76 N 76 N 79
                                                                     Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
                      *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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Appendix K Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Zambia: Conditional Effects w/ Social 
Welfare 
 
 
  Model 7   Model 8   Model 9 
      
Buddhism -.124 Religious Pluralism .129 Atheism -.547**** 
 
(.117) 
 
(.108) 
 
(.105) 
Charity .162 Charity .131 Charity -.023 
 
(.109) 
 
(.103) 
 
(.099) 
Buddhism x Charity .191 Pluralism x Charity .168 Atheism x Charity -.070 
 
(.169) 
 
(.121) 
 
(.110) 
Islam -.071 Islam -.006 Islam -.224** 
 
(.096) 
 
(.109) 
 
(.112) 
Islam x Charity .224*** Islam x Charity .248** Islam x Charity -.055 
 
(.081) 
 
(.113) 
 
(.098) 
Hinduism -.017 Hinduism -.073 Hinduism .070 
 
(.119) 
 
(.110) 
 
(.097) 
Hinduism x Charity -.326** Hinduism x Charity -.220** Hinduism x Charity -.133 
 
(.131) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.114) 
Adjusted R² .041 Adjusted R² .046 Adjusted R² .274 
N 79 N 79 N 76 
  
                                                           *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                                              Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix K Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Zambia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.025**** — -.025**** Individualism -.024**** — -.024**** Individualism -.026**** — -.026**** Individualism -.023**** — -.023****
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Protestantism .038 -.086** -.048 Protestantism .047 -.089** -.042 Protestantism .030 -.091** -.061 Protestantism -.174*** -.090** -.263****
(.070) (.039) (.069) (.065) (.036) (.058) (.075) (.038) (.071) (.060) (.038) (.070)
Catholicism .875* -.146 .730 Catholicism 1.15*** -.188 .960** Catholicism .315 -.175 .140 Religious Pluralism .092 .010 .101
(.468) (.248) (.507) (.393) (.191) (.431) (.519) (.250) (.579) (.060) (.023) (.066)
Orthodox .148* .026 .173** Orthodox .192** .031 .222*** Orthodox .056 .025 .081 Single w/ kids .518**** .036 .555****
(.077) (.033) (.074) (.083) (.033) (.080) (.100) (.039) (.102) (.131) (.067) (.149)
Judaism .076 -.128*** -.052 Judaism .055 -.134*** -.080 Judaism .061 -.135*** -.074 Judaism .020 -.113*** -.093
(.067) (.048) (.078) (.081) (.049) (.081) (.070) (.048) (.076) (.054) (.039) (.060)
Islam -.042 .015 -.027 Hinduism .014 .010 .024 Buddhism -.205** .021 -.184* Buddhism -.100 .022 -.078
(.059) (.037) (.075) (.051) (.018) (.051) (.090) (.048) (.106) (.104) (.045) (.124)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                       — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                             Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
68 68 68 68
                                                                       *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.228 .261 .307 .486
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Appendix K Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Zambia:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.013** — -.013** Individualism -.013 — -.013 Individualism -.005 — -.005
(.005) (.005) (.009) (.009) (.005) (.005)
Protestantism -.076 -.025 -.101 Economic Discrimination .167 .028 .195* Infant Mortality .397** .055 .452***
(.072) (.019) (.076) (.109) (.029) (.113) (.171) (.055) (.159)
Atheism -.245*** -.034 -.279*** Atheism -.364*** -.020 -.385*** Atheism -.110 .001 -.110
(.091) (.031) (.100) (.136) (.027) (.140) (.096) (.010) (.097)
Single w/ kids .460**** -.034 .426**** Health Benefits .003 -.058 -.055 Single w/ kids .419**** -.025 .394****
(.108) (.035) (.106) (.066) (.039) (.049) (.079) (.026) (.074)
Judaism .034 -.046** -.012 Judaism .099 -.032 .067 Economic Freedom -.004 -.0004 -.005
(.048) (.023) (.047) (.068) (.026) (.071) (.010) (.001) (.010)
Economic Inequality .031** .011* .042*** Charity .941 -.837 .104 Economic Inequality .031** .004 .036***
(.015) (.006) (.013) (2.30) (.703) (2.15) (.012) (.005) (.012)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N
                                                                Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
68 68 68
                                                                          *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                          — Indicates parameter not estimated
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
.561 .261 .602
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Appendix L. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates 
w/o Israel:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .510**** — .510**** Single w/ kids .433**** — .433**** Single w/ kids .361**** — .361**** Single w/ kids .390**** — .390****
(.130) (.130) (.099) (.099) (.075) (.075) (.099) (.099)
Protestantism -.101 .163*** .061 Protestantism -.094 .132*** .039 Economic Discrimination .114 -.013 .101 Economic Discrimination .094 .027 .122
(.072) (.054) (.064) (.065) (.046) (.053) (.081) (.054) (.088) (.083) (.051) (.082)
Catholicism -.199 .530** .332 Catholicism .478* .621** 1.10*** Catholicism .421 .675*** 1.10*** Catholicism .362 .586** .949***
(.469) (.258) (.475) (.280) (.247) (.330) (.296) (.260) (.333) (.270) (.226) (.300)
Orthodox .055 .061* .116 Orthodox .093** .055** .147*** Orthodox .107** .031 .138** Orthodox .099** .050* .148***
(.068) (.034) (.077) (.045) (.027) (.056) (.048) (.029) (.055) (.047) (.026) (.055)
Judaism -.042 .004 -.038 Religious Pluralism .116*** .029 .145**** Religious Pluralism .093** .062** .155**** Religious Pluralism .108*** .023 .130***
(.073) (.043) (.089) (.035) (.024) (.039) (.039) (.028) (.040) (.038) (.024) (.039)
Islam -.051 -.022 -.073 Atheism -.530**** -.047 -.578**** Atheism -.528**** -.043 -.571**** Atheism -.502**** -.063 -.565****
(.058) (.027) (.064) (.070) (.041) (.080) (.073) (.045) (.085) (.074) (.040) (.083)
Hinduism -.030 .041* .011 Hinduism -.010 .036* .025 Hinduism -.011 .034* .024 Hinduism .006 .021 .027
(.051) (.024) (.057) (.032) (.018) (.035) (.033) (.020) (.036) (.031) (.017) (.035)
Buddhism -.003 -.076** -.079 Buddhism .072* -.053*** .019 Buddhism .054 -.030 .024 Protestantism -.055 .114** .059
(.060) (.029) (.061) (.037) (.020) (.042) (.040) (.021) (.042) (.064) (.049) (.051)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.232 .558 .542 .552
85 85 85 85
                                                                                 *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                                 — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                       Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Israel:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .230** — .230** Single w/ kids .264*** — .264*** Single w/ kids .405**** — .405**** Single w/ kids .203** — .203**
(.095) (.095) (.082) (.082) (.100) (.100) (.102) (.102)
Economic Inequality .071**** .014** .085**** Economic Inequality .050**** .012** .062**** Economic Inequality Ratio .986**** .524*** 1.51**** Economic Inequality .094**** .013* .107****
(.011) (.006) (.010) (.009) (.005) (.010) (.237) (.162) (.186) (.011) (.007) (.009)
Catholicism .213 .273** .486** Catholicism .618*** .303** .922**** Catholicism .211 .112 .323 Charity 5.36*** 1.32* 6.69****
(.230) (.136) (.241) (.233) (.150) (.255) (.334) (.163) (.350) (1.62) (.766) (1.67)
Orthodox .199**** .057** .257**** Orthodox .226**** .041** .267**** Orthodox .195**** .043** .238**** Orthodox .240**** .041* .281****
(.045) (.022) (.044) (.032) (.016) (.037) (.039) (.021) (.045) (.039) (.021) (.041)
Religious Pluralism .048 .0001 .048 Economic Discrimination .105 .012 .117 Economic Discrimination .056 .009 .065 Economic Discrimination -.037 .023 -.014
(.033) (.012) (.034) (.067) (.030) (.073) (.071) (.043) (.076) (.081) (.027) (.084)
Atheism -.305**** .019 -.286**** Atheism -.062 -.003 -.066 Health Benefits -.153**** .075*** -.078** Charitable Giving -2.87*** -.137 -3.01***
(.068) (.023) (.073) (.069) (.040) (.080) (.036) (.025) (.039) (.867) (.251) (.910)
Charity 1.36 1.60** 2.96* Infant Mortality .560**** -.007 .553**** Educ. Benefits -.046 -.024 -.070 Educ. Benefits -.045 .019 -.026
(1.53) (.733) (1.62) (.101) (.060) (.123) (.048) (.033) (.055) (.049) (.018) (.051)
Protestantism -.018 .053* .036 Protestantism .025 .082** .107*** Protestantism -.035 .102*** .067 Protestantism .024 .051 .075
(.049) (.032) (.040) (.043) (.033) (.033) (.049) (.038) (.045) (.052) (.031) (.047)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
.693 .796 .671 .679
85 85 85 85
                                                                                 *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                                 — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                       Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Israel:  Direct, Indirect, & Total 
Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .508**** — .508****
(.094) (.094)
Economic Freedom -.020* .0003 -.020
(.012) (.008) (.014)
Individual Responsibility .781 1.06 1.84*
(.849) (.704) (1.05)
Orthodox .056 .041 .098
(.055) (.037) (.061)
Economic Discrimination .153 .060 .213*
(.109) (.062) (.118)
Charitable Giving -1.20 1.17 -.031
(1.44) (.818) (1.70)
Income Differences 1.43* -.133 1.29
(.772) (.564) (.970)
Private Ownership -2.26** .263 -2.00
(1.02) (.645) (1.29)
Adjusted R²
N
                                                                                  *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                                  — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                        Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
Model 9
.410
85
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Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Israel:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Secularization .716**** — 1.00f Secularization .171 — 1.00f Secularization .120 — 1.00f Secularization .419**** — 1.00f
(.094) (.164) (.157) (.120)
Protestantism .076 -.015 .060 Religious Pluralism .037 -.002 .036 Religious Pluralism .029 -.002 .027 Economic Freedom -.001 -.010* -.011
(.047) (.041) (.064) (.031) (.004) (.031) (.030) (.004) (.030) (.012) (.005) (.012)
Catholicism .302 .128 .430 Atheism -.217** -.095 -.312**** Atheism -.007 -.064 -.071 Competition -2.02 -.522 -2.54*
(.351) (.386) (.478) (.107) (.092) (.071) (.111) (.087) (.083) (1.26) (.605) (1.37)
Orthodox .219**** -.107* .112 Orthodox .188**** -.008 .180**** Orthodox .182**** -.008 .175**** Orthodox .078 -.042 .036
(.061) (.056) (.070) (.043) (.010) (.042) (.045) (.010) (.041) (.054) (.027) (.052)
Judaism -.069 .031 -.038 Single w/ kids .240**** .005 .245**** Infant Mortality .597**** .022 .619**** Single w/ kids .403**** .066* .469****
(.060) (.062) (.087) (.063) (.012) (.065) (.115) (.030) (.118) (.079) (.036) (.086)
Islam -.150*** .098* -.052 Islam -.071* .015 -.056 Islam -.136*** .009 -.127**** Islam -.147*** .061* -.086*
(.053) (.056) (.065) (.039) (.016) (.035) (.040) (.012) (.036) (.043) (.032) (.044)
Hinduism .019 -.013 .005 Economic Inequality .063**** .006 .069**** Economic Inequality Ratio .978**** .061 1.04**** Charitable Giving -2.80*** .225 -2.57**
(.037) (.040) (.055) (.013) (.006) (.010) (.201) (.080) (.179) (.954) (.425) (1.06)
Buddhism .030 -.091* -.061 Buddhism .010 -.009 .001 Economic Discrimination .098 -.013 .085 Life Meaning -3.55*** -2.95*** -6.50****
(.045) (.055) (.063) (.038) (.011) (.037) (.069) (.018) (.064) (1.21) (.939) (1.11)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
χ² χ² χ² χ²
χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df
RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA
CFI CFI CFI CFI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.473 .698 .755 .605
85 85 85 85
84.42 (p < .001) 60.50 (p < .001) 51.12 (p < .01) 61.53 (p < .001)
3.25 2.33 1.97 2.37
.163 .125 .107 .127
                                                                    Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
.885 .945 .960 .936
                                                                       *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                       — Indicates parameter not estimated
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Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Israel:  Direct, Indirect, & Total 
Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
  Model 5 
 
Direct Indirect Total 
Secularization .246* — 1.00f 
 
(.143) 
  Charity -2.06 -.839 -2.90* 
 
(1.55) (.653) (1.60) 
Religious Member .062 .115 .178 
 
(.134) (.078) (.112) 
New Govt. .650*** .049 .699**** 
 
(.191) (.054) (.188) 
Single w/ kids .312**** -.028 .284*** 
 
(.085) (.024) (.085) 
Islam -.081 .063 -.019 
 
(.056) (.040) (.035) 
Latin Nation .686* .441 1.13**** 
 
(.409) (.275) (.290) 
Life Meaning -4.59**** -1.37* -5.96**** 
 
(1.16) (.779) (.997) 
Adjusted R² .571 
N 85 
χ² 89.99 (p < .001) 
χ²/df 3.46 
RMSEA .170 
CFI .895 
                                                                 *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                — Indicates parameter not estimated 
                                                            Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix L Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Israel: Conditional Effects w/ Economic 
Dominance 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .079 Judaism .114 Buddhism -.120 Protestantism .034 Judaism .069
(.074) (.124) (.088) (.077) (.123)
Economic Inequality .707**** Economic Inequality .587**** Economic Inequality .467**** Economic Inequality Ratio .690**** Economic Inequality Ratio .574****
(.078) (.094) (.090) (.082) (.092)
Prot x Econ Ineq. .070 Judaism x Econ Ineq. -.009 Buddhism x Econ Ineq. .055 Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio .108 Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.124
(.083) (.121) (.119) (.085) (.105)
Catholicism .094 Islam -.032 Religious Pluralism .170** Catholicism .033 Islam .028
(.076) (.087) (.080) (.079) (.089)
Cath x Econ Ineq. .111 Islam x Econ Ineq. -.111 Pluralism x Econ Ineq. .019 Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio .045 Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio -.116
(.077) (.113) (.075) (.073) (.109)
Orthodox .426**** Hinduism -.186* Atheism -.306*** Orthodox .354**** Hinduism -.170
(.097) (.105) (.106) (.090) (.109)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .184 Hinduism x Econ Ineq. -.011 Atheism x Econ Ineq. -.089 Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio .033 Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio .038
(.124) (.102) (.097) (.113) (.096)
Adjusted R² .471 Adjusted R² .344 Adjusted R² .461 Adjusted R² .459 Adjusted R² .371
N 78 N 82 N 78 N 77 N 81
                                                   *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                         Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix L Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Israel: Conditional Effects w/ Economic 
Dominance 
 
 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Buddhism -.135 Protestantism .093 Judaism .019 Hinduism .009 Buddhism -.002
(.089) (.078) (.073) (.067) (.083)
Economic Inequality Ratio .482**** Infant Mortality .760**** Infant Mortality .809**** Infant Mortality .794**** Infant Mortality .802****
(.074) (.072) (.072) (.075) (.074)
Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio .078 Prot x Mortality .010 Judaism x Mortality .046 Hinduism x Mortality .066 Buddhism x Mortality .040
(.086) (.085) (.062) (.063) (.081)
Religious Pluralism .163** Catholicism .406**** Catholicism .178* Catholicism .182* Catholicism .180*
(.075) (.106) (.103) (.103) (.101)
Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio .050 Cath x Mortality .342**** Cath x Mortality .213** Cath x Mortality .214** Cath x Mortality .218**
(.070) (.090) (.087) (.085) (.087)
Atheism -.315*** Orthodox .250*** Islam -.302*** Islam -.295*** Islam -.295***
(.095) (.091) (.093) (.092) (.093)
Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.074 Orthodox x Mortality .118 Islam x Mortality -.158** Islam x Mortality -.157** Islam x Mortality -.142**
(.089) (.091) (.077) (.074) (.068)
Adjusted R² .499 Adjusted R² .552 Adjusted R² .561 Adjusted R² .564 Adjusted R² .560
N 77 N 78 N 83 N 83 N 83
                                        *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                        Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix L Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Israel: Conditional Effects w/ Economic 
Dominance 
 
 
  Model 11   Model 12   Model 13 
      Religious Pluralism .053 Atheism -.148 Single w/ kids .381**** 
 
(.085) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.100) 
Infant Mortality .810**** Infant Mortality .683**** Infant Mortality .498**** 
 
(.067) 
 
(.104) 
 
(.129) 
Pluralism x Mortality -.030 Atheism x Mortality .107 Economic Inequality .208* 
 
(.072) 
 
(.071) 
 
(.114) 
Catholicism .202** Catholicism .159 Catholicism .105 
 
(.100) 
 
(.102) 
 
(.088) 
Cath x Mortality .185** Cath x Mortality .197** Cath x Mortality .113 
 
(.085) 
 
(.089) 
 
(.083) 
Islam -.291*** Islam -.243** Health Benefits -.031 
 
(.091) 
 
(.097) 
 
(.124) 
Islam x Mortality -.153* Islam x Mortality -.123 Charity -.117 
 
(.088) 
 
(.085) 
 
(.076) 
Adjusted R² .562 Adjusted R² .578 Adjusted R² .593 
N 83 N 78 N 74 
  
                                                         *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                                            Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix L Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Israel: Conditional Effects w/ Social 
Welfare 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Protestantism .150 Judaism .068 Hinduism -.111 Religious Pluralism .238*** Protestantism .103 Judaism -.019
(.097) (.106) (.123) (.091) (.122) (.122)
Health Benefits -.476**** Health Benefits -.458**** Health Benefits -.418**** Health Benefits -.148 Charity .126 Charity .160
(.087) (.081) (.077) (.149) (.136) (.113)
Prot x Health -.144 Judaism x Health -.066 Hinduism x Health -.020 Pluralism x Health -.081 Prot x Charity -.145 Judaism x Charity -.052
(.088) (.079) (.079) (.071) (.093) (.117)
Catholicism .291** Catholicism .188 Catholicism .289*** Catholicism .204** Catholicism .139 Islam -.061
(.135) (.135) (.105) (.090) (.123) (.098)
Cath x Health -.183** Cath x Health -.172* Cath x Health -.259*** Cath x Health -.098 Cath x Charity .137 Islam x Charity .163*
(.091) (.099) (.086) (.083) (.135) (.085)
Orthodox .217* Islam -.126 Buddhism -.006 Atheism -.513*** Orthodox .119 Hinduism -.063
(.114) (.123) (.130) (.157) (.167) (.123)
Orthodox x Health -.076 Islam x Health .142 Buddhism x Health -.040 Atheism x Health -.128 Orthodox x Charity -.135 Hinduism x Charity -.200*
(.117) (.099) (.109) (.124) (.151) (.121)
Adjusted R² .236 Adjusted R² .190 Adjusted R² .168 Adjusted R² .376 Adjusted R² -.011 Adjusted R² .008
N 77 N 82 N 82 N 77 N 77 N 80
                                                                  Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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Appendix L Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Israel: Conditional Effects w/ Social 
Welfare 
 
 
  Model 7   Model 8   Model 9 
      
Buddhism -.135 Religious Pluralism .137 Atheism -.569**** 
 
(.118) 
 
(.108) 
 
(.105) 
Charity .158 Charity .126 Charity -.030 
 
(.109) 
 
(.102) 
 
(.099) 
Buddhism x Charity .195 Pluralism x Charity .170 Atheism x Charity -.065 
 
(.169) 
 
(.121) 
 
(.113) 
Islam -.083 Islam -.014 Islam -.235** 
 
(.096) 
 
(.110) 
 
(.112) 
Islam x Charity .225*** Islam x Charity .250** Islam x Charity -.058 
 
(.080) 
 
(.113) 
 
(.098) 
Hinduism .009 Hinduism -.052 Hinduism .087 
 
(.119) 
 
(.111) 
 
(.096) 
Hinduism x Charity -.337** Hinduism x Charity -.228** Hinduism x Charity -.138 
 
(.132) 
 
(.101) 
 
(.116) 
Adjusted R² .041 Adjusted R² .044 Adjusted R² .292 
N 80 N 80 N 77 
  
                                                       *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                                        Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Israel:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.027**** — -.027**** Individualism -.026**** — -.026**** Individualism -.028**** — -.028**** Individualism -.024**** — -.024****
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Protestantism .066 -.088** -.022 Protestantism .073 -.093** -.020 Protestantism .043 -.093** -.049 Protestantism -.170*** -.092** -.262****
(.073) (.040) (.072) (.070) (.037) (.063) (.079) (.039) (.077) (.061) (.039) (.071)
Catholicism .887* -.155 .732 Catholicism 1.13*** -.183 .945** Catholicism .186 -.213 -.027 Religious Pluralism .088 .013 .101
(.476) (.271) (.512) (.396) (.211) (.442) (.533) (.271) (.607) (.062) (.024) (.068)
Orthodox .125 .022 .147* Orthodox .173** .030 .203** Orthodox .023 .014 .037 Single w/ kids .540**** .047 .587****
(.079) (.035) (.078) (.086) (.036) (.084) (.102) (.040) (.106) (.129) (.067) (.147)
Judaism .106 -.158*** -.051 Judaism .101 -.170*** -.069 Judaism .086 -.163*** -.077 Judaism .034 -.138*** -.104
(.081) (.058) (.097) (.093) (.059) (.100) (.079) (.055) (.091) (.060) (.046) (.069)
Islam -.037 .013 -.024 Hinduism .007 .017 .024 Buddhism -.238*** .007 -.231** Buddhism -.099 .024 -.075
(.059) (.041) (.073) (.054) (.019) (.054) (.091) (.049) (.109) (.106) (.046) (.126)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                      — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                            Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
68 68 68 68
                                                                      *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.206 .243 .319 .502
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Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Israel:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.013** — -.013** Individualism -.012 — -.012 Individualism -.006 — -.006
(.005) (.005) (.008) (.008) (.005) (.005)
Protestantism -.074 -.026 -.099 Economic Discrimination .065 .017 .082 Infant Mortality .392** .054 .447***
(.071) (.020) (.075) (.106) (.024) (.102) (.166) (.053) (.156)
Atheism -.250*** -.037 -.287*** Health Benefits -.002 -.052 -.053 Atheism -.111 .0004 -.111
(.090) (.031) (.099) (.052) (.037) (.043) (.097) (.010) (.098)
Single w/ kids .465**** -.033 .432**** Charity 1.40 -.713 .691 Single w/ kids .420**** -.028 .392****
(.108) (.035) (.107) (2.30) (.618) (2.10) (.078) (.028) (.073)
Judaism .054 -.058** -.003 Judaism .113 -.034 .078 Economic Freedom -.004 -.0004 -.005
(.053) (.027) (.055) (.079) (.026) (.079) (.010) (.001) (.010)
Economic Inequality .031** .011* .042*** Economic Inequality .072**** .004 .076**** Economic Inequality .031** .005 .036***
(.014) (.006) (.013) (.015) (.004) (.014) (.012) (.005) (.012)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N
                                                               Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
68 68 68
                                                                         *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                         — Indicates parameter not estimated
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
.583 .344 .621
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Appendix M. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates 
w/o Thailand:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .515**** — .515**** Single w/ kids .432**** — .432**** Single w/ kids .365**** — .365**** Single w/ kids .241** — .241**
(.128) (.128) (.099) (.099) (.076) (.076) (.098) (.098)
Protestantism -.081 .161*** .079 Protestantism -.089 .130*** .041 Economic Discrimination .112 -.014 .099 Protestantism -.017 .054* .036
(.071) (.054) (.065) (.065) (.046) (.054) (.079) (.054) (.085) (.050) (.032) (.040)
Catholicism -.227 .536** .310 Catholicism .499* .612** 1.11*** Catholicism .457 .664** 1.12*** Catholicism .244 .258* .502**
(.462) (.256) (.476) (.278) (.245) (.330) (.296) (.263) (.335) (.229) (.132) (.243)
Orthodox .053 .062* .115 Orthodox .093** .055** .148*** Orthodox .107** .032 .139** Orthodox .198**** .059** .258****
(.066) (.034) (.075) (.045) (.027) (.056) (.048) (.030) (.055) (.045) (.023) (.044)
Judaism -.059 .002 -.057 Religious Pluralism .121*** .027 .148**** Religious Pluralism .103*** .057** .160**** Religious Pluralism .054 -.004 .050
(.064) (.041) (.076) (.036) (.025) (.040) (.039) (.028) (.042) (.033) (.013) (.034)
Islam -.063 -.022 -.085 Atheism -.516**** -.051 -.567**** Atheism -.507**** -.053 -.561**** Atheism -.297**** .016 -.281****
(.057) (.027) (.064) (.072) (.042) (.084) (.074) (.045) (.089) (.067) (.023) (.072)
Hinduism -.011 .040 .029 Hinduism -.006 .034* .028 Hinduism -.003 .031 .028 Economic Inequality .070**** .015** .085****
(.051) (.025) (.058) (.032) (.019) (.036) (.032) (.020) (.036) (.011) (.007) (.010)
Buddhism -.041 -.071** -.112* Buddhism .057 -.048** .009 Buddhism .035 -.019 .015 Charity 1.27 1.69** 2.96*
(.059) (.032) (.065) (.043) (.023) (.050) (.044) (.024) (.049) (1.54) (.770) (1.62)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                       — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                               Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
85 85 85 85
                                                                       *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.258 .559 .544 .695
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Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Thailand:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .286**** — .286**** Single w/ kids .430**** — .430**** Single w/ kids .555**** — .555**** Single w/ kids .473**** — .473****
(.082) (.082) (.099) (.099) (.097) (.097) (.106) (.106)
Protestantism .026 .082** .108*** Protestantism -.029 .099** .069 Economic Freedom -.022* .002 -.020 Protestantism -.051 .053 .003
(.044) (.032) (.033) (.049) (.038) (.045) (.012) (.008) (.014) (.064) (.044) (.074)
Catholicism .666*** .264* .931**** Catholicism .246 .098 .344 Individual Responsibility .369 1.48** 1.85* Educ. Benefits -.077 .054 -.023
(.232) (.151) (.256) (.336) (.172) (.348) (.808) (.711) (1.05) (.064) (.041) (.069)
Orthodox .224**** .045*** .269**** Orthodox .192**** .046** .239**** Orthodox .057 .042 .098 Religious Member .285** .262*** .547****
(.033) (.017) (.037) (.039) (.022) (.045) (.053) (.037) (.062) (.122) (.086) (.132)
Economic Discrimination .129** .0003 .130* Economic Discrimination .072 -.004 .068 Economic Discrimination .170 .044 .214* Economic Discrimination .006 .062 .068
(.063) (.030) (.070) (.069) (.046) (.074) (.108) (.067) (.115) (.102) (.062) (.107)
Atheism -.031 -.032 -.062 Economic Inequality Ratio .912**** .585**** 1.50**** Income Differences 1.24* .066 1.31 Income Differences .297 .022 .319
(.067) (.041) (.081) (.239) (.166) (.187) (.741) (.582) (.954) (.795) (.477) (.938)
Economic Inequality .046**** .016*** .062**** Health Benefits -.155**** .078*** -.077** Private Ownership -1.90* -.085 -1.98 Private Ownership -1.78* -.151 -1.93*
(.009) (.005) (.010) (.036) (.027) (.038) (.987) (.617) (1.31) (.926) (.438) (1.04)
Infant Mortality .608**** -.052 .556**** Educ. Benefits -.055 -.020 -.075 Charitable Giving -1.36 1.34 -.018 Charitable Giving -2.93*** -.102 -3.03***
(.094) (.062) (.126) (.047) (.035) (.053) (1.42) (.888) (1.65) (1.02) (.532) (1.14)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                               — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                      Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
85 85 85 85
                                                                                *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
.803 .679 .438 .456
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Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Thailand:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Secularization .711**** — 1.00f Secularization .174 — 1.00f Secularization .134 — 1.00f Secularization .396*** — 1.00f
(.097) (.147) (.151) (.117)
Protestantism .076 .003 .080 Religious Pluralism .045 -.002 .044 Religious Pluralism .030 -.003 .028 Economic Freedom -.004 -.010** -.013
(.049) (.038) (.064) (.032) (.005) (.031) (.030) (.005) (.030) (.012) (.005) (.011)
Catholicism .299 .139 .439 Atheism -.196* -.097 -.293**** Atheism .007 -.073 -.066 Competition -1.46 -.351 -1.81
(.355) (.383) (.480) (.103) (.082) (.073) (.112) (.085) (.086) (1.18) (.592) (1.27)
Orthodox .219**** -.102* .117* Orthodox .186**** -.008 .178**** Orthodox .183**** -.009 .175**** Orthodox .074 -.039 .035
(.061) (.054) (.070) (.043) (.010) (.041) (.044) (.010) (.041) (.052) (.026) (.049)
Judaism -.082 .024 -.059 Single w/ kids .249**** .005 .254**** Economic Inequality Ratio .982**** .069 1.05**** Single w/ kids .439**** .074** .512****
(.053) (.054) (.074) (.065) (.012) (.067) (.198) (.078) (.176) (.080) (.037) (.086)
Islam -.151*** .092* -.059 Islam -.070* .016 -.054 Islam -.133*** .010 -.123*** Islam -.144*** .059* -.085*
(.053) (.056) (.066) (.038) (.015) (.034) (.040) (.012) (.036) (.043) (.031) (.044)
Hinduism .022 .002 .023 Economic Inequality .063**** .006 .069**** Infant Mortality .594**** .023 .617**** Charitable Giving -2.98*** .150 -2.83***
(.038) (.039) (.056) (.012) (.005) (.010) (.113) (.028) (.117) (.950) (.392) (1.03)
Buddhism .030 -.122** -.092 Buddhism -.004 -.009 -.013 Economic Discrimination .110 -.016 .094 Life Meaning -3.41*** -2.72*** -6.13****
(.052) (.053) (.067) (.041) (.010) (.040) (.069) (.019) (.063) (1.20) (.891) (1.12)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
χ² χ² χ² χ²
χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df
RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA
CFI CFI CFI CFI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                   Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
.906 .952 .940 .956
                                                                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                    — Indicates parameter not estimated
2.87 2.18 2.54 1.95
.148 .118 .134 .106
85 85 85 85
74.58 (p < .001) 56.71 (p < .001) 65.96 (p < .001) 50.60 (p < .01)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.473 .702 .755 .622
208 
 
Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Thailand:  Direct, Indirect, & Total 
Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
  Model 5 
 
Direct Indirect Total 
Secularization .243* — 1.00f 
 
(.141) 
  Charity -2.06 -.834 -2.89* 
 
(1.54) (.647) (1.58) 
Religious Member .048 .113 .160 
 
(.136) (.077) (.114) 
New Govt. .625*** .048 .672**** 
 
(.191) (.055) (.188) 
Single w/ kids .329**** -.025 .304*** 
 
(.092) (.024) (.092) 
Islam -.079 .063 -.016 
 
(.056) (.040) (.036) 
Latin Nation .690* .436 1.13**** 
 
(.406) (.272) (.290) 
Life Meaning -4.54**** -1.35* -5.89**** 
 
(1.16) (.767) (1.00) 
Adjusted R² .577 
N 85 
χ² 93.54 (p < .001) 
χ²/df 3.60 
RMSEA .175 
CFI .892 
                                                        *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                        — Indicates parameter not estimated 
                                                    Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix M Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Thailand: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .104 Infant Mortality .493**** Judaism .069 Buddhism -.129 Protestantism .060
(.075) (.127) (.108) (.108) (.077)
Economic Inequality .689**** Economic Inequality .301** Economic Inequality .581**** Economic Inequality .469**** Economic Inequality Ratio .675****
(.081) (.120) (.095) (.089) (.083)
Prot x Econ Ineq. .099 Economic Freedom .066 Judaism x Econ Ineq. .002 Buddhism x Econ Ineq. .049 Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio .132
(.087) (.107) (.125) (.127) (.087)
Catholicism .113 Catholicism .141* Islam -.037 Religious Pluralism .175** Catholicism .052
(.078) (.079) (.086) (.084) (.080)
Cath x Econ Ineq. .133* Cath x Econ Ineq. .123 Islam x Econ Ineq. -.109 Pluralism x Econ Ineq. .023 Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio .061
(.080) (.078) (.114) (.077) (.074)
Orthodox .445**** Individual Responsibility .026 Hinduism -.165* Atheism -.299*** Orthodox .374****
(.099) (.087) (.099) (.108) (.092)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .202 Income Differences -.033 Hinduism x Econ Ineq. -.019 Atheism x Econ Ineq. -.084 Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio .043
(.127) (.082) (.106) (.096) (.114)
Adjusted R² .482 Adjusted R² .489 Adjusted R² .337 Adjusted R² .459 Adjusted R² .467
N 77 N 79 N 82 N 77 N 76
                                         *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                              Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix M Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Thailand: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Judaism .024 Buddhism -.164 Protestantism .125* Judaism .037 Hinduism .010
(.103) (.106) (.074) (.067) (.068)
Economic Inequality Ratio .562**** Economic Inequality Ratio .489**** Infant Mortality .775**** Infant Mortality .804**** Infant Mortality .788****
(.093) (.075) (.070) (.071) (.073)
Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.143 Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio .067 Prot x Mortality -.007 Judaism x Mortality .029 Hinduism x Mortality .070
(.103) (.090) (.083) (.059) (.062)
Islam .024 Religious Pluralism .177** Catholicism .433**** Catholicism .187* Catholicism .190*
(.089) (.078) (.104) (.106) (.104)
Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio -.119 Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio .061 Cath x Mortality .340**** Cath x Mortality .215** Cath x Mortality .221***
(.110) (.072) (.089) (.086) (.085)
Hinduism -.145 Atheism -.292*** Orthodox .286*** Islam -.289*** Islam -.285***
(.101) (.099) (.089) (.093) (.092)
Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio .048 Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.067 Orthodox x Mortality .106 Islam x Mortality -.162** Islam x Mortality -.157**
(.094) (.086) (.089) (.076) (.074)
Adjusted R² .364 Adjusted R² .501 Adjusted R² .570 Adjusted R² .561 Adjusted R² .565
N 81 N 76 N 77 N 83 N 83
                                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                      Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix M Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Thailand: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
  Model 11   Model 12   Model 13   Model 14 
        Buddhism -.023 Religious Pluralism .063 Atheism -.144 Single w/ kids .444**** 
 
(.091) 
 
(.089) 
 
(.112) 
 
(.089) 
Infant Mortality .792**** Infant Mortality .797**** Infant Mortality .685**** Infant Mortality .513**** 
 
(.073) 
 
(.067) 
 
(.108) 
 
(.122) 
Buddhism x Mortality .039 Pluralism x Mortality -.018 Atheism x Mortality .106 Economic Inequality .160 
 
(.080) 
 
(.073) 
 
(.071) 
 
(.111) 
Catholicism .182* Catholicism .212** Catholicism .161 Catholicism .125 
 
(.102) 
 
(.101) 
 
(.107) 
 
(.088) 
Cath x Mortality .225*** Cath x Mortality .197** Cath x Mortality .198** Cath x Mortality .108 
 
(.086) 
 
(.085) 
 
(.092) 
 
(.082) 
Islam  -.291*** Islam  -.271*** Islam  -.242** Health Benefits -.049 
 
(.093) 
 
(.092) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.122) 
Islam x Mortality -.143** Islam x Mortality -.148 Islam x Mortality -.122 Charity -.135* 
 
(.068) 
 
(.090) 
 
(.085) 
 
(.076) 
Adjusted R² .561 Adjusted R² .562 Adjusted R² .577 Adjusted R² .615 
N 83 N 83 N 77 N 73 
    
                                      *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
  
                                                                                              Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix M Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Thailand: Conditional Effects w/ Social 
Welfare 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Protestantism .172* Protestantism .086 Judaism .057 Hinduism -.097 Religious Pluralism .248*** Protestantism .127
(.099) (.099) (.094) (.133) (.093) (.123)
Health Benefits -.472**** Health Benefits .207** Health Benefits -.456**** Health Benefits -.415**** Health Benefits -.146 Charity .121
(.087) (.100) (.083) (.078) (.148) (.135)
Prot x Health -.161* Prot x Health -.085 Judaism x Health -.070 Hinduism x Health -.030 Pluralism x Health -.087 Prot x Charity -.139
(.086) (.079) (.080) (.081) (.072) (.093)
Catholicism .306** Economic Inequality .444**** Catholicism .193 Catholicism .295*** Catholicism .210** Catholicism .156
(.135) (.104) (.139) (.107) (.092) (.124)
Cath x Health -.191** Infant Mortality .494*** Cath x Health -.174* Cath x Health -.261*** Cath x Health -.102 Cath x Charity .142
(.091) (.148) (.103) (.087) (.083) (.135)
Orthodox .239** Economic Freedom -.032 Islam -.126 Buddhism -.023 Atheism -.509*** Orthodox .137
(.115) (.119) (.125) (.148) (.157) (.168)
Orthodox x Health -.089 Individual Responsibility .007 Islam x Health .134 Buddhism x Health -.021 Atheism x Health -.130 Orthodox x Charity -.141
(.117) (.089) (.099) (.114) (.123) (.151)
Adjusted R² .251 Adjusted R² .508 Adjusted R² .190 Adjusted R² .169 Adjusted R² .376 Adjusted R² -.004
N 76 N 73 N 82 N 82 N 76 N 76
                                                                   Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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Appendix M Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Thailand: Conditional Effects w/ Social 
Welfare 
 
 
  Model 7   Model 8   Model 9   Model 10 
        Judaism -.020 Buddhism -.176 Religious Pluralism .155 Atheism -.588**** 
 
(.122) 
 
(.133) 
 
(.113) 
 
(.110) 
Charity .159 Charity .156 Charity .123 Charity -.031 
 
(.113) 
 
(.109) 
 
(.103) 
 
(.099) 
Judaism x Charity -.052 Buddhism x Charity .189 Pluralism x Charity .173 Atheism x Charity -.059 
 
(.117) 
 
(.171) 
 
(.120) 
 
(.114) 
Islam -.061 Islam -.092 Islam -.009 Islam -.242** 
 
(.098) 
 
(.097) 
 
(.110) 
 
(.112) 
Islam x Charity .163* Islam x Charity .220*** Islam x Charity .253** Islam x Charity -.059 
 
(.085) 
 
(.081) 
 
(.113) 
 
(.099) 
Hinduism -.059 Hinduism .033 Hinduism -.045 Hinduism .082 
 
(.124) 
 
(.126) 
 
(.112) 
 
(.096) 
Hinduism x Charity -.200* Hinduism x Charity -.337** Hinduism x Charity -.225** Hinduism x Charity -.138 
 
(.121) 
 
(.134) 
 
(.101) 
 
(.116) 
Adjusted R² .005 Adjusted R² .045 Adjusted R² .046 Adjusted R² .295 
N 79 N 79 N 79 N 76 
    
                                   *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
  
                                                                                          Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Thailand:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.026**** — -.026**** Individualism -.026**** — -.026**** Individualism -.027**** — -.027**** Individualism -.022**** — -.022****
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.004) (.004)
Protestantism .073 -.083** -.010 Protestantism .079 -.088** -.010 Protestantism .077 -.090** -.013 Protestantism -.162** -.084** -.246***
(.076) (.041) (.074) (.073) (.037) (.065) (.079) (.040) (.074) (.065) (.036) (.073)
Catholicism .926* -.142 .784 Catholicism 1.19*** -.200 .987** Catholicism .204 -.208 -.003 Religious Pluralism .166**** .015 .180****
(.480) (.272) (.518) (.399) (.206) (.437) (.520) (.260) (.587) (.042) (.027) (.051)
Orthodox .125 .022 .146* Orthodox .174** .028 .203** Orthodox .019 .017 .036 Single w/ kids .479**** .034 .513****
(.080) (.035) (.078) (.087) (.035) (.084) (.100) (.041) (.102) (.122) (.061) (.141)
Judaism .082 -.135*** -.053 Judaism .058 -.142*** -.084 Judaism .060 -.140*** -.081 Judaism .001 -.112*** -.111*
(.068) (.050) (.077) (.081) (.051) (.080) (.077) (.049) (.079) (.058) (.038) (.061)
Islam -.037 .018 -.019 Hinduism .019 .011 .029 Buddhism -.278*** .015 -.263** Buddhism -.230*** .008 -.222**
(.058) (.039) (.072) (.052) (.019) (.051) (.087) (.052) (.108) (.071) (.048) (.096)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                     — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                            Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
68 68 68 68
                                                                      *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.205 .238 .359 .591
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Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Thailand:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.021**** — -.021**** Individualism -.007 — -.007 Individualism -.013** — -.013** Individualism -.014 — -.014
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.008) (.008)
Economic Discrimination .080 .065 .145 Economic Discrimination .132 .017 .150* Protestantism -.071 -.025 -.095 Economic Discrimination .132 .030 .162
(.089) (.048) (.100) (.080) (.017) (.085) (.071) (.019) (.074) (.112) (.031) (.115)
Religious Pluralism .113** -.007 .107* Religious Pluralism .037 .0002 .037 Judaism .028 -.046** -.018 Judaism .108 -.034 .074
(.048) (.026) (.055) (.036) (.006) (.036) (.049) (.023) (.047) (.068) (.026) (.071)
Single w/ kids .479**** .020 .498**** Single w/ kids .533**** -.016 .517**** Single w/ kids .484**** -.037 .446**** Health Benefits .011 -.061 -.050
(.128) (.055) (.143) (.072) (.016) (.068) (.115) (.038) (.113) (.065) (.038) (.049)
Economic Freedom -.023* -.018** -.040*** Infant Mortality .609**** .094 .702**** Atheism -.232** -.037 -.269*** Atheism -.407*** -.020 -.427***
(.013) (.007) (.014) (.122) (.068) (.097) (.093) (.031) (.102) (.143) (.027) (.148)
Buddhism -.158 .064 -.095 Individual Responsibility -.324 -.124 -.448 Economic Inequality .030** .011* .042*** Charity .768 -.875 -.108
(.100) (.048) (.117) (.703) (.144) (.717) (.014) (.006) (.013) (2.30) (.705) (2.15)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                                 — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                       Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
68 68 68 68
                                                                                 *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
.560 .632 .581 .264
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Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Thailand:  Direct, Indirect, & Total 
Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
  Model 9 
 
Direct Indirect Total 
Individualism -.005 — -.005 
 
(.005) 
 
(.005) 
Infant Mortality .413** .052 .464*** 
 
(.166) (.053) (.157) 
Economic Freedom -.008 -.0003 -.009 
 
(.010) (.001) (.010) 
Single w/ kids .465**** -.026 .439**** 
 
(.075) (.028) (.068) 
Atheism -.061 .001 -.061 
 
(.095) (.010) (.095) 
Economic Inequality .030** .004 .034*** 
 
(.013) (.005) (.012) 
Adjusted R² .635 
N 68 
                                                           *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                          — Indicates parameter not estimated 
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Appendix N. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates 
w/o Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .521**** — .521**** Single w/ kids .444**** — .444**** Single w/ kids .290**** — .290**** Single w/ kids .398**** — .398****
(.129) (.129) (.098) (.098) (.064) (.064) (.099) (.099)
Protestantism -.087 .162*** .075 Protestantism -.085 .125*** .040 Economic Inequality .068**** .020*** .088**** Protestantism -.046 .107** .061
(.070) (.054) (.065) (.066) (.046) (.057) (.010) (.006) (.011) (.065) (.049) (.055)
Catholicism -.337 .561** .224 Catholicism .412 .689** 1.10*** Catholicism .086 .398** .483** Catholicism .309 .645** .955***
(.467) (.271) (.476) (.288) (.270) (.350) (.234) (.157) (.244) (.279) (.251) (.317)
Orthodox .036 .063* .099 Orthodox .085* .057** .141** Orthodox .192**** .050** .242**** Orthodox .090* .052* .142**
(.068) (.035) (.077) (.044) (.028) (.057) (.040) (.022) (.044) (.047) (.027) (.055)
Judaism -.047 .001 -.046 Religious Pluralism .106*** .040 .145*** Economic Discrimination .075 -.015 .060 Economic Discrimination .090 .028 .117
(.064) (.042) (.076) (.037) (.028) (.043) (.072) (.040) (.081) (.083) (.052) (.082)
Islam -.060 -.023 -.082 Atheism -.515**** -.054 -.570**** Atheism -.276**** .047 -.229*** Atheism -.488**** -.070 -.558****
(.057) (.027) (.063) (.070) (.044) (.081) (.057) (.037) (.069) (.075) (.043) (.084)
Hinduism -.042 .044* .002 Hinduism -.017 .040** .023 Hinduism -.010 .030* .020 Hinduism .0004 .025 .025
(.048) (.025) (.056) (.033) (.020) (.037) (.027) (.016) (.030) (.031) (.018) (.036)
Buddhism .0002 -.077*** -.077 Buddhism .074** -.055*** .019 Buddhism .023 -.031 -.008 Religious Pluralism .100** .032 .132***
(.059) (.030) (.061) (.037) (.020) (.0410 (.038) (.019) (.044) (.039) (.027) (.042)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                               — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                      Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
85 85 85 85
                                                                                *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.248 .551 .681 .544
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Appendix N Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .233** — .233** Single w/ kids .272**** — .272**** Single w/ kids .392**** — .392**** Single w/ kids .508**** — .508****
(.094) (.094) (.064) (.064) (.085) (.085) (.093) (.093)
Protestantism -.013 .052 .039 Infant Mortality .600**** -.008 .593**** Economic Inequality Ratio .956**** .554**** 1.51**** Economic Freedom -.020* .0002 -.020
(.051) (.032) (.043) (.108) (.071) (.139) (.232) (.154) (.191) (.012) (.008) (.014)
Catholicism .182 .289** .472* Catholicism .845*** .470*** 1.31**** Catholicism .238 .253 .491 Individual Responsibility .803 1.05 1.86*
(.240) (.145) (.259) (.276) (.179) (.305) (.346) (.211) (.364) (.839) (.701) (1.04)
Orthodox .197**** .058*** .254**** Orthodox .222**** .025 .247**** Orthodox .197**** .019 .216**** Orthodox .052 .041 .093
(.045) (.022) (.044) (.037) (.017) (.043) (.041) (.023) (.049) (.055) (.037) (.061)
Economic Inequality .071**** .014** .085**** Economic Inequality .045**** .012** .057**** Health Benefits -.151**** .074*** -.077* Income Differences 1.35* -.119 1.23
(.011) (.006) (.010) (.010) (.005) (.010) (.037) (.026) (.040) (.755) (.562) (.944)
Atheism -.300**** .018 -.282**** Atheism -.063 -.008 -.071 Educ. Benefits -.061 .0001 -.061 Private Ownership -2.17** .261 -1.91
(.068) (.023) (.073) (.080) (.044) (.096) (.046) (.029) (.051) (1.02) (.644) (1.28)
Charity 1.38 1.58** 2.97* Economic Discrimination .130** -.012 .118 Economic Discrimination .088 -.026 .062 Economic Discrimination .149 .061 .210*
(1.55) (.720) (1.64) (.063) (.035) (.072) (.068) (.052) (.079) (.107) (.063) (.115)
Religious Pluralism .043 .003 .046 Religious Pluralism .051 .040** .091*** Religious Pluralism -.008 .045** .037 Charitable Giving -1.12 1.16 .031
(.036) (.014) (.038) (.032) (.018) (.034) (.035) (.021) (.036) (1.41) (.808) (1.65)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
.687 .795 .654 .414
85 85 85 85
                                                                                 *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                                 — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                       Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix N Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Secularization .703**** — 1.00f Secularization .161 — 1.00f Secularization .131 — 1.00f Secularization .407*** — 1.00f
(.095) (.156) (.161) (.121)
Protestantism .078 -.004 .074 Religious Pluralism .036 -.002 .034 Religious Pluralism .030 -.003 .028 Economic Freedom -.002 -.010** -.012
(.049) (.041) (.064) (.032) (.004) (.031) (.030) (.005) (.030) (.012) (.005) (.012)
Catholicism .282 .047 .329 Atheism -.224** -.090 -.314**** Atheism -.001 -.070 -.070 Competition -1.91 -.370 -2.28*
(.356) (.386) (.479) (.103) (.088) (.071) (.113) (.089) (.083) (1.27) (.578) (1.38)
Orthodox .211*** -.113** .098 Orthodox .183**** -.008 .175**** Orthodox .182**** -.009 .173**** Orthodox .073 -.042 .031
(.062) (.056) (.071) (.043) (.010) (.042) (.045) (.011) (.041) (.054) (.026) (.052)
Judaism -.077 .031 -.046 Single w/ kids .245**** .007 .252**** Economic Inequality Ratio .988**** .065 1.05**** Single w/ kids .404**** .067* .471****
(.053) (.053) (.074) (.064) (.012) (.066) (.199) (.080) (.177) (.079) (.036) (.086)
Islam -.152*** .092 -.060 Islam -.072* .014 -.058* Islam -.135*** .010 -.125**** Islam -.147*** .059* -.088**
(.052) (.056) (.065) (.039) (.015) (.035) (.040) (.012) (.036) (.043) (.032) (.044)
Hinduism .017 -.020 -.003 Economic Inequality .062**** .005 .067**** Infant Mortality .593**** .022 .615**** Charitable Giving -2.75*** .277 -2.48**
(.037) (.039) (.054) (.013) (.005) (.010) (.112) (.029) (.116) (.955) (.420) (1.06)
Buddhism .029 -.089 -.060 Buddhism .011 -.008 .003 Economic Discrimination .105 -.014 .090 Life Meaning -3.55*** -2.78*** -6.33****
(.044) (.055) (.063) (.038) (.010) (.037) (.069) (.018) (.063) (1.20) (.920) (1.10)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
χ² χ² χ² χ²
χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df
RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA
CFI CFI CFI CFI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.457 .691 .750 .597
85 85 85 85
84.51 (p < .001) 60.13 (p < .001) 49.92 (p < .01) 62.05 (p < .001)
3.25 2.31 1.92 2.39
.163 .124 .104 .128
                                                                   Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
.883 .945 .962 .934
                                                                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                    — Indicates parameter not estimated
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Appendix N Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total 
Effects w/ Secularization 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total
Secularization .241* — 1.00f
(.142)
Charity -1.77 -.779 -2.55
(1.53) (.641) (1.58)
Religious Member .049 .110 .159
(.133) (.076) (.112)
New Govt. .642*** .047 .688****
(.189) (.053) (.186)
Single w/ kids .315**** -.026 .290***
(.085) (.023) (.085)
Islam -.082 .062 -.020
(.055) (.040) (.035)
Latin Nation .675* .431 1.11****
(.406) (.273) (.291)
Life Meaning -4.56**** -1.33* -5.89****
(1.15) (.771) (.987)
Adjusted R²
N
χ²
χ²/df
RMSEA
CFI
                                                                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                    — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                                   Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
Model 5
.566
85
90.82 (p < .001)
3.49
.171
.892
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Appendix N Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Norway: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .088 Judaism .068 Buddhism -.117 Protestantism .041 Judaism .024
(.075) (.108) (.088) (.079) (.103)
Economic Inequality .698**** Economic Inequality .572**** Economic Inequality .459**** Economic Inequality Ratio .683**** Economic Inequality Ratio .554****
(.079) (.094) (.091) (.084) (.094)
Prot x Econ Ineq. .058 Judaism x Econ Ineq. -.003 Buddhism x Econ Ineq. .051 Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio .098 Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.146
(.084) (.124) (.119) (.088) (.102)
Catholicism .086 Islam -.043 Religious Pluralism .164** Catholicism .028 Islam .017
(.077) (.086) (.081) (.080) (.089)
Cath x Econ Ineq. .119 Islam x Econ Ineq. -.105 Pluralism x Econ Ineq. .030 Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio .050 Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio -.115
(.077) (.113) (.077) (.074) (.109)
Orthodox .423**** Hinduism -.171* Atheism -.306*** Orthodox .352**** Hinduism -.155
(.097) (.098) (.106) (.090) (.100)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .184 Hinduism x Econ Ineq. -.008 Atheism x Econ Ineq. -.095 Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio .033 Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio .057
(.124) (.105) (.097) (.113) (.094)
Adjusted R² .460 Adjusted R² .329 Adjusted R² .447 Adjusted R² .446 Adjusted R² .357
N 77 N 82 N 77 N 76 N 81
                                                   *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                         Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix N Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Norway: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Buddhism -.134 Protestantism .104 Judaism .033 Hinduism -.003 Buddhism -.006
(.089) (.078) (.067) (.067) (.083)
Economic Inequality Ratio .473**** Infant Mortality .755**** Infant Mortality .795**** Infant Mortality .772**** Infant Mortality .786****
(.075) (.073) (.073) (.075) (.073)
Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio .074 Prot x Mortality -.004 Judaism x Mortality .034 Hinduism x Mortality .083 Buddhism x Mortality .048
(.086) (.086) (.060) (.063) (.079)
Religious Pluralism .155** Catholicism .401**** Catholicism .173* Catholicism .177* Catholicism .173*
(.076) (.106) (.104) (.102) (.101)
Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio .065 Cath x Mortality .352**** Cath x Mortality .224** Cath x Mortality .233*** Cath x Mortality .235***
(.072) (.091) (.088) (.086) (.088)
Atheism -.312*** Orthodox .250*** Islam -.298*** Islam -.293*** Islam -.294***
(.096) (.092) (.093) (.092) (.093)
Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.083 Orthodox x Mortality .119 Islam x Mortality -.156** Islam x Mortality -.147** Islam x Mortality -.133*
(.090) (.091) (.078) (.075) (.069)
Adjusted R² .487 Adjusted R² .544 Adjusted R² .553 Adjusted R² .559 Adjusted R² .553
N 76 N 77 N 83 N 83 N 83
                                       *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                      Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix N Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Norway: Conditional Effects w/ 
Economic Dominance 
 
 
  Model 11   Model 12   Model 13 
      Religious Pluralism .031 Atheism -.152 Single w/ kids .378**** 
 
(.085) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.100) 
Infant Mortality .792**** Infant Mortality .668**** Infant Mortality .498**** 
 
(.069) 
 
(.105) 
 
(.129) 
Pluralism x Mortality -.003 Atheism x Mortality .107 Economic Inequality .203* 
 
(.076) 
 
(.071) 
 
(.114) 
Catholicism .184* Catholicism .153 Catholicism .099 
 
(.101) 
 
(.102) 
 
(.089) 
Cath x Mortality .212** Cath x Mortality .209** Cath x Mortality .127 
 
(.089) 
 
(.091) 
 
(.085) 
Islam -.290*** Islam -.246** Health Benefits -.020 
 
(.090) 
 
(.097) 
 
(.125) 
Islam x Mortality -.146 Islam x Mortality -.114 Charity -.108 
 
(.091) 
 
(.086) 
 
(.077) 
Adjusted R² .552 Adjusted R² .570 Adjusted R² .585 
N 83 N 77 N 73 
  
                                                         *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                                                           Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix N Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Social 
Welfare 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Protestantism .157 Judaism .049 Hinduism -.135 Religious Pluralism .210** Protestantism .124 Judaism -.018
(.098) (.093) (.124) (.093) (.124) (.122)
Health Benefits -.463**** Health Benefits -.438**** Health Benefits -.400**** Health Benefits -.124 Charity .129 Charity .205*
(.090) (.084) (.078) (.155) (.135) (.108)
Prot x Health -.129 Judaism x Health -.075 Hinduism x Health -.056 Pluralism x Health -.118 Prot x Charity -.123 Judaism x Charity -.053
(.087) (.080) (.080) (.074) (.099) (.114)
Catholicism .282** Catholicism .176 Catholicism .282*** Catholicism .181* Catholicism .119 Islam -.071
(.136) (.134) (.105) (.093) (.124) (.098)
Cath x Health -.197** Cath x Health -.191* Cath x Health -.286*** Cath x Health -.129 Cath x Charity .106 Islam x Charity .151*
(.095) (.103) (.088) (.084) (.138) (.085)
Orthodox .212* Islam -.135 Buddhism .019 Atheism -.516*** Orthodox .117 Hinduism -.088
(.116) (.123) (.137) (.159) (.166) (.122)
Orthodox x Health -.078 Islam x Health .124 Buddhism x Health -.005 Atheism x Health -.124 Orthodox x Charity -.135 Hinduism x Charity -.238**
(.118) (.102) (.120) (.123) (.152) (.118)
Adjusted R² .220 Adjusted R² .181 Adjusted R² .164 Adjusted R² .365 Adjusted R² -.018 Adjusted R² .034
N 76 N 82 N 82 N 76 N 76 N 79
                                                                   Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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Appendix N Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Social 
Welfare 
 
 
  Model 7   Model 8   Model 9   Model 10 
        Buddhism -.113 Buddhism -.025 Religious Pluralism .098 Atheism -.552**** 
 
(.114) 
 
(.091) 
 
(.109) 
 
(.104) 
Charity .210** Charity .069 Charity .167* Charity .009 
 
(.102) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.096) 
 
(.099) 
Buddhism x Charity .259* Buddhism x Charity -.006 Pluralism x Charity .111 Atheism x Charity -.033 
 
(.157) 
 
(.159) 
 
(.120) 
 
(.106) 
Islam -.082 Economic Inequality .420**** Islam -.036 Islam -.227** 
 
(.096) 
 
(.104) 
 
(.111) 
 
(.112) 
Islam x Charity .234*** Infant Mortality .352*** Islam x Charity .213* Islam x Charity -.044 
 
(.079) 
 
(.102) 
 
(.114) 
 
(.099) 
Hinduism -.020 Hinduism -.086 Hinduism -.077 Hinduism .065 
 
(.117) 
 
(.095) 
 
(.112) 
 
(.096) 
Hinduism x Charity -.407*** Hinduism x Charity -.039 Hinduism x Charity -.256*** Hinduism x Charity -.181 
 
(.121) 
 
(.130) 
 
(.097) 
 
(.112) 
Adjusted R² .076 Adjusted R² .439 Adjusted R² .048 Adjusted R² .296 
N 79 N 77 N 79 N 76 
    
                                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
  
                                                                                             Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix N Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.026**** — -.026**** Individualism -.025**** — -.025**** Individualism -.026**** — -.026**** Individualism -.023**** — -.023****
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.004) (.004)
Protestantism .070 -.080** -.010 Protestantism .078 -.084** -.006 Protestantism .051 -.083** -.032 Protestantism -.158** -.079** -.237***
(.074) (.039) (.073) (.071) (.036) (.065) (.082) (.037) (.081) (.063) (.039) (.073)
Catholicism .824* -.195 .630 Catholicism 1.12*** -.228 .895** Catholicism .058 -.279 -.221 Religious Pluralism .080 .003 .083
(.490) (.261) (.514) (.410) (.208) (.443) (.562) (.266) (.620) (.065) (.025) (.071)
Orthodox .116 .018 .135* Orthodox .162* .022 .184** Orthodox .004 .006 .010 Single w/ kids .543**** .042 .585****
(.080) (.033) (.078) (.088) (.034) (.085) (.105) (.038) (.110) (.127) (.064) (.143)
Judaism .081 -.134*** -.053 Judaism .067 -.139*** -.072 Judaism .055 -.135*** -.081 Judaism .017 -.116*** -.099*
(.068) (.050) (.077) (.080) (.050) (.079) (.073) (.047) (.077) (.054) (.040) (.059)
Islam -.046 .012 -.033 Hinduism .009 .006 .016 Buddhism -.257*** -.001 -.259** Buddhism -.092 .025 -.067
(.059) (.037) (.071) (.053) (.019) (.052) (.095) (.047) (.111) (.105) (.043) (.123)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                     — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                            Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
68 68 68 68
                                                                      *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.189 .216 .323 .493
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Appendix N Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.012** — -.012** Individualism -.014 — -.014 Individualism -.006 — -.006
(.005) (.005) (.008) (.008) (.005) (.005)
Protestantism -.066 -.023 -.088 Economic Discrimination .139 .028 .167 Infant Mortality .372** .054 .426***
(.072) (.019) (.075) (.111) (.030) (.114) (.166) (.054) (.156)
Atheism -.255*** -.034 -.289*** Atheism -.394*** -.022 -.416*** Atheism -.118 .001 -.117
(.090) (.029) (.097) (.137) (.027) (.142) (.096) (.010) (.097)
Single w/ kids .469**** -.033 .436**** Health Benefits .018 -.060 -.042 Single w/ kids .426**** -.027 .399****
(.108) (.034) (.107) (.066) (.038) (.049) (.078) (.028) (.073)
Judaism .029 -.045** -.017 Judaism .097 -.033 .064 Economic Freedom -.005 -.0004 -.005
(.047) (.023) (.046) (.067) (.025) (.071) (.010) (.001) (.010)
Economic Inequality .029** .010* .040*** Charity 1.16 -.871 .293 Economic Inequality .030** .005 .034***
(.014) (.006) (.013) (2.30) (.714) (2.16) (.013) (.005) (.012)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
.579 .255 .619
                                                               Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
68 68 68
                                                                        *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                        — Indicates parameter not estimated
228 
 
Appendix O. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates 
w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Colombia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand & Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ 
Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .449**** — .449**** Single w/ kids .378**** — .378**** Single w/ kids .222** — .222** Single w/ kids .248**** — .248****
(.120) (.120) (.096) (.096) (.107) (.107) (.067) (.067)
Protestantism -.076 .119** .043 Protestantism -.081 .101** .019 Protestantism -.020 .041 .021 Economic Inequality Ratio .526*** .247*** .773****
(.068) (.047) (.064) (.064) (.040) (.055) (.048) (.028) (.043) (.177) (.083) (.180)
Catholicism -.327 .395* .068 Catholicism .371 .555** .926*** Economic Inequality .079**** .015* .094**** Catholicism .877*** .312* 1.19****
(.392) (.230) (.417) (.259) (.242) (.328) (.012) (.008) (.012) (.267) (.165) (.304)
Judaism .012 .034 .046 Orthodox .082* .041* .123** Orthodox .233**** .045** .278**** Orthodox .176**** .029** .205****
(.066) (.037) (.078) (.044) (.023) (.052) (.043) (.023) (.044) (.038) (.015) (.041)
Islam -.044 -.025 -.068 Religious Pluralism .103*** .018 .122*** Economic Discrimination .009 .025 .033 Religious Pluralism .066** .023 .089***
(.049) (.024) (.055) (.038) (.024) (.042) (.088) (.031) (.092) (.031) (.015) (.034)
Hinduism -.045 .016 -.029 Atheism -.461**** -.029 -.490**** Educ. Benefits -.087* .028 -.059 Atheism -.050 -.027 -.077
(.044) (.021) (.048) (.066) (.037) (.074) (.051) (.022) (.049) (.071) (.037) (.089)
Buddhism -.034 -.066** -.100* Buddhism .043 -.030 .012 Charity 3.03 1.49* 4.52** Infant Mortality .664**** -.049 .615****
(.056) (.029) (.060) (.042) (.020) (.048) (1.89) (.822) (1.91) (.101) (.065) (.142)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.201 .489 .546 .733
                                                                         Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
79 79 79 79
                                                                                  *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                                  — Indicates parameter not estimated
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Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Colombia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand & Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects 
w/ Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Single w/ kids .436**** — .436**** Single w/ kids .216** — .216** Single w/ kids .351**** — .351****
(.098) (.098) (.103) (.103) (.085) (.085)
Economic Discrimination .132 .001 .134 Religious Member .249** .084* .332** Religious Member -.017 .192*** .175
(.087) (.059) (.108) (.125) (.049) (.128) (.120) (.063) (.107)
Catholicism .089 .692** .780** Catholicism -.677** .141 -.536* Catholicism .146 .011 .156
(.389) (.291) (.396) (.338) (.123) (.314) (.250) (.157) (.266)
Orthodox .058 .026 .084 New Govt. .694*** .092 .786**** New Govt. .403** .183** .586***
(.052) (.030) (.056) (.220) (.066) (.223) (.191) (.090) (.207)
Religious Pluralism .057 .040 .097** Religious Pluralism .012 .014 .026 Economic Inequality .007 .00004 .007
(.043) (.028) (.047) (.035) (.013) (.033) (.016) (.009) (.019)
Economic Freedom -.042**** .006 -.036*** Latin Nation 1.34**** .196* 1.54**** Latin Nation .567* .428** .995***
(.010) (.006) (.011) (.302) (.102) (.283) (.331) (.167) (.379)
Competition -1.42 -.041 -1.46 Charity -1.82 .407 -1.41 Infant Mortality .585**** -.104 .481****
(1.51) (.903) (1.89) (2.00) (.519) (2.00) (.095) (.067) (.121)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N
                                                                         Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
79 79 79
                                                                                   *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                                  — Indicates parameter not estimated
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
.373 .349 .599
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Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects 
w/ Secularization 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Secularization .536**** — 1.00f Secularization .196 — 1.00f Secularization .071 — 1.00f Secularization .381*** — 1.00f
(.101) (.201) (.225) (.116)
Protestantism .035 .004 .039 Orthodox .195**** -.008 .187**** Orthodox .177**** -.002 .175**** Orthodox .079 -.028 .051
(.057) (.026) (.064) (.046) (.011) (.043) (.043) (.007) (.041) (.050) (.021) (.049)
Catholicism -.060 .227 .167 Religious Pluralism .046 -.005 .041 Religious Pluralism .028 -.002 .025 Single w/ kids .398**** .043 .441****
(.343) (.234) (.416) (.037) (.006) (.036) (.032) (.008) (.033) (.081) (.032) (.083)
Judaism .052 .0003 .052 Atheism -.158 -.098 -.256*** Atheism -.053 -.033 -.086 Competition -1.03 -.128 -1.16
(.065) (.037) (.079) (.131) (.102) (.083) (.126) (.108) (.088) (1.15) (.539) (1.18)
Islam -.138*** .091** -.047 Islam -.086** .012 -.073** Islam -.127*** .005 -.122*** Islam -.108*** .059** -.049
(.046) (.039) (.056) (.038) (.014) (.036) (.044) (.014) (.038) (.041) (.029) (.041)
Hinduism -.048 .014 -.034 Economic Inequality .069**** .006 .076**** Economic Inequality .049*** .002 .051**** Charitable Giving -2.96**** -.162 -3.12****
(.036) (.026) (.048) (.015) (.007) (.012) (.016) (.006) (.013) (.707) (.318) (.778)
Buddhism -.019 -.067* -.086 Buddhism -.029 -.012 -.041 Infant Mortality .532**** .011 .543**** Life Meaning -3.37*** -2.42*** -5.79****
(.046) (.036) (.061) (.044) (.015) (.046) (.124) (.034) (.128) (1.08) (.821) (.955)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
χ² χ² χ² χ²
χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df χ²/df
RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA RMSEA
CFI CFI CFI CFI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
50.58 (p < .001) 52.36 (p < .001) 53.11 (p < .001)
79 79 79 79
71.99 (p < .001)
.123 .127 .129
2.28 2.31
                                                                   Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.
.267
3.13
.164
2.20
.579 .670 .567
.897 .952 .950 .942
                                                                    *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                                    — Indicates parameter not estimated
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Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, 
Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ 
Secularization 
 
 
  Model 5 
 
Direct Indirect Total 
Secularization .221 — 1.00f 
 
(.134) 
  Charity -.742 .308 -.434 
 
(1.37) (.340) (1.37) 
Single w/ kids .282**** -.009 .273*** 
 
(.079) (.017) (.081) 
New Govt. .624*** .038 .662**** 
 
(.193) (.045) (.188) 
Islam -.062 .049 -.013 
 
(.048) (.033) (.033) 
Latin Nation .688* .421 1.11**** 
 
(.388) (.276) (.280) 
Life Meaning -4.33**** -1.37 -5.70**** 
 
(1.09) (.836) (.939) 
Adjusted R² .507 
N 79 
χ² 81.79 (p < .001) 
χ²/df 3.56 
RMSEA .180 
CFI .896 
                                                          *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
                                                                                         — Indicates parameter not estimated 
                                                      Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix O Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, 
Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Protestantism .054 Infant Mortality .436**** Infant Mortality .453**** Judaism .119 Buddhism -.150
(.078) (.081) (.095) (.119) (.104)
Economic Inequality .651**** Economic Inequality .359**** Economic Inequality .155 Economic Inequality .480**** Economic Inequality .384****
(.099) (.101) (.128) (.097) (.100)
Prot x Econ Ineq. -.005 New Govt. .045 New Govt. .155** Judaism x Econ Ineq. .036 Buddhism x Econ Ineq. -.034
(.097) (.072) (.079) (.116) (.136)
Catholicism .152* Catholicism .258**** Catholicism .087 Islam -.008 Religious Pluralism .128
(.081) (.061) (.078) (.085) (.085)
Cath x Econ Ineq. .215** Cath x Econ Ineq. .198*** Cath x Econ Ineq. .126 Islam x Econ Ineq. -.075 Pluralism x Econ Ineq. -.056
(.092) (.072) (.087) (.110) (.098)
Orthodox .510**** Orthodox .403**** Single w/ kids .350**** Hinduism -.192* Atheism -.266**
(.103) (.097) (.073) (.108) (.108)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .325** Orthodox x Econ Ineq. .195 Latin Nation -.025 Hinduism x Econ Ineq. -.076 Atheism x Econ Ineq. .036
(.139) (.130) (.083) (.119) (.102)
Adjusted R² .408 Adjusted R² .586 Adjusted R² .576 Adjusted R² .205 Adjusted R² .341
N 72 N 75 N 71 N 76 N 72
                                  *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                        Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Protestantism .008 Judaism .080 Buddhism -.173 Protestantism .077 Judaism .041
(.086) (.121) (.106) (.067) (.069)
Economic Inequality Ratio .598**** Economic Inequality Ratio .471**** Economic Inequality Ratio .417**** Infant Mortality .735**** Infant Mortality .730****
(.102) (.094) (.083) (.069) (.074)
Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio -.018 Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.073 Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio .027 Prot x Mortality -.069 Judaism x Mortality .050
(.110) (.109) (.100) (.081) (.063)
Catholicism .084 Islam .036 Religious Pluralism .142* Catholicism .427**** Catholicism .182*
(.086) (.086) (.082) (.100) (.096)
Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio .136 Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio -.092 Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.007 Cath x Mortality .341**** Cath x Mortality .231***
(.101) (.107) (.086) (.082) (.083)
Orthodox .411**** Hinduism -.194* Atheism -.270*** Orthodox .312**** Islam -.241***
(.097) (.112) (.096) (.085) (.087)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio .136 Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio -.047 Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio .020 Orthodox x Mortality .124 Islam x Mortality -.096
(.144) (.108) (.082) (.084) (.077)
Adjusted R² .349 Adjusted R² .224 Adjusted R² .371 Adjusted R² .588 Adjusted R² .524
N 71 N 75 N 71 N 72 N 77
                         *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                       Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Hinduism .002 Buddhism -.041 Religious Pluralism .050 Atheism -.102 Single w/ kids .352****
(.066) (.078) (.088) (.106) (.089)
Infant Mortality .716**** Infant Mortality .716**** Infant Mortality .732**** Infant Mortality .622**** Infant Mortality .452****
(.078) (.074) (.069) (.109) (.102)
Hinduism x Mortality .064 Buddhism x Mortality .026 Pluralism x Mortality -.021 Atheism x Mortality .120 Economic Inequality Ratio .200*
(.064) (.077) (.073) (.077) (.109)
Catholicism .184* Catholicism .176* Catholicism .206** Catholicism .175* Catholicism .096
(.095) (.093) (.098) (.100) (.084)
Cath x Mortality .235*** Cath x Mortality .236*** Cath x Mortality .204** Cath x Mortality .232** Cath x Mortality .119
(.082) (.081) (.083) (.090) (.079)
Islam -.239*** Islam -.249*** Islam -.230** Islam -.168* Charitable Giving -.118
(.087) (.088) (.089) (.093) (.084)
Islam x Mortality -.092 Islam x Mortality -.081 Islam x Mortality -.086 Islam x Mortality -.043 New Govt. .124
(.076) (.066) (.091) (.086) (.087)
Adjusted R² .525 Adjusted R² .522 Adjusted R² .521 Adjusted R² .546 Adjusted R² .606
N 77 N 77 N 77 N 72 N 71
                                   *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                                                    Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Protestantism .099 Judaism .116 Hinduism -.124 Religious Pluralism .137 Religious Member .162* Protestantism .042
(.087) (.099) (.109) (.086) (.098) (.111)
Health Benefits -.464**** Health Benefits -.418**** Health Benefits -.384**** Health Benefits -.226* Health Benefits -.126 Charity .193
(.091) (.080) (.074) (.132) (.089) (.132)
Prot x Health -.105 Judaism x Health -.032 Hinduism x Health -.072 Pluralism x Health -.097 Life Meaning -.262**** Prot x Charity -.115
(.080) (.075) (.081) (.075) (.073) (.088)
Catholicism .285** Catholicism .200 Catholicism .240** Catholicism .161* Catholicism .004 Catholicism .117
(.119) (.125) (.096) (.091) (.092) (.112)
Cath x Health -.223** Cath x Health -.234** Cath x Health -.293*** Cath x Health -.177** Cath x Health -.110 Cath x Charity .153
(.090) (.095) (.085) (.086) (.084) (.131)
Orthodox .263** Islam -.024 Buddhism -.027 Atheism -.356** New Govt. .297*** Orthodox .188
(.104) (.114) (.134) (.139) (.088) (.156)
Orthodox x Health -.086 Islam x Health .118 Buddhism x Health .053 Atheism x Health -.039 Latin Nation .342**** Orthodox x Charity -.109
(.114) (.097) (.121) (.106) (.089) (.143)
Adjusted R² .308 Adjusted R² .231 Adjusted R² .229 Adjusted R² .349 Adjusted R² .386 Adjusted R² .009
N 71 N 76 N 76 N 71 N 72 N 71
                                                                   Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
                   *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
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  Model 7   Model 8   Model 9   Model 10 
        Judaism .044 Buddhism -.143 Religious Pluralism .079 Atheism -.459**** 
 
(.119) 
 
(.115) 
 
(.103) 
 
(.097) 
Charity .190* Charity .193* Charity .167* Charity .019 
 
(.108) 
 
(.101) 
 
(.098) 
 
(.096) 
Judaism x Charity -.042 Buddhism x Charity .158 Pluralism x Charity .078 Atheism x Charity -.064 
 
(.113) 
 
(.153) 
 
(.117) 
 
(.101) 
Islam .0005 Islam -.029 Islam .024 Islam -.150 
 
(.091) 
 
(.091) 
 
(.107) 
 
(.105) 
Islam x Charity .153* Islam x Charity .202** Islam x Charity .198* Islam x Charity -.034 
 
(.081) 
 
(.079) 
 
(.113) 
 
(.096) 
Hinduism -.121 Hinduism -.030 Hinduism -.096 Hinduism .029 
 
(.110) 
 
(.111) 
 
(.103) 
 
(.087) 
Hinduism x Charity -.207* Hinduism x Charity -.320*** Hinduism x Charity -.221** Hinduism x Charity -.150 
 
(.112) 
 
(.119) 
 
(.095) 
 
(.110) 
Adjusted R² .035 Adjusted R² .070 Adjusted R² .043 Adjusted R² .253 
N 74 N 74 N 74 N 71 
    
                                     *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed) 
  
                                                                                           Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.024**** — -.024**** Individualism -.024**** — -.024**** Individualism -.024**** — -.024**** Individualism -.021**** — -.021****
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Protestantism .006 -.066* -.061 Protestantism .012 -.076** -.063 Protestantism .020 -.074** -.054 Protestantism -.157** -.069** -.226***
(.064) (.036) (.064) (.060) (.033) (.054) (.067) (.035) (.065) (.067) (.033) (.075)
Catholicism .936** -.199 .737 Catholicism 1.00*** -.255 .747* Catholicism .172 -.274 -.102 Religious Pluralism .146**** .017 .163***
(.455) (.243) (.470) (.383) (.204) (.399) (.437) (.252) (.495) (.042) (.027) (.050)
Orthodox .145* .014 .160** Orthodox .154* .021 .175** Orthodox .050 .009 .059 Single w/ kids .345*** .020 .365***
(.074) (.031) (.072) (.082) (.032) (.078) (.087) (.037) (.087) (.121) (.061) (.135)
Judaism .119 -.125** -.006 Judaism .134 -.143*** -.009 Judaism .096 -.132*** -.036 Judaism .051 -.115*** -.064
(.081) (.051) (.092) (.092) (.051) (.101) (.078) (.048) (.084) (.059) (.040) (.064)
Islam -.009 .018 .009 Hinduism -.019 .017 -.002 Buddhism -.240*** .008 -.232** Buddhism -.240*** .006 -.234***
(.058) (.038) (.074) (.048) (.018) (.052) (.075) (.049) (.097) (.071) (.044) (.090)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                     — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                            Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
62 62 62 62
                                                                      *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
.236 .265 .399 .560
238 
 
Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide 
Rates w/o  El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects 
w/ alternate Individualism 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.004 — -.004 Individualism -.006 — -.006 Individualism -.015*** — -.015*** Individualism -.008 — -.008
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.006)
Economic Inequality .010 .004 .014 Economic Inequality .019 .004 .023* Economic Inequality .011 .015** .025* Economic Inequality .041*** .004 .045****
(.012) (.005) (.010) (.015) (.005) (.014) (.015) (.007) (.013) (.012) (.003) (.011)
Religious Pluralism .017 -.0004 .017 Buddhism -.101 .007 -.093 Protestantism -.080 -.022 -.102 Religious Pluralism .148**** -.005 .143****
(.035) (.004) (.035) (.091) (.012) (.097) (.069) (.023) (.073) (.036) (.008) (.036)
Single w/ kids .441**** -.018 .424**** Single w/ kids .338*** -.015 .323** Single w/ kids .455**** -.040 .415**** Infant Mortality .314** .096 .410****
(.073) (.026) (.065) (.127) (.022) (.129) (.110) (.041) (.108) (.147) (.072) (.111)
Infant Mortality .526**** .045 .571**** Infant Mortality .425*** .063 .488**** Judaism .065 -.059** .005 Judaism .084 -.032 .051
(.138) (.058) (.109) (.155) (.064) (.137) (.052) (.028) (.054) (.061) (.027) (.053)
Life Meaning -1.20 -.103 -1.30 Life Meaning -1.21 -.133 -1.34 Atheism -.225** -.042 -.267*** Buddhism -.323**** .015 -.308****
(1.04) (.198) (1.02) (1.02) (.222) (1.02) (.092) (.036) (.102) (.061) (.018) (.064)
Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R² Adjusted R²
N N N N
                                                                                                       — Indicates parameter not estimated
                                                              Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
62 62 62 62
                                                                        *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
.568 .589 .501 .639
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Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the 
Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o  El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, 
Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway:  Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate 
Individualism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total
Individualism -.005 — -.005
(.005) (.005)
Economic Inequality .014 .004 .019
(.014) (.005) (.012)
Single w/ kids .455**** -.017 .438****
(.075) (.024) (.071)
Infant Mortality .438*** .052 .490***
(.167) (.063) (.152)
Economic Freedom -.009 -.0005 -.010
(.010) (.001) (.010)
Atheism -.046 .006 -.041
(.094) (.011) (.094)
Adjusted R²
N
                                                                        *p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)
                                                               Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.
Model 9
.565
62
                                        — Indicates parameter not estimated
